Relationship Property and Trusts: the "Bundle of Rights" Theory?

<p>This dissertation examines the “bundle of rights” theory as it meets at the intersection of trust and family property law. Drawing on conceptions of property, the principles and purposes of the Property (Relationships) Act and contrasted with trust law, a theory is adopted to explain why family property law has presumptive power over trust principles. Orthodox trust principles are discussed to explain why trust assets are protected from third party claims, the importance of the laws of powers and fiduciary obligations, the problems created by settlor or appointor control and the reason a “controller” is a beneficial owner of trust assets. The dispositions of relationship property to trusts and the limits on compensatory payments are discussed alongside the significance of the abolition of gift duty, other statutory remedies and judicial responses. Case authorities are explored, similarities with Australian alter ego trusts are drawn upon, and the application of the “bundle of rights” theory is discussed with reference to the valuation of debts and occupation orders. The dissertation concludes that the “bundle of rights” theory draws on an expansive meaning of property, it is a principled approach but confined to the Act.</p>

Relationship Property and Trusts: the "Bundle of Rights" Theory?

<p>This dissertation examines the “bundle of rights” theory as it meets at the intersection of trust and family property law. Drawing on conceptions of property, the principles and purposes of the Property (Relationships) Act and contrasted with trust law, a theory is adopted to explain why family property law has presumptive power over trust principles. Orthodox trust principles are discussed to explain why trust assets are protected from third party claims, the importance of the laws of powers and fiduciary obligations, the problems created by settlor or appointor control and the reason a “controller” is a beneficial owner of trust assets. The dispositions of relationship property to trusts and the limits on compensatory payments are discussed alongside the significance of the abolition of gift duty, other statutory remedies and judicial responses. Case authorities are explored, similarities with Australian alter ego trusts are drawn upon, and the application of the “bundle of rights” theory is discussed with reference to the valuation of debts and occupation orders. The dissertation concludes that the “bundle of rights” theory draws on an expansive meaning of property, it is a principled approach but confined to the Act.</p>

8. Charitable trusts

Without assuming prior legal knowledge, books in the Directions series introduce and guide readers through key points of law and legal debate. Questions, diagrams and exercises help readers to engage fully with each subject and check their understanding as they progress. Charitable trusts are not subject to the objections against private purpose trusts and enjoy certain privileges. Charities are not public institutions, but are nevertheless subject to judicial control, to the constitutional protection of the Crown as parens patriae (acting through the Attorney-General) and to the supervision of the Charity Commission. Moreover, they are not subject to the beneficiary principle and to the rule against inalienability of capital. This chapter deals with charitable trusts and discusses the distinction between legal and ‘everyday’ notions of charity. It also examines a charitable purpose, the advantages and disadvantages of charitable status, limits on the recognition of charitable trusts, what happens when a charitable purpose fails, whether the purpose of a charitable status is sufficiently beneficial to the public and the administration of charitable trusts. The chapter furthermore considers trust law and tax law privileges; the roles of charities, such as the prevention or relief of poverty and the advancement of education and religion; the public benefit requirement in educational trusts; recreational charities; the exclusivity requirement; the doctrine of cy près; and the disposal of surplus donations.

17. Informal trusts of land

Without assuming prior legal knowledge, books in the Directions series introduce and guide readers through key points of law and legal debate. Questions, diagrams and exercises help readers to engage fully with each subject and check their understanding as they progress. The trust law that applies to family land might not be applicable to other types of land. Resulting trusts present a particular challenge in this regard. Although the doctrines of resulting trust have long been settled in the law of trusts, they have recently been questioned in the context of the family home. This chapter focuses on informal trusts of land and the social reasons why they are recognised, first looking at the problem of informality before turning to the different kinds of informal trusts of land. It also examines whether facts give rise to a resulting trust or a constructive trust, the practical significance of the distinction between constructive and resulting trusts of land, the relationship between proprietary estoppel and constructive trust, express agreement plus detrimental reliance, and the decision of the House of Lords in Stack v Dowden. The chapter concludes by considering some of the problems addressed by, and caused by, the operation of informal trusts in the context of cohabitation.

The true orthodoxy of trusts law

Trusts evolved over time in a process of cyclical development. Legal drafters have repeatedly devised new versions of existing forms to achieve their clients’ objectives. Legislatures and courts have then recognised, or rejected, the legal validity of these innovations. Their responses prompt further innovatory moves by drafters, and so the rules governing validity and drafting practices have developed hand in hand. There is nothing new about the way commercial parties have put trust structures to new uses. Opposing their innovations on the ground that these depart from trust law ‘orthodoxy’ is to misunderstand the true orthodoxy of trusts law.

The Role of Trust Law Principles in Defining Public Trust Duties for Natural Resources

Public trusts for natural resources incorporate both limits and duties on governments in their stewardship of those natural resources. They exist in every state in the United States—in constitutional provisions, statutes, and in common law. Yet the law recognizing public trusts for natural resources may contain only the most basic provisions—often just a sentence or two. The purpose and terms of these public trusts certainly answer some questions about the limits and duties of trustees, but they do not answer all questions. When questions arise that the body of law creating or recognizing a public trust for natural resources does not fully answer, trustees, lawyers, and courts often look to trust law for help. In fact, they have been doing so for more than a century, including in the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark 1892 public trust decision, Illinois Central Railroad Co. v Illinois. In this sense, trust law provides a set of background or underlying principles for interpreting and applying public trusts. Using cases from around the country, this Article sets out a four-step methodology for determining when and how to use trust law principles to help interpret public trusts. This methodology can be applied in any case involving the use of specific trust principles to help interpret any particular public trust. This Article also explains that the relevant trust law should not be limited to private trust law, but rather it should include general trust principles, charitable trust law principles, and private (or noncharitable) trust law principles. This Article uses a 2019 Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania decision, Pennsylvania Environmental Defense Foundation v. Commonwealth, as a case study. The case applies article I, section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which requires that public natural resources be conserved and maintained for the benefit of present and future generations. In that case, the court used an interpretation of private trust law to decide that the state could spend some bonus and rental payment money from oil and gas leasing on state forest and park land, which is constitutional public trust property, for non-trust purposes. This Article applies the four-part methodology to the case, explains general trust law and charitable trust law principles that the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania did not address, and argues that the use of these principles better fits the constitutional public trust. It concludes that the money from bonus and rental payments should be spent entirely for the purposes of the trust. This Article draws attention to both the potential value of trust law principles and also to their potential danger in the interpretation and application of public trust laws for natural resources. Trust law has the potential to enhance the protectiveness of public trusts by imposing various fiduciary duties on trustees. It also has the potential to undermine public trusts, particularly through rules requiring or encouraging that trust assets be financially productive. To vindicate public trusts for natural resources, environmental and natural resources lawyers need to become better trust lawyers.

Reviewing the Decision of the Nigerian Supreme Court in Huebner v AIE and PM Co Ltd: A Dissenting Opinion

In this case, the Nigerian Supreme Court had the opportunity to build on the foundations of Nigerian trust law. The court was faced with facts that should have led to the implication of a resulting trust in favour of the appellant, since he had purchased a large parcel of land in the name of the respondent. While accepting that it made no contribution to the purchase or development of the land, the respondent sought to escape its fiduciary duty by alleging illegality, using the provisions of the Land Use Act as a statutory shield. The Nigerian Supreme Court endorsed the respondent's position, by electing to focus on the breach of the statute, while ignoring that equity would not allow a statute to be used as an instrument of fraud. This article shows how the court erred, as the statutory breach was not fatal to the appellant's claim: equity does not demand that its suitors have led blameless lives.

Scrutinising the role of members in charitable companies: Lehtimäki and others v Cooper [2020] UKSC 33

The law of charities is generally recognised as a branch of the law of trust but, nonetheless, has received special judicial treatment as distinguished from ordinary trust doctrines. In Lehtimäki and others v Cooper [2020] UKSC 33, interesting but difficult questions arose as to how the court should treat the members of charitable companies, and the decision made by the court has significant implications in charity law and trust law. First, the court has recognised the members as fiduciaries to charitable companies, but the boundary of the fiduciary duty needs further judicial clarification. Secondly, the court created an exception to the well-settled “non-intervention principle” in trust law but it calls for scrutiny. Lastly, Lehtimäki has an impact on the corporate governance of charitable companies, since it held that fiduciaries of charitable companies must obey an order made by the court which exercises a discretion of the trustees upon their surrender of discretion.