Norm Exemption in States’ NPT Nuclear Disarmament Obligations

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) is highly appreciated for its ability to stop further nuclear proliferation in the world. Since its existence, this treaty has been said to be successful in preventing potential states from possessing weapons of mass destruction. At least, there are more than 40 states who have the capability to develop their own nuclear programmes, although such programmes are restrained from coming to fruition. However, this successful story has not taken place in the area of nuclear disarmament. None of its nuclear weapon-owning members seem to proceed with realising a full disarmament aim. This raises the question of why the NPT is unable to achieve success in the field of nuclear disarmament as it has in the field of nuclear non-proliferation. The NPT does not only contain the idea of nuclear non-proliferation, but also the idea of nuclear disarmament. In understanding this question, using a political psychology approach, this study finds that nuclear-weapon states face the so-called moral dilemma between the desire to achieve national interests and the desire to fulfil social demands required by the international norm. By taking advantage of the shortcomings in the NPT narrative as well as relevant world situations, these states attempt to be exempted from dismantling nuclear weapons under their possession.

In-regime manager: China’s strategy against nuclear India

This paper examines China’s strategy toward India’s emergence as a nuclear weapons state that reflects boundary work and delineates Beijing’s bond and boundaries of solidarity among member states in the nuclear nonproliferation regime. China’s preferred approach toward India is to maintain an asymmetrical position, to continue with a group-based resistance, and to leverage the scope of conflicts. While many previous studies indicate that China’s foreign policy toward India was an offshoot of a Cold War rivalry and its competition with the United States, with which we agree, this study explores how China’s India policy has shaped a border zone that requires a separate risk management approach. Our study has two findings: First, while Beijing perceives India’s threat as moderate, there has been an increase in New Delhi’s capability to create greater space for future bargaining tasks. Second, to keep India’s threat circumscribed, China has built a challenge-proof group arrangement that proposes a group-binding policy agenda, thus lowering the diplomatic cost for members in the current regime structure. Thus far, Beijing’s strategic action has been more cost-beneficial than India’s counterapproach. Overall, this case study indicates that a regime matters between two competing global powers.

An Ounce of Prevention—A Pound of Cure? The Reagan Administration’s Nonproliferation Policy and the Osirak Raid

The Israeli raid in June 1981 against the Osirak nuclear reactor in Iraq has been extensively analyzed by scholars, especially in the context of debate about the efficacy of preemptive strikes against hostile nuclear programs. Yet surprisingly, some important historical questions have been left unanswered: how did the raid affect the Reagan administration’s nuclear nonproliferation policy, and how was the raid perceived by relevant administration officials? How did the United States design its political strategy of response to the raid, and how did this strategy play out at the International Atomic Energy Agency? What does this episode tell us about Ronald Reagan’s foreign policy priorities? By exploring recently declassified documents from several archives around the world, this article addresses all of these questions and, in the process, debunks revisionist myths relating to the raid.

Deniability in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime: The Upside of the Dual-Use Dilemma

Nuclear technology is often “dual-use,” having both peaceful and military applications. This is widely regarded as a lamentable fact, as states can pursue nuclear weapons under the guise of peaceful intentions. However, this article proposes an upside to the nuclear dual-use dilemma: the deniable nature of dual-use technology makes it more amenable to coercive counterproliferation. Caught proliferators are more likely to come into compliance if they can elude audience costs by denying that they were ever out of compliance. Thus, the dual-use dilemma is both the bane of the nonproliferation regime and a boon to its coercive enforcement. Poor knowledge of past nuclear programs can hamper future verification. Counterintuitively, however, the effectiveness of nonproliferation regime institutions created to promote transparency—the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)—may be enhanced by not directly challenging the denial of past nuclear activities. This research uses interviews and archival evidence from the IAEA, US government, and South African apartheid government. At a time when ongoing nuclear disputes revolve around questions of transparency and admissions of guilt, this article contributes to scholarly and policy debates about secrecy, face-saving, counterproliferation strategy, and the role of international institutions in coercive bargaining.

Japan and Nuclear Nonproliferation

This chapter analyzes the evolution of Japanese policies toward nuclear weapons, nuclear nonproliferation, and nuclear disarmament. It traces the development of Japan’s Three Non-Nuclear Principles and examines how these principles relate to Japan’s security alliance with the United States. By examining the interaction of domestic politics and changes in the international environment, the chapter shows how Japan has reaffirmed its status as a non-nuclear-weapons state. Japan’s promotion of nuclear power to meet its energy needs has rested on an explicit policy to forgo nuclear weapons and a commitment to the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. At the same time, Japan’s reliance on US extended nuclear deterrence and its concerns about regional security threats have tempered its support for nuclear disarmament initiatives.