Outsourcing memory to external tools: A review of ‘intention offloading’

How do we remember delayed intentions? Three decades of research into prospective memory have provided insight into the cognitive and neural mechanisms involved in this form of memory. However, we depend on more than just our brains to remember intentions. We also use external props and tools such as calendars and diaries, strategically-placed objects, and technologies such as smartphone alerts. This is known as ‘intention offloading’. Despite the progress in our understanding of brain-based prospective memory, we know much less about the role of intention offloading in individuals’ ability to fulfil delayed intentions. Here, we review recent research into intention offloading, with a particular focus on how individuals decide between storing intentions in internal memory versus external reminders. We also review studies investigating how intention offloading changes across the lifespan and how it relates to underlying brain mechanisms. We conclude that intention offloading is highly effective, experimentally tractable, and guided by metacognitive processes. Therefore, metacognitive interventions could play an important role in promoting individuals’ adaptive use of cognitive tools.

Metamemory for Prospective Memory Performance in Younger and Older Adults: Does the Reference Point Affect our Judgments?

The present study investigated age differences in the ability to predict prospective memory (PM) performance. A sample of younger (N = 88) and older (N = 88) participants completed an event-based PM task embedded in an ongoing task. Metamemory was measured by asking participants to predict their performance before completing the PM task and complete some questionnaires on self-perceptions of everyday memory ability. We manipulated A) the reference point used to evaluate performance and B) the order of presentation of the instruments. One group of participants predicted their upcoming performance with a general confidence rating (performance condition) whereas a different group predicted their performance in comparison to other people of their age (peers condition). The metamemory questionnaires were completed either at the beginning of the experimental session or after the PM task, in a counterbalanced order. In terms of performance, we did not observe age differences in PM. In terms of metamemory, younger and older participants were similarly underconfident in the performance condition and overconfident in the peers condition. Moreover, older adults reported significantly better PM abilities than younger adults, and participants generally reported more memory failures when the metamemory questionnaires were administered after the PM task and in the performance condition. These findings show that both younger and older adults have limited metacognitive insights, and point to reactive effects of metamemory to metacognitive reference point and order of administration of the instruments.