Quintilian in the Graeco-Roman Rhetorical Tradition

Quintilian’s Institutio oratoria (c.95 ce) provides a comprehensive statement on education based on the author’s belief that the study of rhetoric was essential both for the growth of the individual and also for serving the welfare of the state through effective leadership that united wisdom with eloquence. Quintilian’s Institutio is often identified exclusively as a work of Roman rhetoric. Viewing the Institutio as uniquely Roman is understandable. In the Institutio, Quintilian often used Cicero—the pre-eminent orator and rhetorician of the Roman Republic—as a model whose career illustrated the best features of Roman rhetoric and citizenship. However, viewing Quintilian’s Institutio as exclusively Roman distorts the influence that Greek rhetoric had on Quintilian’s work. Quintilian, and even his Roman model Cicero, were both influenced by Greek rhetoric, especially the contributions of Isocrates. Quintilian’s Institutio is better understood, and appreciated, as a ratio or system that was built upon a foundation of Hellenic rhetoric and a shining example of the Graeco-Roman rhetorical tradition. This chapter reveals a spectrum of Greek contributions in Quintilian’s Institutio ranging from isolated technical concepts to an overarching philosophy of civic rhetoric predicated on the officia or ‘duties’ of good, virtuous citizens eloquently applying rhetoric for social betterment. Quintilian’s use and command of Greek rhetoric is well demonstrated and his indebtedness to Greek sources for crafting his own ‘Roman’ rhetoric is evident throughout his Institutio.

“Religion and Nation Are One”: Social Identity Complexity and the Roots of Religious Intolerance in Turkish Nationalism

Turkish nationalism has long been an enigma for scholars interested in the formation of national identity. The nationalist movement that succeeded in crafting the Republic of Turkey relied upon rhetoric that defined the nation in explicitly secular, civic, and territorial terms. Though the earliest scholarship on Turkish nationalism supported this perspective, more recent research has pointed to Turkey's efforts to homogenize the new state as evidence of the importance of ethnicity, and particularly religion, in constructing Turkish national identity. Yet this marked mismatch between political rhetoric and politics on the ground is perplexing. If Turkey was meant to be a secular and civic state, why did Turkish nationalist policies place such a heavy emphasis on ethnic and religious purity? Moreover, why did religious identity become such a salient characteristic for determining membership in the national community and for defining national identity? This article draws upon historical research and social identity complexity theory to analyze this seeming dichotomy between religious and civic definitions of the Turkish nation. I argue that the subjective overlap between religious and civic ingroups during the late Ottoman Empire and efforts by nationalists to rally the populace through religious appeals explains the persistence of religious definitions of the nation despite the Turkish nationalist movement's civic rhetoric, and accounts for much of the Turkish state's religiously oriented policies and exclusionary practices toward religious minorities in its early decades.

'Religion and Nation are One': Social Identity Complexity and the Roots of Religious Intolerance in Turkish Nationalism

* Final published version available at: https://doi.org/10.1017/ssh.2018.6 * Turkish nationalism has long been an enigma for scholars interested in the formation of national identity. The nationalist movement that succeeded in crafting the Republic of Turkey relied upon rhetoric that defined the nation in explicitly secular, civic, and territorial terms. Though the earliest scholarship on Turkish nationalism supported this perspective, more recent research has pointed to Turkey's efforts to homogenize the new state as evidence of the importance of ethnicity, and particularly religion, in constructing Turkish national identity. Yet this marked mismatch between political rhetoric and politics on the ground is perplexing. If Turkey was meant to be a secular and civic state, why did Turkish nationalist policies place such a heavy emphasis on ethnic and religious purity? Moreover, why did religious identity become such a salient characteristic for determining membership in the national community and for defining national identity? This article draws upon historical research and social identity complexity theory to analyze this seeming dichotomy between religious and civic definitions of the Turkish nation. I argue that the subjective overlap between religious and civic ingroups during the late Ottoman Empire and efforts by nationalists to rally the populace through religious appeals explains the persistence of religious definitions of the nation despite the Turkish nationalist movement's civic rhetoric, and accounts for much of the Turkish state's religiously oriented policies and exclusionary practices toward religious minorities in its early decades.

Precis of How Propaganda Works

The overarching goal of How Propaganda Works is to provide an argument that democracy requires material equality. My aim was to forge an argument for this view without premises about morality or justice. I do so by arguing that material inequality, like other forms of inequality, has pernicious epistemic effects. Inequality results in anti-democratic flawed ideologies, such as the ideology of meritocracy, and the ideology underlying the division of labor, the subjects of the last two chapters. Propaganda plays crucial roles both in preventing us from recognizing these epistemic harms, in the form of demagoguery, and in repairing them, in the form of civic rhetoric.

Propaganda, Non-Rational Means, and Civic Rhetoric

This paper examines Jason Stanley’s account of propaganda. I begin with an overview and some questions about the structure of that account. I then argue for two main conclusions. First, I argue that Stanley’s account over-generalizes, by counting mere incompetent argumentation as propaganda. But this problem can be avoided, by emphasizing the role of emotions in effective propaganda more than Stanley does. In addition, I argue that more propaganda is democratically acceptable than Stanley allows. Focusing especially on sexual assault prevention campaigns, I show that propaganda can be acceptable even when it represents some in our communities as worthy of contempt.

Rhetoric and Early Modern Politics

This chapter examines the relationship between rhetoric and politics in early modern Europe, focusing on the impact and legacy of Renaissance humanism. After summarizing the background from which politically orientated humanist rhetoric emerged in the city-states of late-medieval Italy, it discusses the role of rhetoric and public speech in the works of two influential proponents of republican political thought: Leonardo Bruni and Niccolò Machiavelli; for both authors, civic rhetoric is both the lifeblood and the potential undoing of republics. It then presents the ways in which rhetoric was incorporated into humanistic theories of princely government, especially in exhortations to virtue and discussions of counsel. Finally, turning to the works of Jean Bodin and Thomas Hobbes, it illustrates the reconsideration—and the downgrading—of the political status of rhetoric in the era of monarchical absolutism.