Grant’s North Mississippi Campaign, Chickasaw Bayou, and the Bottomlands

Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant’s North Mississippi Campaign (November 1862 until January 1863) planted a powerful Federal army only a few miles north of Vicksburg. The most important Confederate stronghold on the Mississippi River, Vicksburg was the key to control of the valley that split the Confederacy in two. Grant failed to capture it, but he opened a two-hundred-mile stretch of the valley from Memphis to Vicksburg for federal exploitation. From January to the end of April 1863, during the Bottomlands phase of Grant’s campaign, his men confiscated food and animals from the region, collected slaves as laborers and soldiers, and cared for Black women and children. Federal agents worked abandoned plantations with refugee Black labor. Temporarily stymied in capturing Vicksburg, the Federals reaped benefits from the fertile Mississippi Delta land they occupied, broke down the institution of slavery, and made effective Lincoln’s new directions in war policy.

Second Bull Run/Manassas

The summer of 1862 witnessed the struggle between Northern Republican and Democratic ideologies embodied in the Army of Virginia and the Army of the Potomac even as Union and Confederate armies faced off in the Second Manassas Campaign. Formed to protect Washington while Maj. Gen. George McClellan advanced on Richmond, the Army of Virginia and its leader, Maj. Gen. John Pope, implemented a Republican or “hard war” policy of military occupation by confiscating civilian property and imposing loyalty oaths. Northern and Southern Democrats (characterized by McClellan and Maj. Gen. Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson, respectively) recognized the threat that Pope’s ideology posed and sought to crush it, either by delaying reinforcement or decisive battlefield defeat. The defeat of Pope and his army by Confederate forces at Second Manassas delayed but did not destroy the twin Republican agendas of emancipation and destruction of the Confederacy. Pope and his political generals prefigured the total-war policies of the war’s last year.

Greek Orthodox Citizen Soldiers under the Ottoman Banner

The Great War proved to be an unpleasant and traumatic experience for many Greek Orthodox citizen soldiers called to fight under the Ottoman banner. Although many served dutifully in arms or otherwise, few had self-legitimized their conscription. Regardless, the denomination of minority citizen soldiers by the Ottoman military authorities led to their mass assignment to unarmed positions, which could mean their transfer to the labor battalions, and possibly their death. Most Greek Orthodox were aware of labor battalions’ harsh conditions, and their transformation into killing grounds for the Armenian citizen soldiers. Based on grassroots sources such as diaries, memoirs, and interviews, I demonstrate that this discriminatory war policy was not systematic, as several recruits were later trained and armed during the war, and I argue that a new contractual relationship emerged for those skilled and literate Greek Orthodox through which they could successfully negotiate their skills to avoid the labor battalions and, thus, have greater chances of surviving the war.

THE NOTARIAL SYSTEM IN THE PREWAR YEARS AND DURING THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR (ON THE EXAMPLE OF THE MIDDLE VOLGA TERRITORIES)

The situation of notary bodies in the pre-war years and during the great Patriotic war are analyzes in the article. The article considers the reorganizations of the notary public that occurred during this period, as well as the personnel and material difficulties that the Institute experienced in the 1930s and 1940s. The information about the participation of notaries in combat operations at the front and the activities of notarial bodies in the rear is provided. Changes in the post-war policy towards notaries are also shown.

The United States and the NATO Non-extension Assurances of 1990: New Light on an Old Problem?

The Russian government has claimed that the Western powers promised at the end of the Cold War not to expand NATO, but later reneged on that promise. Most former officials in the West, and many scholars as well, have denied that this was the case; but other scholars, along with a handful of former officials, believe that promises to that effect were, in fact, made in 1990. So who is right? The question still has political importance: how it is answered has bearing on how we should feel about NATO expansion and, indeed, about the United States' post–Cold War policy more generally. So it makes sense to stand back and try to see where the truth lies. An examination of the debate in light of the evidence—especially evidence that the participants themselves have presented—leads to the conclusion that the Russian allegations are by no means baseless, which affects how the U.S.-Russian relationship today is to be understood.

From Senator McCarthy’s Darlings to Marxist Maryknollers

This chapter points out how Maryknollers' evolving sense of mission and experiences in Latin America transformed them from allies in the 1950s to critics of the U.S. Cold War policy in the late 1960s and 1970s. It looks at the new church teachings from Vatican II and Medellín, the effects of U.S. policy, and living in Right-wing military dictatorships that influenced the Maryknollers' shift. It also identifies missioners located in Guatemala and Chile that found themselves in conflict with Latin American governments and conservative U.S. Catholics. The chapter focuses on Maryknoll's shift that challenged the meaning of U.S. Catholic missionary activity. It details how Maryknoll revisited the model that saw evangelization as missionaries' purpose and communism as the primary adversary after the Vatican II.