Why the Agent Theory Is a Bad Idea

Keyword(s):  
2017 ◽  
Vol 56 ◽  
pp. 175-201
Author(s):  
Hoayoung Youn
Keyword(s):  

2021 ◽  
pp. 109634802098857
Author(s):  
Zvi Schwartz ◽  
Timothy Webb

Index scores and competitive sets (compsets) play a critical role in the performance and evaluation of hotels. The reliance on these metrics has drawn skepticism in recent years as competitive sets may be opportunistically chosen, creating bias in performance evaluation. Drawing from the principal–agent theory and the theory of incentives, we explore whether the distance of the competitors chosen for a hotel’s compset influences revenue per available room (RevPAR) index scores. Based on the concepts of resource similarity and market commonality, we develop a novel mathematical model through which we empirically analyze a large dataset of 10,000 compsets. We find evidence that competitor distance influences index performance and that this relationship is bidirectional. Results show that hotels that outperform the competition may use distance to inflate RevPAR indices, while those that underperform may use distance to further reduce scores. These conflicting results may be reflected from the reverse motivations of the stakeholders.


2021 ◽  
pp. 0095327X2110068
Author(s):  
Sam R. Bell ◽  
K. Chad Clay ◽  
Ghashia Kiyani ◽  
Amanda Murdie

Do civil–military relations influence human rights practices? Building on principal–agent theory, we argue that civilian–military relations, instead of having an effect on mean levels of repression, will be associated with the dispersion in human rights practices. States where there is less control of the military or more conflict between civilian and military leadership will see a wider range of human rights practices. We test our hypotheses quantitatively on a global sample of countries, using updated data on civil–military relations and find evidence that civil–military conflict and lack of control increase the variance in human right practices.


2016 ◽  
Vol 70 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Harald Wiese

AbstractEconomic principal-agent theory deals with asymmetric information. It has two aspects. (i) If one person is better informed than another one, the former may outwit the latter.


2014 ◽  
Vol 26 (11) ◽  
pp. 3381-3387
Author(s):  
Benjiang Ma ◽  
Hongwei Chen ◽  
Beiling Ma ◽  
Xiaohong Chen

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