scholarly journals Bosnia and Herzegovina

2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (316) ◽  
Author(s):  
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Bosnia And Herzegovina ◽  
Euro Area ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Money Market ◽  
Reserve Requirements ◽  
European Central ◽  
Excess Reserves

Since 2014, the CBBH has been exposed to a negative spread on the reinvestment of the reserve requirements. Until 2014, the CBBH remunerated reserve requirements on the basis of the returns achieved on their reinvestment in the euro area money market. In 2014, when the European Central Bank (ECB) cut the deposit facility rate below zero, the CBBH decided not to follow the ECB in the remuneration of reserve requirements and to floor such remuneration to zero. Subsequently, in 2016, the CBBH decided to remunerate excess reserves at 50 percent of the ECB deposit facility rate and to continue remunerating reserve requirements at 0 percent. This exposes the CBBH to a negative spread of about 0.25 percent and 0.45 percent between the reinvestment yield and the remuneration of excess reserves and reserve requirements, respectively.

Dramatis Institutiones

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Randall Henning
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
International Monetary Fund ◽  
Euro Area ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
The European Union ◽  
European Central ◽  
Regime Complex ◽  
Basic Facts ◽  
Institutional Conflict

The regime complex for crisis finance in the euro area included the European Council, Council of the European Union, and Eurogroup in addition to the three institutions of the troika. As the member states acted largely, though not exclusively, through the council system, these bodies stood at the center of the institutional mix. This chapter reviews the institutions as a prelude to examining the dilemmas that confronted them over the course of the crises. It presents a brief review of some of the basic facts about their origins, membership, and organization. Each section then delves more deeply into these institutions’ governance and principles to understand their capabilities and strategic challenges. As a consequence of different mandates and design, the European Commission, European Central Bank, and International Monetary Fund diverged with respect to their approach to financing, adjustment, conditionality, and debt sustainability. This divergence set the stage for institutional conflict in the country programs.

scholarly journals Complexity, Uncertainty, and Monetary Policy: Can the ECB Avoid the Unconventional Becoming the ‘New Normal’?

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher A. Hartwell
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Structural Change ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Euro Area ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Unresolved Issue ◽  
Unconventional Monetary Policy ◽  
New Normal ◽  
European Central

Abstract Worries about Italy and the unresolved issue of euro governance – coupled with uncertainty surrounding Brexit – means that the European Central Bank (ECB) may already be facing its next crisis in the euro area. Unfortunately, the ECB is still fighting the last war, deploying the tools of unconventional monetary policy to address lingering problems while unable institutionally to address needed structural change. This paper looks at the ECB as an institution amongst institutions and shows how even more unconventional approaches will not help to bolster the economy of the euro area. Indeed, given the complexity of money, the effects of expectations, and continued uncertainty, expanding the ECB’s unconventional arsenal is likely to have deleterious consequences across Europe.

Recovering from Maastricht

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 129-138
Author(s):  
Agnès Bénassy-Quéré
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Euro Area ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Sovereign Default ◽  
Fiscal Deficits ◽  
Bank Supervision ◽  
European Central ◽  
Idiosyncratic Shocks ◽  
National Governments ◽  
Bail Out

The euro area crisis was less a crisis of the euro than a crisis of the Maastricht doctrine. The latter was based on a triple ban: no monetization of fiscal deficits, no bail-out, no sovereign default. The euro architecture was also based on a strict division of tasks: the European Central Bank would stabilize prices in the euro area as a whole, whereas national governments would stabilize their own economies in case of idiosyncratic shocks. To make things even more dysfunctional, bank supervision remained under the competence of the member states. Although much has been done since the crisis to reform the Maastricht framework, there are still major flaws that weaken the single currency.

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