scholarly journals Towards a Meaningful Prudential Supervision Dialogue in the Euro Area? A Study of the Interaction Between the European Parliament and the European Central Bank in the Single Supervisory Mechanism

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fabian Amtenbrink ◽  
Menelaos Markakis
2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 283-310
Author(s):  
Matthias Goldmann

Banking Union – Single Supervisory Mechanism – Economic interplay between monetary policy and prudential supervision – Strict separation envisaged by the Single Supervisory Mechanism legal framework – Legal framework does not prevent a more holistic approach – Financial stability is a legitimate consideration for monetary policy-making – Price stability is a legitimate concern for prudential supervision – Challenge to European Central Bank legitimacy and independence – Democratising the European Central Bank


2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (347) ◽  
Author(s):  

The mission focused on selected topics in relation to the supervision of less significant institutions (LSIs), which are not directly supervised by the European Central Bank (ECB), and on non-European Union (EU) branches. The supervision of all banks’ anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) policies and procedures was also included, as no tasks related to AML/CFT have been conferred upon the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) of the eurozone. The mission took into account the findings and recommendations formulated by the 2018 euro area (EA) FSAP and coordinated closely with FSAP missions organized in France and Italy.


Author(s):  
C. Randall Henning

The regime complex for crisis finance in the euro area included the European Council, Council of the European Union, and Eurogroup in addition to the three institutions of the troika. As the member states acted largely, though not exclusively, through the council system, these bodies stood at the center of the institutional mix. This chapter reviews the institutions as a prelude to examining the dilemmas that confronted them over the course of the crises. It presents a brief review of some of the basic facts about their origins, membership, and organization. Each section then delves more deeply into these institutions’ governance and principles to understand their capabilities and strategic challenges. As a consequence of different mandates and design, the European Commission, European Central Bank, and International Monetary Fund diverged with respect to their approach to financing, adjustment, conditionality, and debt sustainability. This divergence set the stage for institutional conflict in the country programs.


Author(s):  
Leo Flynn

Without prejudice to the powers of the European Central Bank, the European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall lay down the measures necessary for the use of the euro as the single currency. Such measures shall be adopted after consultation of the European Central Bank.


Author(s):  
Gabriel Moss QC ◽  
Bob Wessels ◽  
Matthias Haentjens

As the European Commission has succinctly explained, ‘institutions will be required to draw up recovery plans setting out arrangements and measures to enable it to take early action to restore its long term viability in the event of a material deterioration of its financial situation. Groups will be required to develop plans at both group level and for the individual institutions within the group. Supervisors will assess and approve recovery plans’. Thus, institutions must draw up ‘recovery plans’ which are to be approved by the relevant supervisory authorities, so as to have a plan in place that might be useful to help turn around a material deterioration of the financial situation that institution may face. The ‘relevant supervisors’ are the European Central Bank (ECB) under the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) for systemically important institutions, and the national supervisory authorities for less systemically important institutions, as well as for institutions outside of the Banking Union.


2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher A. Hartwell

Abstract Worries about Italy and the unresolved issue of euro governance – coupled with uncertainty surrounding Brexit – means that the European Central Bank (ECB) may already be facing its next crisis in the euro area. Unfortunately, the ECB is still fighting the last war, deploying the tools of unconventional monetary policy to address lingering problems while unable institutionally to address needed structural change. This paper looks at the ECB as an institution amongst institutions and shows how even more unconventional approaches will not help to bolster the economy of the euro area. Indeed, given the complexity of money, the effects of expectations, and continued uncertainty, expanding the ECB’s unconventional arsenal is likely to have deleterious consequences across Europe.


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