2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 353-365 ◽  
Author(s):  
Petra Bárd ◽  
Wouter van Ballegooij

This article discusses the relationship between judicial independence and intra-European Union (EU) cooperation in criminal matters based on the principle of mutual recognition. It focuses on the recent judgment by the Court of Justice of the EU in Case C-216/18 PPU Minister for Justice and Equality v. LM. In our view, a lack of judicial independence needs to be addressed primarily as a rule of law problem. This implies that executing judicial authorities should freeze judicial cooperation in the event should doubts arise as to respect for the rule of law in the issuing Member State. Such a measure should stay in place until the matter is resolved in accordance with the procedure provided for in Article 7 TEU or a permanent mechanism for monitoring and addressing Member State compliance with democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights. The Court, however, constructed the case as a possible violation of the right to a fair trial, the essence of which includes the requirement that tribunals are independent and impartial. This latter aspect could be seen as a positive step forward in the sense that the judicial test developed in the Aranyosi case now includes rule of law considerations with regard to judicial independence. However, the practical hurdles imposed by the Court on the defence in terms of proving such violations and on judicial authorities to accept them in individual cases might amount to two steps back in upholding the rule of law within the EU.


Author(s):  
Maria Fanou

In its recent Opinion 1/17, the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) examined the compatibility of an external judicial body, the Investment Court System (ICS) under the EU–Canada Comprehensive and Economic Trade Agreement (CETA), with EU law. At a time when judicial independence has arisen as one of the main challenges for the rule of law in the EU, this article discusses the Court’s findings in relation to the compatibility of the ICS with the right of access to an independent and impartial tribunal.


Significance After accentuated rule-of-law erosion during 2017-19, the new government encouraged hopes that such violations would become a thing of the past. However, last month, the government sacked the ombudsman, while the Constitutional Court declared void a judgement of the EU Court of Justice (CJEU) defending judicial independence. Impacts Recent developments erode hopes that last month’s positive CVM report will lead to Romania’s Schengen zone accession later this year. Failure to replace the ombudsman will not affect the coalition parties electorally, given the politicisation of rule-of-law issues. Subnational courts will be left confused whether to apply the Constitutional Court or the CJEU ruling to legal disciplinary cases.


Author(s):  
Paul Craig ◽  
Gráinne de Búrca

All books in this flagship series contain carefully selected substantial extracts from key cases, legislation, and academic debate, providing able students with a stand-alone resource. The EU develops policy through regulations, directives, and decisions. Any developed legal system must have a mechanism for testing the legality of such measures. This chapter focuses on access to justice and review of legality by the EU Courts. There are a number of ways in which EU norms can be challenged, but the principal Treaty provision is Article 263 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (ex Article 230 EC). Five conditions must be satisfied before an act can successfully be challenged: (i) the relevant body must be amenable to judicial review; (ii) the act has to be of a kind that is open to challenge; (iii) the institution or person making the challenge must have standing to do so; (iv) there must be illegality of a type mentioned in Article 263(2); and (v) the challenge must be brought within the time limit indicated in Article 263(6).


2020 ◽  
Vol 59 (3) ◽  
pp. 459-486
Author(s):  
Joelle Grogan

Joined Cases C-585/18, C-624/18, and C-625/18 concerning the independence of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Sąd Najwyższy (Polish Supreme Court) is the latest in a series of European Union (EU) Member States requesting the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) to rule on the independence of their judicial systems. While the organization of justice systems within Member States is a competence of Member States (and thus not for the EU to determine or decide), the CJEU has held that Member States are nevertheless required to comply with obligations under EU law to ensure effective judicial protection and, as a necessary corollary, judicial independence. The significance of the current case lies in the formulation by the CJEU of a “European” standard of judicial independence, and its finding that national judges may set aside the jurisdiction of courts found not to be independent against that standard and to disapply any national measure (in accordance with the principle of the primacy of EU law over national law) that gives jurisdiction to a non-independent court.


2017 ◽  
Vol 14 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 373-398
Author(s):  
Jan Darpö

In April 2017, the eu Commission published a “Notice on Access to Justice in Environmental Matters”, laying down the views of Brussels on this hot topic. The Notice takes stock of the dynamic development of the cjeu’s case law on the matter and draws cautious conclusions from this jurisprudence. This article is both an introductory and a short comment on the Notice. The main reasoning and conclusions drawn in the document are described, and then a couple of key issues are highlighted and discussed. All in all, evaluation of the Notice is positive, as it represents a rather big step forward compared with previous standpoints from Brussels. In this way, the Notice consolidates the impression that the eu is furnished with a Janus face concerning access to justice in environmental matters. It is very positive and affirming concerning legal challenges to administrative decision-making in national courts on the one hand, but very strict and of a rejecting nature when dealing with direct action to the cjeu on the other.


2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 78-99

managed to modernize its legal system to a level of proper efficiency. This is largely due to the dichotomy of the previous international strategy of our state between the two vectors of development, the old eastern and the new western one, which actually retarded the movement forward. The contradiction between these views on the prospects of Ukraine’s development of the younger generation and the generation that continued to carry the memory of its historical past, was no less significant. Corruption is deeply rooted in the system of public administration and was purposefully supported by internal and external opponents of Ukraine’s independence and overcoming these relics is a fundamental task in asserting sovereignty. Remnants of the post-Soviet legal doctrine, which preserve the defining categories of judicial law in an ossified form, such as ‘court’, ‘judiciary’, ‘justice’, have become a serious obstacle to the formation of the new state and its legal system. This significantly limits the ability to ensure effective legal regulation of relations connected with the administration of justice in the state. An overview of the theoretical and normative foundations that underlie the Ukrainian judiciary and the justice system points to obvious gaps and inconsistencies. It is indisputable that the modernization of the legal system of Ukraine, in particular, in the sphere of the organization of the judiciary, requires a renewed scientific vision based on the doctrine of judicial law and which should attempt to combine Ukrainian traditions and the Western European viewpoint. Key words: access to justice, rule of law, court, judiciary, judicial law, the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, COVID-19 pandemic, justice under COVID-19.


Author(s):  
Catherine Dupré

AbstractThe 2018 CJEU ruling in LM highlighted the importance of judicial independence for the rule of law and protection of the right to fair trial. In so doing, the judgment raised problematic questions about the relationship between Article 2 values and the EU Charter rights, and their connection with mutual trust. This chapter considers these issues through the lens of human dignity, which is both the first foundational value under Article 2 and the first right in the EU Charter. By discussing how the LM judgment raises the constitutional status of the right to a fair trial, this chapter argues that a focus on human dignity could effectively link Article 2 values with EU Charter rights and facilitate assessment of their respective breach.


2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 52-66

On 15-16 October 1999, a meeting of the European Council, whose influence on the development of civil process in the EU cannot be overestimated, took place in Tampere. It was at this meeting that the need was declared to develop and implement the EU level rules of procedure, which should simplify and accelerate cross-border litigation (within the EU). As a result, the Regulation (EC) No 861/2007 of the European Parliament and the Council of 11 July 2007 establishing a European small claims procedure was adopted. On the basis of this Regulation, the European legislators sought to introduce a small claims procedure directly in the EU. However, their intentions and efforts have also become the guideline for legislators of those states that (so far) are not members of the EU, in particular, Ukraine. In more than a decade, the institute of small claims has found its consolidation in the reformed civil process of Ukraine, an associate partner of the EU. In this context, the question arises: have the goals and results of the institutes' implementation coincided within the law of the EU and Ukraine? Is there a positive experience of such an introduction and does this institute need further reforms? This publication is an attempt to provide answers to these questions.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document