Research Topics in Empirical Processes

<p>The first chapter consists of an overview of the theory of empirical processes, covering an introduction to empirical processes in R, uniform empirical processes and function parametric empirical processes in Section 1.1. Section 1.2 contains an overview of the theory related to the law of the iterated logarithm for Brownian motion and the modulus of continuity for Brownian motion. Section 1.3 contains the theory of the limiting processes for the empirical process, most importantly Brownian motion, Brownian bridge and the connections and relationships between them, with distributions of selected statistics of Brownian motion and Brownian bridge derived from reflection principles. Section 1.4 contains an overview of the theory required to prove central limit results for the empirical processes, covering the theory of the space C and Donsker’s theorem. The second chapter covers research topics, starting with Fourier analysis of mixture distributions and associated theory in Section 2.1. Section 2.2 covers findings in a research problem about non-linear autoregressive processes. Section 2.3 introduces a martingale approach to testing a regression model. Section 2.4 links the theory of ranks and sequential ranks to the theory of empirical processes.</p>

Research Topics in Empirical Processes

<p>The first chapter consists of an overview of the theory of empirical processes, covering an introduction to empirical processes in R, uniform empirical processes and function parametric empirical processes in Section 1.1. Section 1.2 contains an overview of the theory related to the law of the iterated logarithm for Brownian motion and the modulus of continuity for Brownian motion. Section 1.3 contains the theory of the limiting processes for the empirical process, most importantly Brownian motion, Brownian bridge and the connections and relationships between them, with distributions of selected statistics of Brownian motion and Brownian bridge derived from reflection principles. Section 1.4 contains an overview of the theory required to prove central limit results for the empirical processes, covering the theory of the space C and Donsker’s theorem. The second chapter covers research topics, starting with Fourier analysis of mixture distributions and associated theory in Section 2.1. Section 2.2 covers findings in a research problem about non-linear autoregressive processes. Section 2.3 introduces a martingale approach to testing a regression model. Section 2.4 links the theory of ranks and sequential ranks to the theory of empirical processes.</p>

Another Look at Reflection

Reflection principles are of central interest in the development of axiomatic theories. Whereas they are independent statements they appear to have a specific epistemological status. Our trust in those principles is as warranted as our trust in the axioms of the system itself. This paper is an attempt in clarifying this special epistemic status. We provide a motivation for the adoption of uniform reflection principles by their analogy to a form of the constructive $$\omega $$ ω -rule. Additionally, we analyse the role of informal arithmetic and the conception of natural numbers as an inductive structure, also with regard to extra conceptual resources such as a primitive truth predicate.

Constructive truth and falsity in Peano arithmetic

Artemov (2019, The provability of consistency) offered the notion of constructive truth and falsity of arithmetical sentences in the spirit of Brouwer–Heyting–Kolmogorov semantics and its formalization, the logic of proofs. In this paper, we provide a complete description of constructive truth and falsity for Friedman’s constant fragment of Peano arithmetic. For this purpose, we generalize the constructive falsity to $n$-constructive falsity in Peano arithmetic where $n$ is any positive natural number. Based on this generalization, we also analyse the logical status of well-known Gödelean sentences: consistency assertions for extensions of PA, the local reflection principles, the ‘constructive’ liar sentences and Rosser sentences. Finally, we discuss ‘extremely’ independent sentences in the sense that they are classically true but neither constructively true nor $n$-constructively false for any $n$.

Rado’s Conjecture and its Baire version

Rado’s Conjecture is a compactness/reflection principle that says any nonspecial tree of height [Formula: see text] has a nonspecial subtree of size [Formula: see text]. Though incompatible with Martin’s Axiom, Rado’s Conjecture turns out to have many interesting consequences that are also implied by certain forcing axioms. In this paper, we obtain consistency results concerning Rado’s Conjecture and its Baire version. In particular, we show that a fragment of [Formula: see text], which is the forcing axiom for Baire Indestructibly Proper forcings, is compatible with the Baire Rado’s Conjecture. As a corollary, the Baire Rado’s Conjecture does not imply Rado’s Conjecture. Then we discuss the strength and limitations of the Baire Rado’s Conjecture regarding its interaction with stationary reflection principles and some families of weak square principles. Finally, we investigate the influence of Rado’s Conjecture on some polarized partition relations.

Knowledge and Conditionals

A set of interconnected chapters on topics in the theory of knowledge. Part 1 considers the concept of knowledge, its logical properties, and its relation to belief and partial belief, or credence. It includes a discussion of belief revision, two discussions of reflection principles, a chapter about the status of self-locating knowledge and belief, a chapter about the evaluation of normative principles of inductive reasoning, and a development and defense of a contextualist account of knowledge. Part 2 is concerned with conditional propositions, and conditional reasoning, with chapters on the logic and formal semantics of conditionals, a discussion of the relation between indicative and subjunctive conditionals and of the question whether indicative conditionals express propositions, a chapter considering the relation between counterfactual propositions and objective chance, a critique of an attempt to give a metaphysical reduction of counterfactual propositions to nonconditional matters of fact, and a discussion of dispositional properties, and of a dispositional theory of chance.