Adding Emergence and Spatiality to a Public Bad Game for Studying Dynamics in Socio-Ecological Systems (Part I): The Design of Musa-Game for Integrative Analysis of Collective Action in Banana Disease Management

Human decision-making plays a critical and challenging role in the prevention and control of public bads within socio-ecological systems. Farmers daily confront dilemmas regarding public bad management, such as infectious diseases in their crops. Their decisions interplay with multiple factors and may create the risk conditions in which a public bad can occur (e.g., a disease outbreak). This article presents an experimental board game method (DySE) and its contextualized version (Musa-game) to study the effect of individual and collective human actions on creating or preventing a public bad. The DySE method and the Musa-game add emergence and spatiality (both attributes of SES) to the study of public bads and collective action problems. This methodological proposal allows us to build a contextual understanding of how individual and collective actions of various entities lead to typical system outcomes, i.e., conditions that are (un)favourable to pathogens, and individual decisions about infectious disease management. To conceptualize our method, we used the case of Banana Xanthomonas Wilt disease in Rwanda. This research is published as a diptych. Part I (this article) covers the conceptualization and design of Musa-game. Part II presents empirical findings from testing Musa-game with farmers in Rwanda and recommendations for using the method.

Siderophores drive invasion dynamics in bacterial communities through their dual role as public good versus public bad

Microbial invasions can compromise ecosystem services and spur dysbiosis and disease in hosts. Nevertheless, the mechanisms determining invasion outcomes often remain unclear. Here, we examine the role of iron-scavenging siderophores in driving invasions of Pseudomonas aeruginosa into resident communities of environmental pseudomonads. Siderophores can be 'public goods' by delivering iron to individuals possessing matching receptors; but they can also be 'public bads' by withholding iron from competitors lacking these receptors. Accordingly, siderophores should either promote or impede invasion, depending on their dual effects on invader and resident growth. Using supernatant feeding and invasion assays, we show that invasion success indeed decreased when the invader was inhibited (public bad) rather than stimulated (public good) by the residents' siderophores. Conversely, invasion success often increased when the invader could use its siderophore to inhibit the residents. Our findings identify siderophores as a major driver of invasion dynamics in bacterial communities.

Is COVID-19 the end of US hegemony? Public bads, leadership failures and monetary hegemony

COVID-19 is the most invasive global crisis in the postwar era, jeopardizing all dimensions of human activity. By theorizing COVID-19 as a public bad, I shed light on one of the great debates of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries regarding the relationship between the United States and liberal international order (LIO). Conceptualizing the pandemic as a public bad, I analyze its consequences for US hegemony. Unlike other international public bads and many of the most important public goods that make up the LIO, the COVID-19 public bad not only has some degree of rivalry but can be made partially excludable, transforming it into more of a club good. Domestically, I demonstrate how the failure to effectively manage the COVID-19 public bad has compromised America's ability to secure the health of its citizens and the domestic economy, the very foundations for its international leadership. These failures jeopardize US provision of other global public goods. Internationally, I show how the US has already used the crisis strategically to reinforce its opposition to free international movement while abandoning the primary international institution tasked with fighting the public bad, the World Health Organization (WHO). While the only area where the United States has exercised leadership is in the monetary sphere, I argue this feat is more consequential for maintaining hegemony. However, even monetary hegemony could be at risk if the pandemic continues to be mismanaged.

Bioeconomic Peace Research and Policy

We argue for viewing COVID-19 as an additional instance of bioeconomic interaction in an ongoing history of human relations with the rest of nature. We assert that COVID-19 and other increasingly frequent zoonotic pandemic diseases are a further example of global public bads (GPBs), which are collectively provoking the transition from an extensive to an intensive economic growth model characterized by the provision of corresponding global public goods (GPGs) and sigmoid growth. We describe how these dynamics map on to the classic production–predation dichotomy of peace and conflict economics and call for that dichotomy to be extended to the relationship between the human and nonhuman worlds. Finally, we argue that peace economists are particularly well-positioned to extend their research to diagnose human–nonhuman peace and conflict.

Localized prosocial preferences, public goods, and common-pool resources

The presence of prosocial preferences is thought to reduce significantly the difficulty of solving societal collective action problems such as providing public goods (or reducing public bads). However, prosociality is often limited to members of an in-group. We present a general theoretical model where society is split into subgroups and people care more about the welfare of others in their own subgroup than they do about those in out-groups. Individual contributions to the public good spill over and benefit members in each group to different degrees. We then consider special cases of our general model under which we can examine the consequences of localized prosociality for the economic outcomes of society as a whole. We ask to what extent prosociality closes the welfare gap between the Nash equilibrium without prosociality and the social optimum. The answer depends on whether private and public inputs are good or poor substitutes in producing final output. Critically, the degree to which this welfare gap closes is a concave function of the level of prosociality in the case of poor substitutes, so even low levels of prosociality can lead to social welfare near the social optimum.