The Second Paralogism

This chapter examines Kant’s discussion of the second paralogism, focusing on the changes in his diagnosis between the two editions. It begins by isolating the contribution made to the argument by a certain sub-argument known as the ‘Achilles’. It then argues that Kant switches from presenting the paralogism, in the A-edition, as a valid argument (with one unknown premise), which aims to establish the ‘simplicity’ of the soul (in the sense of its being one thing as opposed to many) to presenting it, in the B-edition, as an invalid argument, with known premises, which aims to establish the soul’s individual substantiality (its being one substance). He makes this change because he comes to doubt his own earlier claim that an assumption supporting the minor premise, the so-called ‘nervus probandi’, cannot be known to be true. The chapter seeks to explain this change of mind.

TINJAUAN YURIDIS TERHADAP DOKUMEN PERJANJIAN PEMBIAYAAN KONSUMEN PT BAF SURAKARTA

<p>Abstract<br />This article aims to determine the suitability of the consumer financing agreement made by PT Bussan Auto Finance (BAF) with the regulations stipulated in the Civil Code. As for analyzing these problems is done by using normative methods with approaches used through the statute approach. The legal material analysis technique used by using the syllogism method is by using the deduction method which is the opposite of submitting a major premise and then submits a minor premise and from then draws a conclusion. The results of this study indicate that the consumer financing agreement of PT Bussan Auto Finance (BAF) is in accordance with the terms of the agreement stipulated in the Civil Code. The conditions are as follows: (1) Their agreement is binding, agreement can be seen through the signatures of the parties in the agreement; (2) The ability to make an engagement, the parties must include a National Identity Card (KTP) to prove their skills; (3) A certain subject matter, namely regarding the financing of a motorized vehicle; (4) A reason that is not prohibited, the financing made is a reason that is lawful and does not conflict with the law. Then the agreement is valid and binding and applies as a law for the parties who make it.<br />Keywords: Agreement; Consumer Financing Agreement; Financing Company.</p><p>Abstrak<br />Artikel ini bertujuan untuk mengetahui kesesuaian antara perjanjian pembiayaan kosumen yang dibuat oleh PT Bussan Auto Finance (BAF) dengan peraturan yang diatur dalam KUH Perdata. Adapun untuk menganalisis permasalahan tersebut dilakukan dengan menggunakan metode normatif dengan pendekatan yang digunakan melalui pendekatan undang-undang (statute approach). Teknik analisis bahan hukum yang digunakan dengan menggunakan metode silogisme yaitu dengan penggunaan metode deduksi yang bepangkal dari pengajuan premis mayor kemudian diajukan premis minor dan dari kemudian ditarik suatu kesimpulan. Hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa perjanjian pembiayaan konsumen PT Bussan Auto Finance (BAF) telah sesuai dengan syarat-syarat perjanjian yang diatur dalam KUH Perdata. Adapun syarat-syarat tersebut adalah sebagai berikut: (1) Kesepakatan mereka yang mengikatkan diri, kesepakatan dapat dilihat melalui tanda tangan para pihak dalam perjanjian; (2) Kecakapan untuk membuat perikatan, para pihak wajib mencantumkan Kartu Tanda Penduduk (KTP) untuk membuktikan kecakapannya; (3) Suatu pokok persoalan tertentu, yakni mengenai pembiayaan sebuah kendaraan bermotor; (4) Suatu sebab yang tidak terlarang, pembiayaan yang dilakukan tersebut merupakan suatu sebab yang halal dan tidak bertentangan dengan undang-undang. Maka perjanjian tersebut sah dan mengikat serta berlaku sebagai undang-undang bagi para pihak yang membuatnya. <br />Kata Kunci: Perjanjian; Perjanjian Pembiayaan Konsumen; Perusahaan Pembiayaan</p>

Circular Demonstration and the Necessity of Minor Premises

In the Prior Analytics Aristotle famously endorses the validity of the mixed modal syllogism Barbara lxl, but in the Posterior Analytics we appear to find Aristotle arguing that since demonstrations are only of what cannot be otherwise, both premises need to be necessary. One would almost think that Aristotle had forgotten what he said about mixed modal syllogisms were it not for the fact that he also appears to refer to it directly in Posterior Analytics i.6. This is puzzling. In this paper I will consider evidence for and against taking both premises to be necessary and conclude that, in accordance with Barbara lxl, the major premise of a demonstration needs to be necessary but the minor premise need not be, and this because the minor term – which denotes the object of inquiry and that to which the demonstrator is trying to demonstrate that something belongs necessarily – may be an accidental term. In particular, I will be offering an original interpretation of Aristotle’s arguments against circular demonstration in Posterior Analytics i.3, which only makes sense if the minor premise is not necessary.

Playing peripatos: Creativity and abductive inference in religion, art and war

Peirce proposed the concept of abductive inference to inquire into the generation of new hypotheses and defined it as another term for pragmatism, no less (Admitting, then, that the question of Pragmatism is the question of Abduction, let us consider it under that form. What is good abduction? What should an explanatory hypothesis be to be worthy to rank as a hypothesis? Of course, it must explain the facts. But what other conditions ought it to fulfill to be good? The question of the goodness of anything is whether that thing fulfills its end. What, then, is the end of an explanatory hypothesis? Its end is, through subjection to the test of experiment, to lead to the avoidance of all surprise and to the establishment of a habit of positive expectation that shall not be disappointed (Peirce. 1931–1966. The collected papers of Charles S. Peirce, 8 vols., C. Hartshorne, P. Weiss & A. W. Burks (eds.). Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 5.197)). Apart from being linked to the vague idea of the play of musement as an almost dreamlike process of epiphany or inspiration or as an inverted minor premise from a syllogism, we are far from understanding the dynamics and specificity of this kind of inference. Among authors dealing with this problem I could trace three factors at work in processes of abduction, i.e. combination, resemblance, and dialetics or questioning. In this paper I attempt to look a bit further into this enigma by a category of play I defined as “peripatos” or games of invention, riddles, and puzzles, hoping it could shed some light on the process of creativity in several social activities such as science, art, war, and religion. The approach will take on Huizinga’s idea of the play of culture, Lakoff and Johnson’s conception of cross-domain correlations, Kant’s view of “aesthetic ideas,” and my proposal of the play of peripatos through a “what if-as if” coupling into this very common yet little understood, and thus mystified, process of the generation of innovative ideas.

Substance and Procedure

This chapter discusses the procedure for prosecuting international crime. Being guilty of an international crime is one thing; being prosecuted and convicted is quite another. Being guilty in principle requires the following: first, an identification of a norm under which the suspect would be guilty if the norm applied to them; second, the application of the norm to the offender to conclude that the particular person is guilty. Initially, this two-stage procedure might take place in the minds of observers, and then, in the minds of people capable of bringing to bear the procedures of the International Criminal Court (ICC) or other international-national tribunals in order to effectuate a conviction. In either case, the notion of liability or guilt requires reasoning in a syllogism. The major premise is the substantive law, and the minor premise consists of the facts that appear to be provable at trial.

Pode o intraduzível traduzir-se. Deve.

Resumo: A partir da situação de obras-limite como Grande sertão: veredas, de Guimarães Rosa (e o Finnegans Wake, de James Joyce, por exemplo) o texto apresenta um argumento em favor da traduzibilidade da literatura como tal e, especialmente, das obras literárias mais radicais, propondo inclusive que essa sua radicalidade torna ainda mais central sua condição de “traduzíveis”. Ao longo de uma comparação entre obras literárias, musicais e pictóricas, e seus diferentes conceitos de original e reprodução, o texto sustenta que a reprodutibilidade é por necessidade corolário da base linguística da literatura, o que acarreta a traduzibilidade necessária como premissa menor, derivada, e, portanto, quase inquestionável.Palavras-chave: traduzibilidade; experimentalismo; Grande sertão: veredas; Finnegans Wake.Abstract: From the situation of such radical works as Grande Sertão: Veredas, by João Guimarães Rosa (and Finnegans Wake, by James Joyce, for instance) this paper argues in favor of the translatability of literature as such and, most specially, of the more avant-garde works of literary art, whose radical position makes their translatability even more necessary. After comparing works of literature, music and painting, and their different ideas of originality and reproduction in each of these fields, this paper argues that this reproducibility is a natural consequence of the linguistic basis of literature, which entails this translatability as a minor premise, a second-order premise, which is, as such, unquestionable.Keywords: translatability; experimentalism; Grande sertão: veredas; Finnegans Wake.