Hedge Funds and Financial Misreporting

The growth of the hedge fund industry can be ascribed to its performance-based incentive compensation system as well as a lighter regulatory environment. These features, however, could also potentially create more opportunities for financial misreporting and even fraud. In response, recent research has attempted to detect misreporting by using due diligence information or by examining patterns in hedge fund returns. Empirical evidence suggests that hedge fund fraud can be usefully predicted from due diligence information, especially evidence of previous misrepresentation. Predicting misreporting from hedge fund returns, however, is much more difficult. This is because returns may reflect patterns in underlying assets instead of manager manipulation. For hedge fund investors, the good news is that the accumulated body of experience about detecting misreporting should help improve the quality of hedge fund investments. In addition, newly-imposed registration requirements for hedge fund advisors should also lower occurrences of misreporting.

Hedge Fund Treasury Trading and Funding Fragility: Evidence from the COVID-19 Crisis

Hedge fund gross U.S. Treasury (UST) exposures doubled from 2018 to February 2020 to $2.4 trillion, primarily driven by relative value arbitrage trading and supported by corresponding increases in repo borrowing. In March 2020, amid unprecedented UST market turmoil, the average UST trading hedge fund had a return of -7% and reduced its UST exposure by close to 20%, despite relatively unchanged bilateral repo volumes and haircuts. Analyzing hedge fund-creditor borrowing data, we find the large, more regulated dealers provided disproportionately more funding during the crisis than other creditors. Overall, the step back in hedge fund UST activity was primarily driven by fund-specific liquidity management rather than dealer regulatory constraints. Hedge funds exited the turmoil with 20% higher cash holdings and smaller, more liquid portfolios, despite low contemporaneous outflows. This precautionary flight to cash was more pronounced among funds exposed to greater redemption risk through shorter share restrictions. Hedge funds predominantly trading the cash-futures basis faced greater margin pressure and reduced UST exposures and repo borrowing the most. After the market turmoil subsided following Fed intervention, hedge fund returns recovered quickly, but UST exposures did not revert to pre-shock levels over the subsequent months.