The structure of the Eurosceptic movement in Poland – political and civil far-right extremists

Far-right extremist groups in Poland have undergone the substantive evolution over the course of last thirty years – from being marginalized, small in number group to being one of the most developed and numerous movements in civil society, as well as on the political landscape. The article examines the history of this movement, its stages of development and demonstrates how pivotal is the role of far-right groups in Euroscepticism in Poland.

Exploring the Radicalization Pipeline on YouTube

On September 16, 2021, Amanda Champion presented Exploring the Radicalization Pipeline on YouTube at the 2021 CASIS Vancouver Defence and Security Advisory Network Workshop. Champion discussed incel and misogynistic radicalization on YouTube in order to uncover and explore its effect on the broader network of extremist groups.

What Drives Women to Extremist Groups?: Internal and External Drivers to Radicalization of Women

This article addresses the issue of the causes and drivers of radicalization and violent extremism (external and internal/contextual and psychological) from a general (irrespective of gender) and a gender-specific perspective (factors affecting women exclusively). It endeavors to explore and to understand the drivers that are conducive to, specific and inherent to women. The paper attempts to dissect the dichotomy of masculinity and femininity in relation to violent extremism and the gender components that determine, influence and amplify the process of radicalization.

Trusted authorities can change minds and shift norms during conflict

The reintegration of former members of violent extremist groups is a pressing policy challenge. Governments and policymakers often have to change minds among reticent populations and shift perceived community norms in order to pave the way for peaceful reintegration. How can they do so on a mass scale? Previous research shows that messages from trusted authorities can be effective in creating attitude change and shifting perceptions of social norms. In this study, we test whether messages from religious leaders—trusted authorities in many communities worldwide—can change minds and shift norms around an issue related to conflict resolution: the reintegration of former members of violent extremist groups. Our study takes place in Maiduguri, Nigeria, the birthplace of the violent extremist group Boko Haram. Participants were randomly assigned to listen to either a placebo radio message or to a treatment message from a religious leader emphasizing the importance of forgiveness, announcing the leader’s forgiveness of repentant fighters, and calling on followers to forgive. Participants were then asked about their attitudes, intended behaviors, and perceptions of social norms surrounding the reintegration of an ex–Boko Haram fighter. The religious leader message significantly increased support for reintegration and willingness to interact with the ex-fighter in social, political, and economic life (8 to 10 percentage points). It also shifted people’s beliefs that others in their community were more supportive of reintegration (6 to 10 percentage points). Our findings suggest that trusted authorities such as religious leaders can be effective messengers for promoting peace.

Breaking connections in the representations of “I – Stranger” interaction: Determinants and prerequisites (the case study of extremist groups)

The article presents the results of a theoretical reflection on the main prerequisites and determinants of extremism as a complex sociopsychological phenomenon which poses a serious threat to international security. Purpose: to study social and socio-psychological determinants which contribute to and lead to breaking connections in the “I – Stranger” dyad as fundamentals of sociability (on the example of extremist groups). We identified social and socio-psychological factors (social tension, instability, uncertainty, stratified social isolation, group status, perceived discrimination, group ideology), serving as prerequisites for extremism, which contribute to breaking ties in the “I – Stranger” dyad along with psychological predictors. The example of extremist groups has shown that, on the one hand, breaking these connections leads to an exaggerated sense of “We”, erosion of individuality, depreciation of one’s own life and “self-erasure” against the background of group superiority and narcissism, on the other hand, it leads to depersonalization, demonization and dehumanization of “Stranger”, positioning him / her as a person who is not fully human, a faceless enemy. It has been established that breaking connections in representations of “I – Stranger” interaction facilitates the process associated with losing a sense of self as a key point in the construction and cognition of the social world and its replacement by the collective “We”. The applied aspect of the problem under study is the possibility of using the results of the analysis for developing preventive socio-psychological programmers and trainings aimed at preventing extremism and religious radicalism in the young people’s environment.

Deradicalization Programs: Recommendations for Policy and Practice

Involvement in violent extremism is not a one-way street. People can, and do, leave violent extremist movements. Understanding how and why they leave (or want to leave) constitutes actionable knowledge that brings immense practical benefits. Such knowledge may help in designing initiatives aimed at persuading people to leave violent extremist groups as well as reducing the risk of re-engagement in violent extremism in the future. Deradicalization programs have much to offer but they are not a magic solution to a highly complex, fluid problem. Not everyone who engages in violent extremism is necessarily going to benefit from such interventions, and no program can ever expect to produce complete success. Yet, they continue to show promise. Deradicalization programs can be effective for some and, if subjected to greater evaluation efforts, may prove far more beneficial than is currently believed. Despite an abundance (and apparent increase) in programming, a continued lack of evaluation work both fuels skepticism and hinders our ability to believe that there is a strong future for these programs.

O Herói Mujahid e o Recrutamento: A Violência Como Meio de Mobilização l The Mujahid Hero and Recruitment: The Violence As an Instrument of Mobilization

A partir do século XXI, grupos extremistas ganharam força ao propor o realinhamento radical entre estruturas de governança e comunidades imaginadas. Para isso, reinventam narrativas e criam personificações de antagonismo e heroísmo. Embates ontológicos são reforçados de maneira a formar e unir comunidades através da bravura e da violência. A noção de heroísmo nas Relações Internacionais foi aplicada nas narrativas do Estado Islâmico presentes na revista Rumiyah, destinada aos anglofalantes. Notou-se o uso do heroísmo como maneira de angariar apoiadores através de duas características: a violência e o autossacrifício. Assim, essas especificidades, aliadas a um viés ideológico, recrutam pessoas dispostas a imitarem os “heróis” dessa organização, conhecidos como mujahidin.Palavras-Chave: Jihadismo; Estado Islâmico; Heroísmo e Violência.ABSTRACTSince the beginning of the 21st century, extremist groups gained relevance by proposing a radical realignment between governance structures and imagined communities. In that case, they reinvent narratives and create personifications of antagonism and heroism. Ontological clashes are reinforced in order to form and unite communities through bravery and violence. The notion of heroism in International Relations was applied in the narratives of the Islamic State present in the magazine Rumiyah, addressed to english speakers. The use of heroism was noted as a way of attracting supporters through two characteristics: violence and self-sacrifice. Thus, these specificities, combined with an ideological bias, do recruit people willing to imitate the “heroes” of this organization, known as mujahidin.Keywords: Jihadism; Islamic State; Heroism and Violence. Recebido em: 04/04/2021 | Aceito em: 09/06/2021.

Radicalization and Violent Extremism in the Era of COVID-19

On January 21, 2021, the Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies (CASIS) Vancouver hosted its first digital roundtable event of the year, Radicalization and Violent Extremism in the Era of COVID-19. The presentation was conducted by guest speaker, Dr. Garth Davies, an Associate Professor in the School of Criminology at Simon Fraser University. He is also currently involved in developing data for evaluating programs for countering violent extremism. Dr. Davies’ presentation provided an overview of the changes that society has had to make in adapting to the COVID-19 pandemic and shared some of his research findings on radicalization and violent extremism online during the pandemic. The increase in working remotely and being on the Internet has possibly contributed to a larger dissemination of misinformation leading people to certain extremist sites and forums that may contribute to radicalization. Additionally, Dr. Davies answered questions submitted by the audience, which focused on online radicalization, online platforms used for recruiting by extremist groups, misinformation, and the Incel movement.

Mental Health Intervention for Violent Radicalization: The Quebec Model

The place of clinical, medical, or health professional interventions in addressing violent radicalization is a topic of ongoing debate. Although violent radicalization is primarily a social phenomenon with significant psychological dimensions, the high prevalence of mental health “issues” and past psychiatric diagnosis in lone actors suggests that it may be useful to distinguish socialized actors who have strong ties to structured extremist organizations from relatively socially isolated actors who claim, and even boast about, virtual affiliation to extremist groups. For the latter, the potential efficacy of mental health interventions should be considered. However, because of the risk of profiling, stigmatization of minorities, pathologizing social dissent, and resistance, clinical intervention may cause harm and should be carefully evaluated. Until the effectiveness of clinical interventions in reducing radical violence is improved through evaluative research, exchanges about existing clinical models can be useful to support practitioners in the field and provide initial insights about good and potentially harmful practices. The Quebec model of clinical services to mitigate violent radicalization (secondary and tertiary prevention) is structured around three pillars: multiple access points to facilitate outreach and decrease stigma; specialized teams to assess and formulate treatment plans based on existing best evidence in forensic, social, and cultural psychiatry; and collaborative involvement with primary care services, such as community mental health, education, and youth protection institutions, which are in charge of social integration and long-term management. Beyond the initial assessment, the program offers psychotherapy and/or psychiatric interventions services, including mentorship to foster clients’ social integration and life-skill development. Artistic programs offering a semi-structured, nonjudgmental environment, thus fostering self-expression and creativity, are very well received by youth. A multimedia pilot program involving young artists has been shown to provide them with alternative means of expressing their dissent. Three years on from its inception, the preliminary evaluation of the Quebec clinical model by its partners and clinicians suggests that it could be considered a promising approach to address the specific challenges of individuals who present as potential lone actors at high risk of violent radicalization. The model does not, however, appear to reach many members of extremist groups who do not present individual vulnerabilities. While initial signs are positive, a rigorous evaluation is warranted to establish the short, medium, and long-term efficacy of the model, and to eventually identify the key elements which may be transferable to other clinical settings. In 2020, a five-year evaluative research project began to examine these questions. It is important to consider that any intervention can be harmful if due attention is not paid to structural discrimination and violence stemming from associated marginalization and exclusion. Clinical care can in no way replace social justice, equity, and human rights—all key pillars in primary prevention against violent radicalization. In the meantime, however, providing empathy and care in the face of despair and rage may prove most beneficial in decreasing the risk of violent acts.