Iraqi Kurdistan will face dilemmas over federal ties

Significance Long-time Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) leader Masoud Barzani and new Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) chief Bafel Talabani discussed how to form a common front over government formation in Baghdad. The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) is benefitting from temporary stability linked to higher oil prices. Impacts Kurdish hesitation on whether to commit to a Sadrist-led majority federal government will also simultaneously hold back Sunni groups. Both Turkey and Iran could become more militaristic in their approach to the KRI -- and each other. The intra-PUK deadlock could lead to fighting in Suleimaniya, but mediation is more likely, if senior party figures step up.

Bulgarian elections will not ease government formation

Significance While the presidential election is the scheduled five-yearly poll, the November parliamentary election comes about after elections in April and July failed to resolve political deadlock. Bulgaria is polarised around the personalities of former Prime Minister Boyko Borisov and incumbent President Rumen Radev. Impacts Rising COVID-19 infections and the lowest vaccination level in the EU create a context conducive to the search for quick fixes. The anti-Borisov protest wave is increasingly balanced out by polarisation around Radev’s alleged ambitions. A focus on the record of caretaker governments in charge since May will partially deflect scrutiny of Borisov’s eleven years in government.

Flanders

This chapter considers a case, Flanders, where secessionism has not gained strength despite many episodes fuelling tensions between the two main communities and significant, though episodic, cynicism about the future of the country. The singular political development of the Belgian state, which has involved an incremental and open-ended process of decentralization, has meant that Flemish autonomy is dynamic. Belgium is famous for its seemingly incessant constitutional politics leading to reforms of the state that transform the country’s institutional architecture in innovative ways. For Flanders, these state reforms have meant a gradual expansion of autonomy. Moreover, the reforms are never meant to conclude a process of decentralization; they always leave issues to be dealt with at an ulterior date. State reforms are high-profile events that often occur to manage a crisis between the two communities and are subject to government formation agreements in the context of the country’s consociational practices. Flemish parties can typically have a state reform if most of them want one or else the country remains without a government, which is something Francophone parties want to avoid for fear it makes Belgium seem unworkable and therefore feeds Flemish secessionist arguments. As Flemings know there is a forthcoming state reform that will enhance their collective autonomy and address some issues perceived as important for their national identity and interests, there is little incentive to support secessionist positions.

Government formation in Germany could take months

Headline GERMANY: Government formation could take months

Foreign influence could affect German elections

Significance With Angela Merkel stepping down after 16 years in power, and opinion polls showing the race is narrowing, the incentive for interference is unusually high. The Greens, who are polling strongly and advocate a much tougher stance towards China and Russia, are most at risk. Impacts If there is no option for a two-party coalition after the elections, government formation talks will take a long time. If elected, Laschet will come under pressure from CDU members to take a tougher line on China. After COVID-19, climate change is the most important issue for voters ahead of the elections.

Portugal: Left-Wing Single-Party Governments and Right-Wing Coalitions

How have Portuguese political parties, especially the ones in coalition governments, operated? The main focus of this chapter is the study of coalition governments in Portugal since the 2000s. This chapter shows how the country’s governments have shifted back and forth from left-wing single-party governments to right-wing coalition governments during this period. It aims to improve the understanding of Portuguese governments by shedding light on their specificities and dynamics. It is thus useful as a standalone chapter or as a source for multi-country comparisons. The chapter is initiated with a brief description of Portugal’s institutional setting. It is developed further by delving into the country’s party system followed by a discussion of government-formation issues. In conclusion, the chapter considers all the previous information going deeper into coalition governance mechanisms.

Denmark: How to Form and Govern Minority Coalitions

Not much has changed in Denmark in the past few decades when it comes to the institutional setting and government formation: Danish governments remain predominantly of the minority form, most of them coalitions; the formal institutions of the constitution and the procedures for government formation have not been altered, and neither has the party system changed much. Likewise, the number of portfolios remain steady at around twenty. Yet, the internal workings of Danish governments have changed. Based on interviews with leading former ministers, the chapter shows how, over the last thirty years, Danish coalition governance has shifted towards more centralized decision-making through hierarchical coordination committees and oversight from the office of the prime minister and the ministry of finance. Actual decision moves away from the model of full individual responsibility for ministers found in the constitution. Furthermore, Danish governments now usually remain in office for the full term. All of this indicates that the Danish case provides a scenario in which political parties have developed a form to make minority governments function effectively.

Spain: Single-Party Majority and Minority Governments

This chapter examines governments in Spain, which stands out in comparative European perspective. Between its transition to democracy in the 1970s and 2019, it did not have a coalition government. Instead, governments were either single-party minority or majority ones. It was not until 2020 that Spain had its first coalition government—a minority one. This chapter reviews the institutions relevant to the life cycle of governments, the parliamentary party system and changes therein, and the record of government formation, governability, and government termination until 2018. In comparative perspective, Spain’s governments before 2015 generally formed rather easily, governed without great difficulty, and were quite stable. In contrast, the party system change in 2015 led to severe difficulties of government formation and governability.

Coalition Governance Patterns across Western Europe

We here summarize and compare the empirical results found by our country authors, focusing on the coalition life cycle in seventeen countries. The chapter starts with a description of the changes that have occurred during the past decades in the party systems of Western Europe, and some institutional rules surrounding government formation and duration. We then turn to the comparing patterns of government formation across countries, showing that coalitions constitute almost 70 per cent of the cabinets in Western Europe, and that the Scandinavian countries have been dominated by minority cabinets. Focusing on the coalition governance stage, we analyse the variation in the use of different control mechanisms across countries, for example showing that many coalition governments draft extensive contracts to control their partners in cabinet. The comparative data we present also shows that such agreements have become longer over time. Focusing on the last stage of the life cycle, we show that in a majority of countries, it is more common that a cabinet terminates early than serves the full term. There has also been a clear trend towards more government instability, even though the variation in cabinet duration across countries is large. We conclude this chapter by returning to the three coalition governance models described earlier in this volume, classifying the countries as being closer to one of the three models, based on a number of indicators and the information provided by our country experts.