The distributional outcomes of rights-based management in fisheries

Fisheries managers have increasingly adopted rights-based management (i.e., “catch shares” or “individual transferable quotas” [ITQs]) to address economic and biological management challenges under prior governance regimes. Despite their ability to resolve some of the symptoms of the tragedy of the commons and improve economic efficiency, catch shares remain controversial for their potentially disruptive social effects. One criticism is that the benefits of rights-based reforms are unequally distributed across vessels and between fishery participants (e.g., crew and hired captains) and that stakeholders that do not receive an allocation of harvest rights may see their remuneration decrease. Yet, empirically assessing these claims is difficult in almost all ITQs due to poor availability of longitudinal cost, earnings, and employment data. This paper evaluates these claims using vessel-level data to characterize impacts of a long-established ITQ program for Alaskan crab fisheries on the level and distribution of payments to claimant groups. We find that the share of vessel proceeds accruing to captains, crew, and vessel owners declined under the catch-share regime to make room for new payments to quota owners. Average daily payments to captains, crew, and vessel owners declined, albeit slightly, yet retained their pre-ITQ premia relative to compensation in other sectors. However, inequality in payments to workers and vessel owners declined after ITQs, as did the interseasonal volatility in compensation to workers, a measure of financial risk. Finally, we find that consolidation-induced increases in leasing costs have had little effect on workers’ remuneration, but have reduced returns to vessel ownership.

Constrained public benefits from global catch share fisheries

Across publicly owned natural resources, the practice of recovering financial compensation, commonly known as resource rent, from extractive industries influences wealth distribution and general welfare of society. Catch shares are the primary approach adopted to diminish the economically wasteful race to fish by allocating shares of fish quotas—public assets—to selected fishing firms. It is perceived that resource rent is concentrated within catch share fisheries, but there has been no systematic comparison of rent-charging practices with other extractive industries. Here, we estimate the global prevalence of catch share fisheries and compare rent recovery mechanisms (RRM) in the fishing industry with other extractive industries. We show that while catch share fisheries harvest 17.4 million tons (19% of global fisheries landings), with a value of 17.7 billion USD (17% of global fisheries landed value), rent charges occurred in only 5 of 18 countries with shares of fish quotas primarily allocated free of charge. When compared with other extractive industries, fishing is the only industry that consistently lacks RRM. While recovering resource rent for harvesting well-governed fishery resources represents a source of revenue to coastal states, which could be sustained indefinitely, overcharging the industry might impact fish supply. Different RRM occurred in extractive industries, though generally, rent-based charges can help avoid affecting deployment of capital and labor to harvest fish since they depend on the profitability of the operations. Our study could be a starting point for coastal states to consider adapting policies to the enhanced economic condition of the fishing industry under catch shares.

Catch shares drive fleet consolidation and increased targeting but not spatial effort concentration nor changes in location choice in a multispecies trawl fishery

Catch share systems are generally expected to increase economic rents in fisheries by increasing harvest efficiency, reducing capital costs through consolidation, and increasing the value of landed catch. However, these benefits may have costs, as consolidation and the potential for associated change in spatial distribution in landings can hinder social objectives such as maintaining access for fishery-dependent communities and small owner-operators. Achievement of such fishery management objectives are determined by changes in fisher behavior, which may be complex and difficult to predict. Predicting fisher behavior is particularly challenging in multispecies fisheries, in which the mix of species is a determinant of where and when fishing effort and landings occur. We evaluate changes in overall fishing effort, species targeting, and determinants of fishing location choice in response to catch shares in the US West Coast Groundfish Trawl Fishery. We found reductions in total fishing effort, increased targeting of some species, and no evidence of spatial effort concentration. Key determinants of location choice (distance, expected revenue, and recently fished locations) were similar among time periods, but after catch shares there was more avoidance of areas that lacked recent fishing activity or associated information with which to develop expectations of catch and bycatch. Additionally, location choice remained constant with up to 100-fold financial penalties on bycatch species.

Optimizing effort allocation in data poor mixed fisheries

Management of mixed fisheries requires reconciling many different and often conflicting objectives (achieving MSY targets and ensuring economic viability among others). In multi-gear mixed fisheries, where many fleets exploit the same species, reallocation of fishing effort can optimize the biological and socioeconomic output of the fishery. Most existing effort allocation tools require extensive data for their parameterization (i.e. detailed effort data and/or analytical assessment of stock status). We present a low-data demanding effort allocation framework for fisheries managed through effort control, with minimum data requirements the surplus production assessment of key stock, catch shares and basic economic fleet data. Profit maximization is considered the overall management goal, which is constrained by single-species biological targets. The method is tested on the Aegean Sea demersal fishery, where two fleet segments exploit numerous species. To achieve sustainable exploitation for the main Aegean stocks, the total effort should be reduced by ∼30%. The framework allows integrating various biological, economic, or other objectives and provides a simple graphical illustration of the allocation result, which can provide a useful tool to convey complex information to managers. To facilitate its application, the source code developed in R programming environment is provided as a supplement.

Crew in the West Coast Groundfish Catch Share Program: Changes in Compensation and Job Satisfaction

Catch share programs can have far-reaching effects on coastal communities and the people that rely on fishing income, including crew members. Analysis of management actions affecting crew wages and well-being is often limited due to a dearth of available data. We examine crew-related outcomes during the first six years of the West Coast Groundfish Trawl Catch Share Program using two unique datasets – a mandatory economic survey and a voluntary social science study. We find that impacts on crew compensation differ from other catch share programs due to prior conditions of the fishery and also vary by the target species within the program. The median number of crew positions per vessel increased slightly, annual crew days decreased, and crew wage as a percentage of revenue was nearly unchanged, even with the introduction of new costs. Median daily crew compensation increased from \$514 per day to \$776 after implementation of catch shares and annual compensation increased from \$33 thousand to \$39 thousand. Many crew members expressed a lack of support for the program and job satisfaction did not rise with increased wages and fewer days at sea, indicating that job satisfaction is likely influenced by more than compensation and effort.