THE NEOREALISM AND NEOLIBERALISM BEHIND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS DURING COVID-19

The literature contains much discussion on the contemporary differences between neorealism and neoliberalism, especially in the context of international relations. However there have, as yet, been limited attempts to investigate how these international relations theories fare in explaining state responses to the COVID-19 outbreak. This study reviews the conceptual frameworks underpinning neorealism and neoliberalism and applies them to key state behaviors during the COVID-19 outbreak. Some examples of neorealism attached to the current pandemic include: criticism of the role of the World Health Organization, the closure of international borders, international competition to collect pharmaceutical products, bans on exports, richer states protecting their national interests, the international misuse of power during emergency orders, restrictions placed on the international media, and the deployment of military forces. By contrast, neoliberalism's focus on international cooperation is noted in U.S., Chinese, and other countries’ attempts to distribute knowledge and aid internationally, as well as in the efforts of key international organizations like the World Health Organization and the global Covax initiative. I offer an evidence-based conceptual framework using neorealism and neoliberalism to show how both have informed international behavior during the COVID-19 outbreak—although continued emphasis on the former shows few signs of abating as the pandemic approaches its third year.

Domestic Politics, China's Rise, and the Future of the Liberal International Order

With the future of liberal internationalism in question, how will China's growing power and influence reshape world politics? We argue that views of the Liberal International Order (LIO) as integrative and resilient have been too optimistic for two reasons. First, China's ability to profit from within the system has shaken the domestic consensus in the United States on preserving the existing LIO. Second, features of Chinese Communist Party rule chafe against many of the fundamental principles of the LIO, but could coexist with a return to Westphalian principles and markets that are embedded in domestic systems of control. How, then, do authoritarian states like China pick and choose how to engage with key institutions and norms within the LIO? We propose a framework that highlights two domestic variables—centrality and heterogeneity—and their implications for China's international behavior. We illustrate the framework with examples from China's approach to climate change, trade and exchange rates, Internet governance, territorial sovereignty, arms control, and humanitarian intervention. Finally, we conclude by considering what alternative versions of international order might emerge as China's influence grows.

Putin, Putinism, and the Domestic Determinants of Russian Foreign Policy

Why did Russia's relations with the West shift from cooperation a few decades ago to a new era of confrontation today? Some explanations focus narrowly on changes in the balance of power in the international system, or trace historic parallels and cultural continuities in Russian international behavior. For a complete understanding of Russian foreign policy today, individuals, ideas, and institutions—President Vladimir Putin, Putinism, and autocracy—must be added to the analysis. An examination of three cases of recent Russian intervention (in Ukraine in 2014, Syria in 2015, and the United States in 2016) illuminates the causal influence of these domestic determinants in the making of Russian foreign policy.

The Political Agency of Billionaires

Chapter 4 develops arguments and hypotheses about the political agency of billionaires, in terms of capacities, goals, and power. It draws upon insights from the “structure-agency” discussion and the political sociology of elites. While all billionaires control vast amounts of money, only few of them venture into world politics. A billionaire’s motivation to act transnationally may stem from material interests or a sociopolitical identity whose commitments reach across national borders. Wealth can be a highly fungible power resource, but its activation depends on what can be purchased, which is regulated by laws and norms. Entrepreneurial success in business can foster self-efficacy beliefs as well as social and cultural capital, yet whether this can be put to use in politics is contingent upon the political field that a billionaire is trying to enter. Further analysis thus needs to take the specificities of a billionaire’s international actions into account. This chapter is developing the analytical tools for the following case studies (chapter 5), which are structured around three goals that are often assumed to drive the international behavior of states: security, wealth (economy), and esteem (social entrepreneurship).

Middle Eastern Middle Powers

This chapter analyzes a selection of mediation and conflict-prevention initiatives promoted by Middle Eastern middle powers since the 1980s. It begins by noting that behavioral approaches to middle power status consider systematic engagement in mediation and conflict prevention as one of the key traits of “middlepowerness,” and reflects on how the literature on middle power mediation and norm-based international behavior can be applied specifically to the Middle East. It then turns to the analysis of three case studies of norm-based mediation or conflict resolution initiatives promoted by three Middle Eastern middle powers—Algeria, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt—since the 1980s.

Withdrawal, Opposition, and Aggression

This chapter discusses why it is expected of humiliating events to alter state behavior. It outlines the various responses that states may have to humiliating events, ranging from withdrawal to direct military conflict. The chapter addresses how responses to humiliating events can affect the behaviors of other states as well as the overall stability of the international system. It shows that the effects of national humiliation on state behavior are not so straightforward. Not all states respond to humiliating events in the same ways. Some states pursue direct military revenge, whereas others may pursue symbols of high status or initiate conflict against third-party states. The chapter also discusses why exactly humiliating events affect international behavior and describes possible reactions to national humiliation.

Conclusion The Attenuation and Prevention of National Humiliation

This chapter provides a conclusion by placing the findings into the broader context of international politics and international relations theory. It demonstrates the utility of the theory for understanding the contemporary foreign policies of China and Russia and sheds light on why the effects of humiliation may linger in some states longer than others. The chapter draws key distinctions between the theory and predictions of humiliation and more material and security-based explanations of international behavior. It addresses questions on what can be done to ameliorate or even prevent national humiliation and why are the ameliorative strategies often not employed by other states, much to the detriment of international stability and cooperation. It emphasizes how national humiliation affects world affairs in crucial ways and how it led important periods of international competition within the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and will continue to do so in the future.

Introduction

This chapter shows that Germany's catastrophic reaction to humiliation engendered by the outcome of World War I was not an anomaly. It talks about how Germany's humiliation was representative of a broader pattern of international behavior in which states that have experienced certain humiliating events are more likely to engage in international aggression and intentionally defiant foreign policies. It also explains how humiliated states will be more apt to pursue territorial conquest, intervene in the affairs of other states, engage in diplomatic hostility and verbal discord, and pursue advanced weaponry and other symbols of national resurgence. Humiliated states engage in hostile behaviors because they define high international status and enables those who identify with the state to overcome humiliation and regain a sense of collective efficacy and authority. The chapter explores the ways in which the hostile acts toughen the image of the state in the eyes of others because they demonstrate the state's distinctive capabilities as well as its intention to restore prior status.