Côte d’Ivoire

Côte d’Ivoire first experienced a civil war in 2002, but the country’s rapid socio-political disintegration after the demise of Félix Houphouët-Boigny in 1993 produced several risk factors that would eventually culminate in atrocity crimes between 2010 and 2011. This article identifies a weak state that only exercised jurisdiction over the south of the country, years of instability driven by horizontal inequalities and an identity crisis, past abuses that had gone unpunished, and election disputes that served as triggers for atrocity crimes. The deeply polarized nature of Ivorian society meant that local mechanisms for resolving disputes and building peace were not wholly effective, even though they helped to resolve disputes and prevent violence in some local communities. Findings from the Ivorian case demonstrate the need to pay closer attention to the structural and proximate factors that underpin conflicts. Côte d’Ivoire also presents lessons on the need for decisive action in the face of unfolding atrocity crimes. There was a need for timely and decisive response in accordance with the principles of R2P. Nonetheless military intervention was delayed for months, resulting in avoidable fatalities.

South Sudan

When South Sudan gained independence in 2011, the whole world rejoiced. The country marked 10 years of independence on July 9, 2021, but on that occasion, as was the case for the previous decade, its people had very little to celebrate. The country had been gripped by both state violence and deadly ethnic feuds. The intense rifts in ethnic relations emanating from this cycle have become a major risk factor for mass atrocities. This paper aims to chronicle the atrocity crimes that have happened in South Sudan in the past 12 years, what drives them, and how they can be mitigated or stopped. It will also suggest what the international community can do to assist the South Sudanese to find justice, accountability for atrocity crimes and above all, how to reduce or end violence. The paper is based on a review of reports by human rights agencies, the United Nations agencies operating in South Sudan, independent researchers, academics and think tanks. It is also based on the author’s first-hand knowledge of the context and on numerous interviews with South Sudanese. The goal, however, is not to ask: what lessons have been learned from the ongoing efforts in the country?

Syria

The Syrian civil war stands as the most serious failure of the responsibility to prevent since the adoption of R2P in 2005. As the war has continued, there have been atrocities and abuse committed against vulnerable populations on a widespread and systematic scale. This article focuses on the atrocity prevention efforts undertaken in the first phase of the crisis from March 2011 to August 2012. It shows that while there were multiple tools utilized by a range of local, regional, and international actors, none of them had a lasting impact on the commission of atrocity crimes in Syria. This failure is due to five principal reasons. First, engagement to prevent atrocities came too late. Second, domestic and regional conditions were not conducive to prevention. Third, there was little reason for the warring parties to compromise. Fourth, there was a disconnect between what Western states wanted to achieve in Syria and what they were prepared to do about it. And fifth, the UN’s envoys had limited options for engagement.

Lessons in Atrocity Prevention: A Closer Look at Guinea

This article identifies the most significant atrocity risk factors and their indicators in accordance with the UN Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes and provides a taxonomy of measures, taken by a variety of external and internal stakeholders, in different combinations, which reduced the risk of atrocity crimes reoccurring after the 2009 stadium massacre in Conakry, Guinea. On the 28th of September 2009, 157 protesters were killed, at least 1200 were injured, and over 100 women were raped by security forces in a stadium in Conakry. The UN’s Commission of Inquiry (coi) concluded that these crimes committed by the security forces amounted to crimes against humanity. The efforts to halt further violence and prevent the commission of crimes post-2009 stadium massacre were varied and encompassed regional and international preventive diplomacy. The coordination of a coherent political strategy among international, regional and sub-regional actors in the Guinean context contributed towards the perceived success in preventing further atrocities in Guinea, post-2009 massacre. Importantly, Guinea is not a typical example in terms of atrocity and conflict prevention, due to a unique regional and global dynamics that allowed for a rapid and rather coherent response to the September 2009 stadium massacre.

Kenya

On 4 March 2013, when Kenyans participated in national presidential and legislative elections, there was wide-spread concern that the underling grievances that erupted during the 2007 and 2008 post-election violence would remerge. However, the polls were relatively peaceful in comparison. This case study will interrogate how mass atrocities were prevented in 2013 in Kenya, despite the prevalence of risk factors which could spark tensions and fuel violence. This article interrogates the local sources of resilience and inhibitors of atrocity crimes and considers the preventive actions that were undertaken and by whom, with a view to understanding what they achieved. In addition, it will assess the outcomes that were achieved as a result of these preventive actions. Through an evaluation of the preventive actions the article will examine which actions proved to be most effective in affecting the risks dynamics of the country in the short, medium and long-term. Kenya’s history of violence and failure to uphold accountability and redress for victims, meant that in 2013, it was significantly prone to the scourge of atrocity crimes. This analysis will draw out a number of key lessons for enhancing the prevention of atrocity crimes in the future.

Central African Republic

Central African Republic (car) has been a theatre of instability for decades, especially following the 2013 coup, which saw crimes that have been found to be premeditated and systematic. This article identifies states collapse, persistent instability and impunity as key factors engendering atrocity crimes in car. Despite the overwhelming evidence of the risk of atrocity crimes, the international response has been inadequate if not passive, and interventions do not consider atrocity prevention in their execution. Thus, subsequent peacebuilding initiatives have not had real and visible impact on the prevention of atrocity crimes. To address this, the establishment of an accountable and functioning state is the overriding condition precedent to preventing and mangaging atrocity crimes in car. The international community should further engage local actors to promote inclusive governance and lay the foundations for stability and sustainable peace. Subsequent restoration of structures for justice and ensuring their effective functioning will help end structural impunity in the country and go a long way in averting future atrocity crimes.

Conclusions

The prevention of atrocity crimes is the cornerstone of R2P. Yet, how prevention works in practice is little understood. In practice, multiple actors at different levels employ multiple prevention tools simultaneously which relate to, and impact upon, the regional, national and local contexts in which atrocity crime risk is evident. Strengthening preventive action requires better understanding of the combination of measures employed and how these measures interact and affect the risk of atrocity crimes. Recognising the growing gap between the promise and practice of atrocity prevention, the UN Office on Genocide Prevention and R2P commissioned a series of case studies to evaluate atrocity prevention efforts, covering the countries of Burundi, Central African Republic, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, Kenya, Myanmar, South Sudan and Syria. From these studies, four main lessons become apparent. One, imminently apprehended atrocity crimes are preventable. Two, best outcomes are achieved when atrocity prevention is made a priority. Three, unity of purpose is essential. And four, atrocity prevention relies on several factors, some of which are outside the control of those undertaking prevention. These lessons mean that while atrocity prevention is difficult, it is possible.

Legal Mobilization and the Internationalization of Anticorruption Enforcement

This article contributes a critical study of efforts to internationalize the investigation and prosecution of corruption. The efforts to internationalize anticorruption enforcement are visible, for instance, in calls for an International Anticorruption Court (IACC) or an Anticorruption Protocol to the United Nations Convention against Corruption (APUNCAC). Inspired by a historical sociological perspective, this article investigates mobilizations around these initiatives, how mobilizers frame their engagement, and the ideological context in which they operate. In particular, the article zooms in on elites and how they push for states to internationalize the investigation and prosecution of corruption. This article situates the efforts of these elites in a larger historical context and compares the push to internationalize anticorruption enforcement to earlier legal mobilizations in the field of international criminal justice focused on atrocity crimes.

IMPLEMENTING THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT IN LIBYA

The last decade of the XXth century was marked by three major humanitarian crises, in Rwanda, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. The international community adopted different approaches to these situations, but they all had in common a sense of failure. Today, we see that such catastrophic situations continue to exist in places like Yemen or Syria, where civlian populations face atrocity crimes. These are just two examples of ongoing humanitarian crises and we have to keep in mind to there is an imminent risk for the escalation of disastrous conflicts in countries such as Ethiopia or Myanmar. By 2005, the United Nations adopted a comprehensive tool for avoiding and approaching situations where the lives of civilians are in peril, namely, the responsibility to protect. The analysis of its use in Libya, having NATO as a main actor, will reveal the reasons this tool is not as effective as the world hoped in the moment of its creation, and, hopefully, will contribute to an enhanced understanding of the responsibility to protect.

Negative Aesthetic Experiences of Prosecuting the Barely Alive

Theories of negative aesthetics claim that some aesthetic qualities like disgust, ugliness, and repulsiveness are instrumentally valuable, and can be justified as a necessary means to producing what might be considered an ultimately positive aesthetic experience. In an international criminal trial, the presentation of “ugly” visual and oral evidence may be justified in service of the aims of the trial. But when the “barely alive” are prosecuted, however, a justification for a negative aesthetic experience may not exist. In this paper, I argue that due to their vulnerability and the need to protect their dignity, individuals who have been accused of mass atrocity crimes but who are nearing the end of their lives should generally not be subjected to public trial and punishment. The negative aesthetic experiences generated by displaying someone close to death in that setting cannot be justified by positive aesthetic or moral experiences.