Ethics: A Guide for Science

Ethics is crucial for science. This article aims to outline the relationship between ethics and science. Science as a profession cannot be separated from ethics. Scientists require not only rigorous methods and procedures in their work but also ethics to guide them. They are demanded as experts in their fields and as good persons. Ordinary people (non-scientific society) trust reliable scientists who have good competence, skill and personality. Hence, integration of science and ethics bring up epistemic trust, on the one hand among scientists and on the other hand among scientists and non-scientific society. There are various kinds of ethics that can be a guide for the scientific work of scientists. However, in this article I offer Karol Wojtyła's personalist ethics based on the philosophy of being as a guide for science.

Errare Humanum Est (To Err Is Human): A Mentalizing Breakdown in the Therapeutic Work With an Adolescent

The therapeutic stance in therapies conceptualized by the two-person psychology (Wachtel, 2010) binds the therapist to genuine self-scrutiny. The concepts of transference and countertransference are viewed as jointly constructed endeavors between therapist and client, wherein the therapist needs to be aware of her contribution to difficulties arising in the therapeutic dyad. Different conceptualizations of this therapeutic technique have been eloquently described elsewhere throughout the years in terms of intersubjectivity (Stern, 2005; Aron, 2006), mentalizing (Fonagy and Bateman, 2006), mindfulness-in-action (Safran et al., 2001), rupture and repair (Newhill et al., 2003), and epistemic trust (Fonagy and Allison, 2014). These concepts will be presented interchangeably with a clinical vignette delineating a rupture in the therapeutic work with an adolescent. Finally, the article concludes with a discussion of identifying non-mentalizing modes (Allen et al., 2008) within the therapist to get back on track and restore epistemic trust (Fonagy et al., 2014) in the therapeutic relationship.

Biased memory retrieval in the service of shared reality with an audience: The role of cognitive accessibility

After communicators have tuned a message about a target person’s behaviors to their audience’s attitude, their recall of the target’s behaviors is often evaluatively consistent with their audience’s attitude. This audience-tuning effect on recall has been explained as resulting from the communicators’ creation of a shared reality with the audience, which helps communicators to achieve epistemic needs for confident judgments and knowledge. Drawing on the ROAR (Relevance Of A Representation) model, we argue that shared reality increases the cognitive accessibility of information consistent (vs. inconsistent) with the audience’s attitude, due to enhanced truth relevance of this information. We tested this prediction with a novel reaction-time task in three experiments employing the saying-is-believing paradigm. Faster reactions to audience-consistent (vs. audience-inconsistent) information were found for trait information but not for behavioral information. Thus, audience-congruent accessibility bias emerged at the level at which impressions and judgments of other persons are typically organized. Consistent with a shared-reality account, the audience-consistent accessibility bias was correlated with perceived shared reality about the target person and with epistemic trust in the audience. Among possible explanations, the findings are best reconciled with the view that the creation of shared reality with an audience triggers basic and "automatic" (spontaneous, low-level) cognitive mechanisms that facilitate the retrieval of audience-congruent (vs. audience-incongruent) trait information about a target person.

Acquiring knowledge: Epistemic trust in the age of fake news

The alarming spread of fake news and the breakdown of collective trust in sources of information is a major ongoing concern. Public mistrust and conspiracy beliefs canchange behaviour in a way that profoundly alters society’s reaction to new information. However, we still lack a broad psychological and socio-evolutionary understanding ofthe transmission of knowledge: the concept of epistemic trust (defined as trust in communicated knowledge) could provide the basis for such an integrated understanding. This study examined the role of epistemic trust in determining individualcapacity to recognise fake and real news, and susceptibility to conspiracy thinking – both in general and in relation to COVID-19. Measuring three different epistemic dispositions – trusting, mistrusting and credulous – in two different studies (study 1 = 705; study 2 = 502), we found that Credulity is associated with inability to discriminate between fake and real news. To explore the developmental factors at work in creating vulnerability to fake news, we investigated the mediating role of Mistrust and Credulity, and found that these factors mediated the relationship between exposure to childhood adversity and the failure to distinguish between fake and real news. Both Mistrust and Credulity were also associated with general and COVID-19 related conspiracy beliefs; similarly, Mistrust and Credulity were associated with vaccine hesitancy, both in general and in relation to COVID-19. Findings illuminate the potential psychological processes at work in generating broad social-political phenomena such as fake news and conspiracy thinking.

Epistemic Trust and the Emergence of Conduct Problems: Aggression in the Service of Communication

Fonagy and colleagues have recently proposed that deficits in the capacity for epistemic trust (i. e., the expectation that interpersonal communication is relevant to the addressee) are fundamental to psychopathology. In this paper, we consider the implications of this hypothesis for understanding the role of aggression in conduct disorder and conduct problems more generally. Our main proposal is to view conduct problems not only as reflecting dysregulation, but as an adaptation that allows communication with others who are (or are perceived to be) unreliable. Our formulation hinges on two propositions. The first one is to view aggression as a modality of communication adapted to scenarios in which the communicator expects the audience to have low epistemic trust in the communicator. The second idea is to conceptualize the failed “unlearning of aggression” as reflecting a lack of interest in maintaining one's reputation as a communicator, which in turn stems from a lack of epistemic trust in other communicators. In this paper, we discuss these ideas and examine how they may account for the developmental pathways that lead young people to develop conduct problems.

How Group Perception Affects What People Share and How People Feel: The Role of Entitativity and Epistemic Trust in the “Saying-Is-Believing” Effect

This research investigated how interpersonal communication with a large audience can influence communicators’ attitudes. Research on the saying-is-believing effect has shown that when an individual’s attitude is perceived in advance by a communicator, the communicator tunes the message to the person, which biases the communicator’s attitude toward the person’s attitude. In this study, we examined the conditions under which audience tuning and attitude bias can occur with audiences containing more than one individual. We manipulated communicators’ perceived group entity for a large audience and the audience’s prior attitudinal valence and measured the audience’s epistemic trust. The results showed that communicators tuned their messages to the audience’s attitude when they perceived group entitativity and epistemic trust. Furthermore, tuning the message to the audience was found to bias communicators’ subsequent impressions of the topic in a direction closer to the audience’s attitude. These results suggest that perceiving a large audience as a group influences the subsequent impressions of electronic word-of-mouth product or service communicators.

Forgiveness and the Repairing of Epistemic Trust

The epistemic relevance of forgiveness has been neglected by both the discussion of forgiveness in moral psychology and by social epistemology generally. Moral psychology fails to account for the forgiveness of epistemic wrongs and for the way that wrongs in general have epistemic implications. Social epistemology, for its part, neglects the way that epistemic trust is not only conferred but repaired. In this essay, I show that the repair of epistemic trust through forgiveness is necessary to the economy of knowledge for fallible persons like us. Despite the fact that forgiveness is never included on lists of important intellectual virtues or epistemic activities, it is vital to our lives as social knowers. Likewise, an account of forgiveness that neglects its epistemic dimension is importantly incomplete.

Cultivating trust, producing knowledge: The management of archaeological labour and the making of a discipline

Like any science, archaeology relies on trust between actors involved in the production of knowledge. In the early history of archaeology, this epistemic trust was complicated by histories of Orientalism in the Middle East and colonialism more broadly. The racial and power dynamics underpinning 19th- and early 20th-century archaeology precluded the possibility of interpersonal moral trust between foreign archaeologists and locally hired labourers. In light of this, archaeologists created systems of reward, punishment, and surveillance to ensure the honest behaviour of site workers. They thus invented a set of structural conditions that produced sufficient epistemic trust for archaeological research to proceed—a system that continues to shape archaeology to the present day.

Epistemic Blame and the Normativity of Evidence

The normative force of evidence can seem puzzling. It seems that having conclusive evidence for a proposition does not, by itself, make it true that one ought to believe the proposition. But spelling out the condition that evidence must meet in order to provide us with genuine normative reasons for belief seems to lead us into a dilemma: the condition either fails to explain the normative significance of epistemic reasons or it renders the content of epistemic norms practical. The first aim of this paper is to spell out this challenge for the normativity of evidence. I argue that the challenge rests on a plausible assumption about the conceptual connection between normative reasons and blameworthiness. The second aim of the paper is to show how we can meet the challenge by spelling out a concept of epistemic blameworthiness. Drawing on recent accounts of doxastic responsibility and epistemic blame, I suggest that the normativity of evidence is revealed in our practice of suspending epistemic trust in response to impaired epistemic relationships. Recognizing suspension of trust as a form of epistemic blame allows us to make sense of a purely epistemic kind of normativity the existence of which has recently been called into doubt by certain versions of pragmatism and instrumentalism.