Revision and Conditional Inference for Abstract Dialectical Frameworks

For propositional beliefs, there are well-established connections between belief revision, defeasible conditionals and nonmonotonic inference. In argumentative contexts, such connections have not yet been investigated. On the one hand, the exact relationship between formal argumentation and nonmonotonic inference relations is a research topic that keeps on eluding researchers despite recently intensified efforts, whereas argumentative revision has been studied in numerous works during recent years. In this paper, we show that similar relationships between belief revision, defeasible conditionals and nonmonotonic inference hold in argumentative contexts as well. We first define revision operators for abstract dialectical frameworks, and use such revision operators to define dynamic conditionals by means of the Ramsey test. We show that such conditionals can be equivalently defined using a total preorder over three-valued interpretations, and study the inferential behaviour of the resulting conditional inference relations.

What “X Does Not Exist” Says About We Who Do Exist

An untruth can still be true where thus and such is concerned; no surprise there. What is perhaps surprising is that an unfalsehood can be false, when conceived as addressed to a certain subject matter. So it is with “The King of France is bald,” according to Strawson, understood as a claim about the bald people. Could “Vulcan exists” be like this? Though not false, because the term lacks a referent, it is nevertheless false about the existing things; it misdescribes them as including Vulcan. This is a misdescription because for every existing x, x is not Vulcan even if Vulcan exists. How can “x is not Vulcan even if Vulcan exists” be evaluated, though, when the name is empty? Just use the Ramsey Test. When we imagine the oracle saying, “Vulcan exists,” and consider on that basis whether Vulcan is, say, Saturn, the answer is clear.

Ranking kinematics for revising by contextual information

Probability kinematics is a leading paradigm in probabilistic belief change. It is based on the idea that conditional beliefs should be independent from changes of their antecedents’ probabilities. In this paper, we propose a re-interpretation of this paradigm for Spohn’s ranking functions which we call Generalized Ranking Kinematics as a new principle for iterated belief revision of ranking functions by sets of conditional beliefs with respect to their specific subcontext. By taking into account semantical independencies, we can reduce the complexity of the revision task to local contexts. We show that global belief revision can be set up from revisions on the local contexts via a merging operator. Furthermore, we formalize a variant of the Ramsey-Test based on the idea of local contexts which connects conditional and propositional revision in a straightforward way. We extend the belief change methodology of c-revisions to strategic c-revisions which will serve as a proof of concept.

New Paradigm Psychology of Conditional Reasoning and Its Philosophical Sources

There is a new Bayesian, or probabilistic, paradigm in the psychology of reasoning, with new psychological accounts of the indicative conditional of natural language and of conditional reasoning. Dorothy Edgington has had a major impact on this new paradigm, through her views on inference from uncertain premises, the relation between the probability of the indicative conditional, P(if p then q), and the conditional probability, P(q|p), and the use of the Ramsey test to evaluate conditionals. Accounts are given in this chapter of the psychological experiments in the new paradigm that confirm empirical hypotheses inspired by her work and other philosophical sources.

Determinant of Sharia Bank's Financial Performance during the Covid-19 Pandemic

Financial performance as a measuring instrument to know the process of implementing financial resources owned by the company. The Covid-19 pandemic has impacted the banking sector, resulting in poor financing due to debtors' disbursements as a result of the large number of people losing their jobs and difficulties in financing payments. This research aims to analyze the financial performance of Islamic Banks during the Covid-19 pandemic, using records of annual financial statements from 2011 to 2020 through Multiple Linear Regression testing and linearity testing of the model used ramsey test. As a result of this study, the results of the t test found that the Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR), Operating Costs to Operating Income (BOPO), Financing to Deposit Ratio (FDR) had a positive and significant effect on financial performance (ROA) while Not Performing Financing (NPF) had a negative and insignificant effect on financial performance (ROA). Furthermore, simultaneously capital adequacy ratio (CAR), Operating Costs to Operating Income (BOPO), Financing to Deposit Ratio (FDR) and Not Performing Financing (NPF) significantly influenced the financial performance (ROA) of Sharia banks in Indonesia.

The Evidential Conditional

This paper outlines an account of conditionals, the evidential account, which rests on the idea that a conditional is true just in case its antecedent supports its consequent. As we will show, the evidential account exhibits some distinctive logical features that deserve careful consideration. On the one hand, it departs from the material reading of ‘if then’ exactly in the way we would like it to depart from that reading. On the other, it significantly differs from the non-material accounts which hinge on the Ramsey Test, advocated by Adams, Stalnaker, Lewis, and others.

Conditional Reasoning Part II

The influential idea that the Ramsey test provides a proper analysis of the psychological means by which we evaluate indicative and subjunctive conditionals is explained. Several recent views have implicated sui generis imaginative states in the psychological implementation of the Ramsey test. The comparative relevance of the Ramsey test to indicative and subjunctive conditionals is explained. It is then argued that one can accept the basic insight afforded by the Ramsey test without concluding that sui generis imaginative states are used in conditional reasoning. A simpler, more parsimonious approach involves only beliefs. Anyone who could have used sui generis imaginative states to arrive at a belief in a new conditional via the Ramsey test could have, with equal warrant, inferred the conditional from their standing beliefs. Finally, it is shown how the imaginings that occur in response to philosophical thought experiments can in fact be sequences of beliefs.

The Suppositional Rule

The chapter describes the role of suppositions in conditional thinking, from everyday decision-making to mathematical proof, and the cognitive role of imagination in developing the consequences of suppositions. It proposes that the primary way of assessing a conditional ‘If A, C’ is to suppose A and on that basis assess C; whatever attitude you take to C conditionally on A (such as acceptance, rejection, or something in between) take unconditionally to ‘If A, C’; this corresponds to the Ramsey Test or Suppositional Rule. Such offline assessment’s similarities to, and differences from, online updating on new information are discussed. Other ways of assessing ‘If A, C’ are also considered, including experimental testing by making A true, and reliance on memory or testimony without new first-hand testing.