14. Horizontal agreements (2): oligopoly, tacit collusion and collective dominance

Oligopoly exists where a few firms between them supply all or most of the goods or services on a market without any of them having a clear ascendancy over the others. The purpose of this chapter is to examine whether oligopoly presents a particular problem for competition policy and, if so, how that problem should be overcome. The chapter discusses the theory of oligopolistic interdependence and how oligopolies can lead to a well-known problem for competition law and policy: oligopolists are able, by virtue of the characteristics of the market, to behave in a parallel manner and to derive benefits from their collective market power without, or without necessarily, entering into an agreement or concerted practice of the kind generally prohibited by competition law. This phenomenon is known in economics as ‘tacit collusion’ and is the result of each firm’s individual and rational response to market conditions. The chapter identifies possible ways of dealing with the ‘oligopoly problem’, before considering the extent to which Articles 101 and 102 can be used to address that problem. The chapter also discusses UK law and, in particular, the possible use of the market investigations to address market failure that may arise in oligopolies.

Dominant Position in Digital Markets

The article explores the state of dominant situation in digital markets from the point of view of Russian and foreign legislation.The conclusion is justified that traditional antitrust measures of the dominant situation (including those related to collective dominance) cannot be applied to the digital market, since market shares and concentration ratios based on market shares will not be significant indicators in the market environment.It is proposed to use new criteria for determining the dominant position of a subject in the digital market, for example, direct and indirect network effects, parallel use of a service from different suppliers, etc.

Individual Abuse of Collective Dominance in Cellular Communications: Problems of Identification

Recently, discussions about the validity of the Russian practice of establishing the facts of individual abuse of collective dominance have been escalating: many experts point to a contradiction between the meaning of collective dominance, in which a small number of companies have a joint dominant position, in connection with each other, and the possibility of an individual company to abuse this position. The purpose of the article is to assess the correctness of this approach in the context of recent antitrust cases in the cellular communications market – in particular, two cases against the mobile operator “Tele2”. In the article, the applied practice is assessed in relation to the currently known results in the field of economic theory, as well as international best practices in the application of the concept of collective dominance. The findings indicate that the conclusion of the FAS Russia on the presence of the dominant position of Tele2 as part of collective dominance and the possibility of the company to exercise its market power does not correspond to either foreign practice or industrial organization theory. The source of error in the qualification of behavior is largely due to the focus of the antimonopoly authority on quantitative criteria of collective dominance to the detriment of the analysis of qualitative criteria and behavior. This case illustrates a typical tendency for such cases not to investigate the behavior of other collectively dominant market participants in relation to the behavior of the company accused of individual abuse, as well as not to investigate consumer behavior, and, in particular, their real possibilities to switch and switching actions. The article was written on the basis of the RANEPA state assignment research programme.

Chimera of domestic antitrust: Institute of collective dominance in Russia

The paper defines the features of the collective dominance institute in Russia as well as the relation between collective dominance and oligopoly in the spheres of law and economic theory. The article evaluates the grounds and consequences of the collective dominance legal norm application; it suggests an approach to examining the relation between effects and expected results of this legal norm application and outlines the potential ways to harmonize the best international practices of the collective dominance norm application with the existing economic standards of product market analysis for the purpose of competition law enforcement. Results of the oligopoly theory and the Russian version of collective dominance institution key elements comparison show: the collective dominance institution concept is inadequately applied to identify individual abuse of dominant position due to possible law enforcement errors. The Russian version of collective dominance institution reflects one fundamental tendency intrinsic to Russian antitrust: examined more closely, law enforcement, which is de jure aimed at protecting competition, appears to be economic regulation, which de facto can lead to competition restriction. One of the possible structural alternatives for the collective dominance institution reforming is based on presumption of the need to analyze the joint impact exerted by a group of undertakings on the market.

Are the signs of collective dominance in law “On protection of competition” helpful for arbitration judges in taking right decisions?

The Russian officials extensively apply antitrust prohibitions in the domestic markets. Therefore, it is necessary to correctly determine the presence of dominant companies in the market. The article examines the signs of collective dominance in the antimonopoly practice in Russia. For this purpose, the author examines judicial acts for cases on cancellation of decisions of the Russian Antimonopoly authority concerning collective dominance for 2007-2017, and considers type I and type II errors arising in establishing collective dominance. The empirical analysis of the factors influencing judicial reviews shows that the predictions of economic theory are not sufficiently taken into account in law enforcement.

Application of the concept of collective dominance in the Russian competition law: challenges and solutions

The Russian competition law does not include the definition of the concept of collective dominance, and the notion of this institution itself contains many gaps. The indicated disadvantages of statutory regulation and simplified approaches of the Federal Antimonopoly Service, which became possible due to the formal approach, have led to the formation of controversial law enforcement practice by the antimonopoly authority and courts. The article presents the analysis of legal regulation, as well as the law enforcement practice, and proposition on solutions to the stated problems.

9. Horizontal Agreements—Cartels and Collusion

This chapter examines how EU competition law applies both to undertakings operating cartels and to undertakings that tacitly coordinate their behaviour on a market. It starts by looking at the difference between ‘explicit’ and ‘tacit’ collusion in the light of the theory of games and the ‘prisoners’ dilemma’. The chapter then deals with cartels and other agreements akin to cartels, or which may facilitate explicit or tacit collusion on a market. Next, it considers the problem of tacit collusion and whether, in particular, Articles 101 and 102 operate as effective mechanisms for dealing with the oligopoly problem. The chapter also considers other options that EU competition law might offer to deal with tacit collusion, either ex ante or ex post, such as the use of the concept of collective dominance and sector enquiries under Regulation 1/2003, art 17.