An Analysis of the Singapore and Hanoi Denuclearization Summits between the United States and North Korea from a Negotiation Theory Perspective

This article analyzed the two summits between United States (U.S.) President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un at Singapore and Hanoi in 2018 and 2019 respectively, from a negotiation theory perspective. The results of the analysis showed that the goals and bottom lines of the negotiation between the U.S. and North Korea were quite opposite to reach a meaningful agreement because the former wanted to dismantle North Korean nuclear weapons while the latter did not. President Trump opted for a hard positional negotiation strategy at the Hanoi summit, unlike the soft positional negotiation strategy he opted at the Singapore summit. However, Kim Jong-un maintained a hard positional strategy throughout the whole process which led to the failure of these summits. When it comes to a “Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement” (BATNA), President Trump did not imply any BATNA before or during the Singapore summit, while Kim demonstrated a new BATNA, i.e. China. However, both leaders did not prepare any BATNA for the Hanoi summit, except for a collapse of the negotiation by the U.S. Both of them depended on a top-down decision-making style throughout the whole negotiations without the working-level officials in the decisions. By analyzing all these, the article found that President Trump did not follow the recommendations that negotiation theorists had suggested for a successful negotiation, failing to achieve any progress on the denuclearization of North Korea.

Centripetal and centrifugal incentives in mixed-member proportional systems

How does competition for first (candidate) and second ballot (party-list) votes affect the strategic positioning of parties in mixed-member proportional systems? We study this question in a simulation study of multiparty competition in the two tiers. In the first step, we use data from elections for the German Bundestag to estimate individual vote function for each tier based on ideology, policy, and valence incentives. We then use these parameter estimates to calibrate a model in which parties compete for either first- or second-tier votes. Results suggest that parties may face a dilemma when adopting a positional strategy. When national parties and their candidates hold significantly different valences, large valence advantages generate centripetal incentives whereas smaller valences exert a centrifugal pull. Overall, centrifugal incentives dominate the German mixed-member system.

ANALISIS STRUKTUR JARINGAN KOMUNIKASI DALAM ADAPTASI EKONOMI, SOSIAL DAN BUDAYA PADA PAGUYUBAN BABUL AKHIRAT DI KOTA BATAM

<p>ABSTRACT</p><p><br />The purposes of this study include : (1) To know the communication network on the Babul Akhirat <br />community in the economic, social, and cultural adaptation; (2) To identify individual roles in the<br />communication network of the Babul Akhirat community in the economic, social, and cultural<br />adaptation; and (3) To describe the communication network centrality of the Babul Akhirat community <br />in the economic, social, and cultural adaptation. This study constitutes a descriptive research with <br />the quantitative approach. The study design of communication network is a complete network and<br />the focus of this study was at the system level. In this study, the researcher referred to the nominalist<br />approach by viewing the study population. The actor determination in this study was based on the<br />positional strategy, namely the Babul Akhirat Community in Batam City where the actors becoming<br />samples of the population were members of the Babul Akhirat community. Sampling used in this study<br />was the samples of small groups, that were all members of the Babul Akhirat community, amounted to<br />82 members. This study used the analysis technique of sociometric data and the communication network<br />structures by using by using UCINET VI. The results of this study showed: (1) The social and economic<br />communication network took possession of the interlocking network structure; (2) The individual roles<br />in the communication network of the Babul Akhirat community in the economic, social, and cultural<br />adaptation encompassed opinion leader, cosmopolite, and bridge; and (3) The actors representing the<br />highest local centrality value for the communication network of economic adaptation were node 15, 22,<br />30, and 59, while values of the communication network for the social adaptation were node 22 and 31,<br />and values of the network communication for the cultural adaptation were node 30, 47, and 45. On the<br />other result, actors representing the lowest global centrality value for each communication network of<br />economic adaptation, social adaptation, and cultural adaptation were node 23, node 5, and node 13. <br />Keywords: Communication Network Structure, Actor, Babul Akhirat Community</p>