Composite Procedures and Judicial Review in the Single Resolution Mechanism: Iccrea Banca

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 109-125
Author(s):  
Menelaos Markakis

Iccrea Banca is a landmark ruling regarding judicial protection in composite decision-making procedures. Its importance extends not only to the Banking Union but also to EU administrative law more broadly. This paper argues that the Court's judgment in Iccrea Banca affirms the recent Berlusconi and Fininvest ruling regarding the Single Supervisory Mechanism, and extends its ratio decidendi to the Single Resolution Mechanism. It further argues that Iccrea Banca leaves open a number of questions, notably as regards the irregularities affecting the national preparatory act or proposal that would be reviewed by the CJEU, and the 'legal fate' of that national measure. Furthermore, we do not know which other composite procedures, whether within or beyond the Banking Union, would come to be decided under the principles established in this case. It is likely that more litigation will follow on these matters, and that future case law will provide much-needed answers to the questions left open in Iccrea Banca and earlier rulings.

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-32
Author(s):  
Benjamin Joshua Ong

Abstract The Singapore courts often state that judicial review of executive decision-making ought only to involve an inquiry into the ‘legality’ of a decision or the ‘decision-making process’, and not the ‘decision itself’ or its ‘merits’ – let us call this the ‘Distinction’. This article argues that the Distinction should be expunged from Singapore law. The Distinction has its roots in English case law which aimed to prevent the courts from arbitrarily substituting their decision for the executive's by reason of mere disagreement. But Singapore case law has gone further and treated the Distinction as a general principle applicable to all of administrative law. However, the Distinction is too vague for this purpose (as seen from Singapore cases which have interpreted the distinction inconsistently). It is conceptually problematic, incompatible with the practicalities of judicial review (particularly substantive review as recognised in Singapore law), and has occasionally been paid lip service but not followed in substance. The Distinction cannot form a coherent principle to guide the courts and ought to be replaced by a more nuanced application of constitutional principles relevant to determining the appropriate scope of review. Whatever these principles may be, and however they are to be balanced, the Distinction can be but an over-inclusive rough approximation of them which hampers the development of the law.


2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 55-86
Author(s):  
Luis Arroyo Jiménez ◽  
Gabriel Doménech Pascual

This article describes the Europeanisation of Spanish administrative law as a result of the influence of the EU law general principle of legitimate expectations. It examines, firstly, whether the formal incorporation of the principle of legitimate expectations into national legislation and case law has modified the substance of the latter, and if so, secondly, whether this has led to a weaker or a more robust protection of the legal status quo. To carry out that examination, the article considers the influence of the principle of legitimate expectations in two different areas: in individual administrative decision-making, and in legislative and administrative rulemaking. Our conclusion is that the Europeanisation of Spanish administrative law through the principle of legitimate expectations has been variable and ambiguous.


Author(s):  
Carol Harlow ◽  
Richard Rawlings

In this chapter, we argue that administrative procedure has become a central organising concept for administrative law. Our first theme is the steady proceduralisation of public administration experienced in recent years, in the framework of a relationship between courts and administration which we present as a two-way, non-hierarchical process. We look first at internal drivers to proceduralisation emanating from administration, notably the managerial reforms of the 1980s and the rise of regulation as a standard governance technique. We then turn to the contemporary case law of judicial review, focussing on the judicial response to, and stimulus for, administrative proceduralism. Our second theme is the idea of procedures as a repository for values and of values as an important, though often subliminal, driver of administrative procedure. We look at the potential for exchange as well as dissonance between public administration and administrative law. Our third theme concerns challenges to administrative law from the technological revolution currently under way. The impact of automation on public administration was at first rather modest; today, however, technology is taking great leaps forward—from computerisation to artificial intelligence and beyond. The innovations have so far been welcomed as beneficial—faster and more consistent administration, swifter and less costly courts and tribunals. It is time to recognise that we are facing a paradigm change, in which key values and procedures of administrative law, such as transparency, accountability, individuation, and due process, will need to be supported and sustained.


2021 ◽  
Vol 44 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Huggins

Automation is transforming how government agencies make decisions. This article analyses three distinctive features of automated decision-making that are difficult to reconcile with key doctrines of administrative law developed for a human-centric decision-making context. First, the complex, multi-faceted decision-making requirements arising from statutory interpretation and administrative law principles raise questions about the feasibility of designing automated systems to cohere with these expectations. Secondly, whilst the courts have emphasised a human mental process as a criterion of a valid decision, many automated decisions are made with limited or no human input. Thirdly, the new types of bias associated with opaque automated decision-making are not easily accommodated by the bias rule, or other relevant grounds of judicial review. This article, therefore, argues that doctrinal and regulatory evolution are both needed to address these disconnections and maintain the accountability and contestability of administrative decisions in the digital age.


2016 ◽  
Vol 6 (11) ◽  
pp. 15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ross Alexander Spence

<p>The rationales for the creation of the European Banking Union (“EBU”), what its objectives are and the main pillars of support for such a scheme, are worthy of investigation.  This article means to critically discuss the various elements of the EBU and determine whether the Single Supervisory Mechanism and the Single Resolution Mechanism, the main pillars underpinning the structure, are robust enough to avert another debt crisis in Europe. At the EBU’s heart lies the Single Rulebook (“SR”), which aims to counter the risk of fragmentation and nationalist tendencies. This inward looking trend became apparent in the recent financial crises, and contributed greatly to them. In an effort to avoid repeating the divisive and disjointed mistakes of the past, the SR is instead looking to provide unity and harmonisation across all participating member states. </p>


2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 109-115
Author(s):  
Ieva Deviatnikovaitė

This paper serves few purposes. First, it examines the principles of public administration in Lithuania. Good administration principle is analysed as constitutional principle relying on the case law of the Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania. Second, it explores impact of the decisions of Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania to the contemporary judicial review of Lithuanian administrative courts. Therefore, one of the latest rulings of the Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania related to the spelling of names and family names in the passports of citizens of the Republic of Lithuania will be reviewed.


2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 6-20
Author(s):  
Maia Perraudeau

This article explores how legal culture influences judicial interpretation of environmental legislation, which in turn affects how effectively public authorities are legally held to account for environmental decisions. Analysis of initial case law from the UK’s transposition of the EU Environmental Impact Assessment Directive shows English administrative courts interpreting the directive so restrictively as to undermine the purpose of the legislation itself. It will be suggested that the political sensitivity and legal complexity of administrative law, combined with the legally challenging nature of environmental problems, contribute to a legal culture of narrow interpretation. In contrast, the purposive and effectiveness-orientated approach of EU legal culture facilitated the House of Lord’s later reinterpretation of the Directive, allowing increased judicial engagement in the challenge of environmental law. This article therefore contends that ensuring effective environmental law after Brexit will require a reframing of the legal culture of administrative law itself.


2020 ◽  
Vol 48 (3) ◽  
pp. 401-431
Author(s):  
Grant Robert Hooper

Over the last three decades, Australian administrative law decisions about who will be allowed to stay in Australia have led to more interaction and tension between the elected government (Parliament and Ministry) and the judiciary than any other subject matter. This interaction has been intensified by Parliament’s attempts to amend the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) to codify judicial review and the procedures to be followed when making decisions under the Act. These amendments were made with the specific aim of minimising, if not practically eliminating, the judiciary’s influence over executive decision-making. However, this outcome has not been achieved. Rather, through a thousand cuts, or more literally cases, the codification efforts of Parliament have been weakened. Instead, the judiciary has put in place an overarching judicial review framework centred on the inherently flexible concept of jurisdictional error. This framework places equal emphasis on both express and implied statutory obligations and procedures. Express procedures have often being interpreted to include judicially created natural justice-like obligations and implied procedures often including other natural justice-like obligations or at least a base level of fairness premised on the constitutionally entrenched premise that the executive cannot decide arbitrarily.


2021 ◽  
pp. 72-74
Author(s):  
Oriol Mir

This chapter discusses administrative procedure and judicial review in Spain. The Spanish Constitution of 1978 (CE) devotes two central provisions to judicial review of administrative action. Article 106(1) CE, located in Part IV on government and administration, establishes that 'The Courts control the power to issue regulations and to ensure that the rule of law prevails in administrative action, as well as to ensure that the latter is subordinated to the ends which justify it'. On the other hand, Article 24(1) CE enshrines the fundamental right to effective judicial protection, which also includes protection against administrative action: 'Every person has the right to obtain the effective protection of the judges and the courts in the exercise of his or her legitimate rights and interests, and in no case may he go undefended'. Judicial review is usually performed by specific courts fully integrated into the judiciary, the so-called jurisdicción contencioso-administrativa (administrative jurisdiction), competent to review administrative action subject to Spanish administrative law.


Author(s):  
Ian Loveland

This chapter examines the procedural grounds of judicial review. It discusses how the courts have used the procedural fairness doctrine by reviewing a number of leading cases to identify the values that appear to be shaping the content of the law. The analysis focuses on case law drawn from the ‘modern’ (ie post-1960) era, but several seminal decisions from earlier periods are also considered. The concept of procedural fairness has generated a vast body of case law in the modern era and will continue to do so in future. But the law on this point, even when seen in conjunction with the law relating to the traditional substantive grounds on which government action can be held unlawful, offers only a partial picture of the way in which administrative law fits into the broader constitutional principles of the rule of law and the sovereignty of Parliament.


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