Real Time Object Detection Using YoloReal Time Object Detection Using Yolo

Object detection is related to computer vision and involves identifying the kinds of objects that have been detected. It is challenging to detect and classify objects. Recent advances in deep learning have allowed it to detect objects more accurately. In the past, there were several methods or tools used: R-CNN, Fast-RCNN, Faster-RCNN, YOLO, SSD, etc. This research focuses on "You Only Look Once" (YOLO) as a type of Convolutional Neural Network. Results will be accurate and timely when tested. So, we analysed YOLOv3's work by using Yolo3-tiny to detect both image and video objects. Keywords: YOLO, Intersection over Union (IOU), Anchor box, Non-Max Suppression, YOLO application, limitation.

Basics of Consciousness Theory

The verifiable concepts of classical physics proved unsuitable to create physics of small distances, high speeds, and large masses. Is there any chance that the verifiable notions of reality developed by modern physics and other branches of science will prove suitable to create a scientific theory of consciousness, which one day should appear? The paper examines what prevents the creation of scientific models of consciousness that can effectively represent empirical experience, and what theoretical construct (abstract object) is needed to create these models.

Perception of soft materials relies on physics-based object representations: Behavioral and computational evidence

When encountering objects, we readily perceive not only low-level properties (e.g., color and orientation), but also seemingly higher-level ones--including aspects of physics (e.g., mass). Perhaps nowhere is this contrast more salient than in the perception of soft materials such as cloths: the dynamics of these objects (including how their three-dimensional forms vary) are determined by their physical properties such as stiffness, elasticity, and mass. Here we hypothesize that the perception of cloths and their physical properties must involve not only image statistics, but also abstract object representations that incorporate "intuitive physics". We provide behavioral and computational evidence for this hypothesis. We find that humans can visually match the stiffness of cloths with unfamiliar textures from the way they undergo natural transformations (e.g. flapping in the wind) across different scenarios. A computational model that casts cloth perception as mental physics simulation explains important aspects of this behavior.

Notion-Concept-Term. Interpretations

There are various interpretations of the fundamental notions used in the study of terminology. This article is a comparative study of their definitions, conducted in the process of establishing benchmarks in the study of editorial-printing terminology. It presents a research of the theoretical foundations of terminology, a study of various interpretations of linguistic meanings of key notions of terminology: „notion”, „concept” and „term”. One of the fundamental units of terminology is the „notion”, which is characterized as an abstract object of knowledge. Another fundamental unit, the „concept”, represents classes of objects of knowledge, of perceptible phenomena. Concepts are called abstractions, mental constructions or units of thought that ensure the connection between objects and their definitions. They have an essential role in human knowledge, communication not being possible if we do not have a codification of concepts in linguistic signs (terms). The concepts ensure the connection between the objects and the designations that correspond to them. And the „term” is the material form, expressed through linguistic means, of a notion specialized in a certain field of knowledge.

Epistemic and poietic intentional processes

We examine the intentional processes that correspond to conceptualizations of activities performed by subjects with the intention of achieving an objective. Taking as its basis a general framework of intentional processes, two types of such process are considered: epistemic ones, aimed at acquiring knowledge about something, and poietic ones, aimed at bringing about something. The “something” is understood as anything that the processes can pertain to: a physical, mental or abstract object, a phenomenon, a state of affairs, etc. The generic features of such processes are discussed, with focus on: (1) features that are common for epistemic and poietic intentional processes as well as on features that differentiate them, (2) the dynamic and static features of the processes, and on (3) issues involved in controlling the progression of the processes towards intended objectives. The latter issue is the essential part of our considerations, the two former establish the necessary conceptual framework. The presented analysis aims at shedding light on these aspects of human intentional activities which can be considered virtually independent of any specific area of human intentional activity, be it natural sciences, humanities or technology.

Non-Factualism about Abstract Objects

Chapter 5 provides an argument for a non-factualist view of the abstract-object question; in other words, it argues that there’s no fact of the matter whether there are any such things as abstract objects like numbers and sets and propositions (where an abstract object is a non-physical, non-mental, unextended, acausal, non-spatiotemporal object). Roughly speaking, the argument proceeds by showing that the sentence ‘There are abstract objects’ is catastrophically unclear and indeterminate—i.e., that it’s so unclear that it doesn’t have any truth conditions and, hence, doesn’t have a truth value. In addition, the chapter also argues against necessitarian versions of platonism and anti-platonism.

Metaphysics, Sophistry, and Illusion

This book does two things. First, it introduces a novel kind of non-factualist view, and it argues that we should endorse views of this kind in connection with a wide class of metaphysical questions, most notably, the abstract-object question and the composite-object question (more specifically, the book argues that there’s no fact of the matter whether there are any such things as abstract objects or composite objects—or material objects of any other kind). Second, the book explains how these non-factualist views fit into a general anti-metaphysical view called neo-positivism, and it explains how we could argue that neo-positivism is true. Neo-positivism is (roughly) the view that every metaphysical question decomposes into some subquestions—call them Q1, Q2, Q3, etc.—such that, for each of these subquestions, one of the following three anti-metaphysical views is true of it: non-factualism, or scientism, or metaphysically innocent modal-truth-ism. These three views can be defined (very roughly) as follows. Non-factualism about a question Q is the view that there’s no fact of the matter about the answer to Q. Scientism about Q is the view that Q is an ordinary empirical-scientific question about some contingent aspect of physical reality, and Q can’t be settled with an a priori philosophical argument. And metaphysically innocent modal-truth-ism about Q is the view that Q asks about the truth value of a modal sentence that’s metaphysically innocent in the sense that it doesn’t say anything about reality and, if it’s true, isn’t made true by reality.

Metaphysics of linguistic signs

The aim of the paper is to elaborate on the metaphysical distinction between ideal signs and physical signs in terms of the method of abstraction. Ideal signs are derived from physical signs by eliminating certain kinds of properties as theoretically superfluous. Ideal signs are claimed to be instructions that prescribe how physical signs are to be produced in their graphic form, acoustic form or any other suitable form. It is examined which level of abstraction is permitted in the case of ideal signs, i.e., which properties can be eliminated while admitting that the resulting abstract object can be still considered a sign. It is argued that one cannot eliminate the properties that are connected with the syntactic and semantic aspects of signs.

A Judgmental Reconstruction of Some of Professor Woleński’s Logical and Philosophical Writings

Roman Suszko said that “Obviously, any multiplication of logical values is a mad idea and, in fact, Łukasiewicz did not actualize it.” The aim of the present paper is to qualify this ‘obvious’ statement through a number of logical and philosophical writings by Professor Jan Woleński, all focusing on the nature of truth-values and their multiple uses in philosophy. It results in a reconstruction of such an abstract object, doing justice to what Suszko held a ‘mad’ project within a generalized logic of judgments. Four main issues raised by Woleński will be considered to test the insightfulness of such generalized truth-values, namely: the principle of bivalence, the logic of scepticism, the coherence theory of truth, and nothingness.

Textuality

The concept of “text” is ambiguous: it can identify at the same time a concrete reality and an abstract one. Indeed, text presents itself both as an empirical object subject to analysis and an abstract object constructed by the analysis itself. This duplicity characterizes the development of the concept in the 20th century. According to different theories of language, there are also different understandings of “text”: a restricted use as written text, an extensive use as written and spoken text, and an expanded use as any written, verbal, gestural, or visual manifestation. The concept of “text” also presupposes two other concepts: from a generative point of view, it involves a proceeding by which something becomes a text (textualization); from an interpretative point of view, it involves a proceeding by which something can be interpreted as a text (textuality). In textual linguistics, “text” is considered at the same time as an abstract object, issued from a specific theoretical approach, and a concrete object, a linguistic phenomenon starting the process of analysis. In textual linguistics, textuality presents as a global quality of text issued from the interlacing of the sentences composing it. In linguistics, the definition of textuality depends on the definition of text. For instance, M. A. K. Halliday and Ruqaiya Hasan define textuality through the concepts of “cohesion” and “coherence.” Cohesion is a necessary condition of textuality, because it enables text to be perceived as a whole, but it’s not sufficient to explain it. In fact, to be interpreted as a whole, the elements composing the text need to be coherent to each other. But according to Robert-Alain De Beaugrande and Wolfgang Ulrich Dressler, cohesion and coherence are only two of the seven principles of textuality (the other five being intentionality, acceptability, informativity, situationality, and intertextuality). Textual pragmatics deals with a more complex problem: that of the text conceived as an empirical object. Here the text is presented as a unit captured in a communication process, “a communicative unit.” Considered from a pragmatic point of view, every single unit composing a text constitutes an instruction for meaning. Since the 1970s, analyzing connections between texts and contexts, textual pragmatics, has been an important source of inspiration for textual semiotics. In semiotics, the theory of language proposed by Louis T. Hjelmslev, the concept of “text” is conceived above all as a process and a “relational hierarchy.” Furthermore, according to Hjelmslev, textuality consists in the idea of “mutual dependencies,” composing a whole which makes the text an “absolute totality” to be interpreted by readers and analyzed by linguists. Since texts are composed of a network of connections at both local and global levels, their analyses depend on the possibility to reconstruct the relation between global and local dimensions. For this reason, François Rastier suggests that in order to capture the meaning of a text, the semantic analysis must identify semantic forms at different semantic levels. So textuality comes from the articulation between the semantic and phemic forms (content and expression), and from the semantic and phemic roots from which the forms emerge. Textuality allows the reader to identify the interpretative paths through which to understand the text. This complex dynamic is at the foundation of this idea of textuality. Now that digital texts are available, researchers have developed several methods and tools to exploit such digital texts and discourse, representing at the same time different approaches to meaning. Text Mining is based on a simple principle: the identification and processing of textual contents to extract knowledge. By using digital tools, the intra-textual and inter-textual links can be visualized on the screen, as lists or tables of results, which permits the analysis of the occurrences and frequency of certain textual elements composing the digital texts. So, another idea of text is visible to the linguist: not the classical one according to the culture of printed texts, but a new one typical of the culture of digital texts, and their textuality.