Legitimate Expectations and Fair-and-Equitable-Treatment under the Energy Charter Treaty

A recent tide of ISDS cases in the renewable energy sector has generated a large number of arbitral awards that turn of the notion of legitimate expectations. The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard (FET) and the notion of legitimate expectations has been highly undetermined in the past. This work contains a comprehensive analysis of the renewable energy awards and the interpretation of the notion of legitimate expectations therein. In particular, it is examined whether arbitral jurisprudence formed a cohesive body of caw-law. The author analyses which aspects with regard to commitment by the states, due diligence of the investors, and level of impact were considered a violation of the FET Standard by recent arbitral tribunals.

Investor Due Diligence and Legitimate Expectations

This article examines the significance of investor due diligence in the context of a claim that a host State has breached its obligation to provide fair and equitable treatment (FET). Despite increasing reliance on due diligence exercises, there are considerable differences in how tribunals understand and use such exercises. These differences are related to different visions of the function and future of international investment law. After exploring the different approaches that are taken, this article will argue that the most coherent approach is to treat investor due diligence as merely a technique for assessing investor reasonableness and prudence, rather than a strict requirement.

BALANCING INVESTOR PROTECTION WITH A STATE’S REGULATORY AUTONOMY IN THE AMENDED SADC FIP

This article focuses on the 2016 Amended Annex 1 to the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Finance and Investment Protocol (FIP) (the Amended Annex), which entered into force on 22 August 2017. It aims at a comprehensive assessment of the adequacy of the Amended Annex in balancing investor protection with SADC member states’ quest for domestic policy space in the content of the treaty provisions. Prior to the amendment, the 2006 SADC FIP contained clauses that were considered challenging in the old international investment agreements (IIAs) – such as broad definitions of “investor” and “investment”, provision for international arbitration as a recourse, and according foreign investors fair and equitable treatment (FET) and most favoured nation (MFN) treatment. The challenges associated with bilateral investment treaties (BITs) (especially investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanisms, restrictions on sovereign policy space and regulatory autonomy) necessitated a review by the SADC member states of the 2006 SADC FIP. The purpose of this article is to reflect on the implications of the 2016 Amended Annex 1 to the SADC FIP with a view to finding a balance between protection enjoyed by investors and the host states’ right to regulate. The article adopts a comparative international law approach, which is useful in order better to understand a SADC member country’s approach to foreign investment protection.

AUTONOMY TO SET THE LEVEL OF REGULATORY PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW

This article argues that State autonomy in setting the level of protection for permissible regulatory aims can be better operationalised in the investment treaty regime. The article draws on comparative insights from WTO law, where it is established that WTO members have the right to determine the level of protection for permissible regulatory aims, although significant disciplines are placed on the means used to achieve those aims. It is then argued that investment treaties are, properly interpreted, consistent with the idea that States retain autonomy to determine the level of protection for permissible regulatory aims. Finally, the article proposes removing from the fair and equitable treatment and indirect expropriation standards proportionality balancing stricto sensu, as this undermines State autonomy in setting the level of protection. Overall, this article argues for a partial reorientation of investment law, in which non-discriminatory measures that pursue a permissible regulatory aim, including at a particular level, should not amount to a breach of a treaty where a State uses the means that involve the least possible restriction of the competing interests protected by relevant investment treaty obligations.

Regulatory Coherence Requirements in Investment Treaty Arbitration

Part IV comprises two chapters, Chapter Seven and Chapter Eight. These chapters focus on investment treaty arbitration. Chapter Seven identifies the regulatory coherence tests emerging under each of the core investment protection guarantees. Fair and equitable treatment guarantees require host States’ regulatory measures to bear reasonable relationships to rational policies. National treatment guarantees call for a reasonable nexus to a rational government policy. The law on expropriation increasingly incorporates the understanding that reasonable measures adopted in good faith to address a real public health or environmental concern are ‘for a public purpose’. These tests all tend to accommodate domestic level decision-making, allowing room for the operation of democratic processes rather than envisaging an international legal override. This will assist with traditional procedural justifications for authority at the domestic and international level.