scholarly journals A Critique of Bernard Häring’s Application of the Double Effect Principle

1982 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 259
Author(s):  
Paul J. Micallef
Author(s):  
Suzanne Uniacke

‘Double effect’ refers to the good and bad effects which may foreseeably follow from one and the same act. The principle of double effect originates in Aquinas’ ethics, and is supposed to guide decision about acts with double effect where the bad effect is something that must not be intended, such as the death of an innocent person. The principle permits such acts only if the bad effect is unintended, not disproportionate to the intended good effect, and unavoidable if the good effect is to be achieved. The principle has wide relevance in the moral evaluation of acts which have foreseen double effects. Controversy arises over the identification of the agent’s intention in difficult cases, and over the use of the principle to resolve issues such as abortion, euthanasia, the use of pain-relieving drugs which hasten death, self-defence, and the killing of certain sorts of non-combatants in war.


2020 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 273-292
Author(s):  
Anna Bogatyńska-Kucharska

The aim of the article is to present some of the differences and similari- ties in various versions of the double effect principle (DDE or PDE). The following formulations will be analyzed: that of Thomas Aquinas and two contemporary ap- proaches, namely those of Mangan and Boyle. It will be shown that the presented modern versions vary significantly and the distinction between their intended and only predicted effects is far from clear. As a result, the different contemporary for- mulations of DDE lead to contradictory conclusions, with some justifying what the others condemn. Moreover, it will be demonstrated that, unlike Aquinas, contem- porary authors mostly concentrate on unintentionality condition while neglecting the proportionality requirement. So, unlike Aquinas, they only take into account a narrow scope of cases, where the evil effect occurs with certainty, which leads to a complicated and intricate hypothetical intention test like Donagan’s. It will be shown that, besides its theoretical indistinctness, DDE lead to serious pragmatic risks. It can be quite easily misused as a kind of psychological mechanism to protect self-esteem from a sense of guilt since wrong-doing is treated as merely a predicted unintended effect.


2020 ◽  
Vol 74 (1) ◽  
pp. 80-104
Author(s):  
Marie-Luise Raters

Most arguments of Applied Ethics (e.g.slippery slope argument, argument of double effect) are well analyzed. An exception is the argument 'I do not do this because it is not my duty'. It makes sense to call the argument the 'argument of supererogation' (ASE): Since J. Urmson's essay Saints and Heroes of 1958, those actions are called 'supererogations' which (despite of their moral value) are not supposed to be duties. The argument is widely used not only in Applied Ethics, but also in ordinary moral everyday life. Nevertheless, there is a need of investigation because it has an indecency-problem. The argument is convincing if an actor does not want to risk his life. It seems indecent, however, if an actor refuses a simple favor or a service of friendship with the 'argument of super-erogation', although they both constitute no duties. This paper reconstructs the 'argument of supererogation' as a syllogism. It analyzes its formal structure by benefitting from current Anglo-American literature on supererogation. The overall aim of this paper is to solve the problem of indecency.


2011 ◽  
pp. 25-29
Author(s):  
Mike Inkson ◽  
Philip Antier ◽  
Malcolm Topfer

During the SIT conference in Dubai 2005 a single strike crystallization scheme model based on the way that Russian beet factory operated when refining raw sugar was proposed and suggested that it would be particularly suitable for medium size refineries up to about 2000 t/d RSO (refined sugar output). Now there is operational a 1700 t/d RSO stand-alone refinery that uses the scheme. It melts up to VHP raw sugar with 1200 IU (ICUMSA units) and runs carbonatation followed by a light dosing of PAC (powdered activated carbon) as necessary then double effect evaporation to produce fine liquor. Target color for the fine liquor is 340 IU. The centrifugal run-off needs to be segregated into the higher purity, lower color (so-called white) and lower purity, higher color (so called ‘green’) run-off. The white run-off (about 75%) is sent to white crystallization. The remaining 25% (green run-off) is sent to a three-stage crystallization recovery but, given the high purity regime without affination, the ‘A’ sugar is melted back to fine liquor having been crystallized and purged as if food quality. The results presented in the paper show that the refinery is operating broadly as predicted, producing a refined sugar to EEC 2 standard.


2021 ◽  
Vol 170 ◽  
pp. 341-353
Author(s):  
Yanli Song ◽  
Xin Chen ◽  
Shanshui Zhou ◽  
Tao Du ◽  
Feng Xie ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  

2015 ◽  
Vol 40 (44) ◽  
pp. 15320-15327 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ahmed Hamed ◽  
Sayed A. Kaseb ◽  
Abdalla S. Hanafi

2021 ◽  
Vol 88 (2) ◽  
pp. 149-162
Author(s):  
Charles C. Camosy ◽  
Joseph Vukov

Double Effect Donation claims it is permissible for a person meeting brain death criteria to donate vital organs, even though such a person may be alive. The reason this act is permissible is that it does not aim at one’s own death but rather at saving the lives of others and because saving the lives of others constitutes a proportionately serious reason for engaging in a behavior in which one foresees one’s death as the outcome. Double Effect Donation, we argue, opens a novel position in debates surrounding brain death and organ donation and does so without compromising the sacredness and fundamental equality of human life. Summary: Recent cases and discussion have raised questions about whether brain death criteria successfully capture natural death. These questions are especially troubling since vital organs are often retrieved from individuals declared dead by brain death criteria. We therefore seem to be left with a choice: either salvage brain death criteria or else abandon current organ donation practices. In this article, we present a different way forward. In particular, we defend a view we call Double Effect Donation, according to which it is permissible for a person meeting brain death criteria to donate vital organs, even though such a person may be alive. Double Effect Donation, we argue, is not merely compatible with but grows out of a view that acknowledges the sacredness and fundamental equality of human life.


2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Reyes Carlos Macedo y Ramírez ◽  
Jorge Fernando Vélez Ruiz

Abstract Even though the evaporation is a common process in the food industry, there is scarce information about the convective coefficient evaluation as an important parameter for equipment and process design. A research on evaporation of sugar solution in a double effect was carried out. The experimental results obtained in this equipment, from the heat transfer and concentration processes are presented, a range of 2658–6091 W of heat flow was quantified implying computed values of 1431–3763 W/m2K for the convective coefficients and 1020–1815 W/m2K for the overall coefficient. The quantification of the convective coefficient, the fitting methodology and modeling were developed in order, to obtain the correspondent correlations. Then, from a set of several equations, two general relationships are proposed. Both correlations were applied to experimental and supposed data, finding a difference lower than 30% between the experimental and predicted values of the Nusselt number, that was considered as satisfactory.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document