Singular Thoughts

There seem to be good reasons for recognizing singular thought: thoughts that are about particular objects. It seems that singular propositions capture the truth-conditions of such thoughts; that is, propositions individuated by objects and not senses, intensions, descriptions, or even names. But then how do we handle cases where a person regards “Cicero was an orator” as true but regards “Tully was an orator” as false? She seems to believe and disbelieve the same singular proposition. The chapter argues that we need to “unburden” propositions. Beliefs are episodes that have truth-conditions that can be captured by a variety of propositions, and the propositions that “that” clauses refer to don’t capture everything relevant to understanding the belief. I provide some concepts and terminology for implementing these lower expectations for propositions.

Singular Thought, Russellianism, and Mental Files

Many philosophers believe that there is a kind of thought about an object that is in some sense particularly directly about the object. The chapter will use the terms de re or singular thought for thoughts of this sort. It outlines a broadly Russellian approach to singular thought on which to have a singular thought about an object o is to have a thought whose content is a singular proposition having o as a constituent. It then explores some of the consequences of this view. It also critically discusses recent attempts by Francois Recanati and Robin Jeshion to explicate the notion of singular thought by means of the notion of a mental file.

Kripke on Epistemic and Metaphysical Possibility

This chapter discusses Saul Kripke’s treatment of the necessary a posteriori and concomitant distinction between epistemic and metaphysical possibility. It extracts the enduring lessons of his treatment of these matters and disentangles them from errors and confusions that mar some of his most important discussions. It argues that there are two Kripkean routes to the necessary a posteriori—one correct and philosophically far-reaching; the other incorrect, philosophically misleading, and the source of damaging errors that persist to this day. It connects two false principles involved in the second, unsuccessful, route to the necessary a posteriori with the plausible and potentially correct idea that believing a singular proposition that o is F always involves also believing a richer more descriptively informative proposition in which some further property plays a role in the agent’s thoughts about o. It explains why this idea will not save the failed second route to the necessary a posteriori and suggests that it may help reconcile Kripke’s insights with the lessons of Frege’s puzzle.

KAIP APIBRĖŽIAMOSIOS DESKRIPCIJOS VARTOJAMOS SINGULIARINIAMS TEIGINIAMS IŠREIKŠTI?

Straipsnyje keliamas klausimas: kokios sąlygos turi būti patenkintos, kad, ištarę sakinį su apibrėžiamąja deskripcija kaip sakinio subjektu, mes išreikštume singuliarinį teiginį (Kaplano prasme). Autorius teigia, kad Wettsteino įsitikinimas, jog teiginio singuliariškumas nustatomas ištarimo metu nurodant apibrėžiamosios deskripcijos referentą, yra nenuoseklus. Straipsnyje siūlomas kitas singuliariškumo kriterijus: teiginys yra singuliarinis, jeigu jame dalyvaujanti apibrėžiamoji deskripcija įvertinama vieninteliame galimame pasaulyje, o jeigu apibrėžiamoji deskripcija turi būti įvertinta daugiau nei vieno galimo pasaulio atžvilgiu, tai teiginys yra bendrasis (general). Šis kriterijus veiksmingas aiškinant kontroversiškus atvejus – kai išreiškiame teisingą singuliarinį teiginį, kurio subjekto dėmuo nedera su apibrėžiamąja deskripcija, pavartota ištartame sakinyje.Pagrindiniai žodžiai: apibrėžiamoji deskripcija, nuoroda, singuliarinis ir bendrasis teiginys, galimų pasaulių semantika. How Do We Use Definite Descriptions to Express Singular Propositions?Evgeny Borisov AbstractThe paper is devoted to the question: under what conditions do we express a singular proposition (in the Kaplanian sense) when uttering a sentence containing a definite description as the subject term. It is argued that Wettstein’s claim that singularity of a proposition is determined by the demonstration of the referent of definite description accompanying the utterance contains an inconsistency. An alternative criterion of singularity is proposed: we express a singular proposition if the definite description in question is to be evaluated at a single possible world, and we express a general one if the definite description in question is to be evaluated at a range of possible worlds. This criterion is effective in explaining controversial cases in which we manage to express a true singular proposition with a subject constituent that does not fit the definite description used in the utterance.Keywords: definite description, reference, singular and general propositions, possible world semantics

Narratiivsuse roll Hegeli filosoofilises süsteemis: üks täiendus "dialektilise" meetodi mittemetafüüsilise tõlgendamise juurde

Artikkel lähtub Hegeli filosoofilise süsteemi mittemetafüüsilisest tõlgendusest ja keskendub ühele aspektile Hegeli dialektilise meetodi juures, mille iseloomustamiseks oleks autori arvates kõige adekvaatsem kasutada narratiivi mõistet. Artikli tees on kokkuvõtlikult järgmine: Hegeli arvates ei ole filosoofiline tõde väljendatav ühe lause või propositsiooniga, vaid (1) see nõuab tervet väidete jada, kusjuures (2) mõistete määratlused selles väidete jadas peavad suutma teiseneda --- nii nagu kirjandusliku jutustuse käigus võivad teiseneda tegelaste iseloom ja arusaamine asjadest (eriti ilmne on see Bildungsroman'ile omase narratiivi puhul). Lisaks neile kahele omadusele on narratiivile iseloomulik talle omaste struktuurielementide (algus, keskpaik ja lõpp) abil loodud (3) terviklikkus, mis võimaldab tal anda edasi sellist mõtet, mis ei sisaldu üheski narratiivi moodustavas lauses üksikult võetuna. Need kolm omadust võimaldavad Hegeli "dialektilisele" meetodile narratiiviteooria vahenditega uut valgust heita ja spekulatiivse tõe loomust paremini mõista.The paper discusses the nature of Hegel's dialectical method and criticizes its wide-spread interpretation according to the thesis-antithesis-synthesis formula. It is argued that there is no evidence of triadic structures in Hegel's works. Rather, the elements (usually defined as "moments", "formations" (Gestalten) or "determinations" (Bestimmungen)) that make up the body of Hegel's texts, are organized as "series" (Reihen) that form circles, in which, as Hegel maintains, the last element leads us back to the first. If synthesis means creating something new by using the initial elements then it is problematic whether anything becomes synthesized in Hegel texts. The paper argues against interpreting the every third element of the series (the moment of Becoming being the most obvious candidate in the Science of Logic) or the end-points of the series (such as the final moment of absolute knowledge in the Phenomenology of Spirit) as synthetic unities. Instead, the paper proposes that Hegel's speculative method uses the form of narrative for creating a vessel that is able to express the "speculative truth" which is "fluid" (flüssig) and which requires a "plastic" (plastische) form of presentation. Narrative can accomplish what a singular proposition and a deductive system cannot, because (1) it consists of a series of claims (2) that is able to express the movement of what is said in each claim, and (3) because its ending creates a point at which the story as a whole obtains a meaning that is not expressed in any particular sentence constituting the story.

The Quotient Problem for Noetherian Rings

Our work was motivated by attempts to find a criterion for the existence of a classical quotient ring, for a noetherian ring, in analogy with the various known criteria for the existence of an artinian classical quotient ring ([9], [10], [13], [2]).We have restricted our attention to Krull symmetric noetherian rings R, and we make heavy use of the fact that all their Krull composition factors are non-singular (Proposition 7). The collection Kprime R of the associated primes of the Krull composition factors of R plays a central role, taking the place of the collection of the associated primes of R.