Climate Fiction, Climate Theory: Decolonising Imaginations of Global Futures

The international politics of climate change invokes the imagination of various potential global futures, ranging from techno-optimist visions of ecological modernisation to apocalyptic nightmares of climate chaos. This article argues that most dominant framings of the future in climate policy imaginaries tend to be depoliticised and linear visions of universal, homogenous time, with little spatio-temporal or ecological plurality. This article aims to convince IR scholars of climate politics that Africanfuturist climate fiction novels can contribute to the decolonisation of climate politics through radically different socio-climatic imaginaries to those that dominate mainstream imaginations of climate futures. The Africanfuturist climate fiction novels of authors such as Nnedi Okorafor, Lauren Beukes and Doris Lessing imagine different spaces, temporalities, ecologies and politics. Reading them as climate theory, they offer the possibility of a more decolonised climate politics, in which issues of land and climate justice, loss and damage, extractive political economies and the racialised and gendered violence of capitalism are central.

Nationalist Backlash Against Foreign Climate Shaming

Should international pro-climate actors speak up against climate rogues, or do foreign critics risk igniting nationalist backlash against global environmental norms and institutions? We explore naming and shaming dynamics in global climate politics by fielding survey experiments to nationally representative samples in Brazil. Our results show that nationalism moderates public reactions to foreign climate shaming: individuals who are highly attached to their nation are more likely to reject international criticism than their lowly attached peers. Yet, we also find that nationalist publics express little support for virulent defiance against foreign critics. Our findings hold irrespective of the source of criticism and the nature of the critical message. These results sound a cautionary note on the belief that liberal internationalists should tread carefully so as not to unadvisedly unleash nationalist pushback. Foreign climate criticism may bump up against nationalist sentiment in climate rogues, but it will not necessarily fuel an all-out backlash against the global environmental regime.

Promoting Intergenerational Justice Through Participatory Practices: Climate Workshops as an Arena for Young People’s Political Participation

In the fall of 2019, Trøndelag County Council, Norway, organized a Climate Workshop for children and youth. The intention of the workshop was to include children’s and youth’s perspectives as a foundation for a policy document titled “How we do it in Trøndelag. Strategy for transformations to mitigate climate change”. The workshop involved a range of creative and discussion tools for input on sustainable development and climate politics. In this article, we aim to (1) describe and discuss innovative practices that include children and youth in policymaking related to climate action, and (2) discuss the theoretical implications of such policymaking in relation to children’s rights, young citizenship, and intergenerational justice. We employ a generational framework and perceive climate politics as inherently ingrained in intergenerational justice, where no generation has a superior claim to the earth’s resources, yet power is unfairly concentrated and accumulated among adult generations. We draw on contributions by various stakeholders involved: Two young workshop participants, two county council policymakers, and an interdisciplinary team of researchers from Childhood Studies and Design.

Financing climate justice in the European Union and China: common mechanisms, different perspectives

Climate justice is a concept with many different and competing interpretations. It has salience at intra-country, inter-country and intergenerational levels of climate politics. While inter-country climate justice has long been on the agenda of United Nations climate negotiations, the intra-country and intergenerational aspects of climate justice have assumed new prominence in many countries in recent years, as the economic consequences of mitigation became felt and transnational activism highlighted youth concerns. The diverse elements of and approaches to climate justice have this in common: realising them requires massive financial interventions and reforms. This article examines the still emerging frameworks to finance climate justice in two of the jurisdictions most important to the global response to climate change: the European Union and the People’s Republic of China. The EU and China have in common that they are both on the front line of financial innovation to respond to climate change. They are utilising similar tools of systemic financial intervention in order to transition financing to climate-friendly investment, in the first case domestically, but with clear implications for global financial markets. However, the EU and China are utilising climate financing mechanisms in the context of very different prevailing perspectives on climate justice. This article interrogates the relationship between these different perspectives on climate justice and the distribution, scale and pace of climate finance. The article also observes that while the EU incorporated climate justice considerations in its economic responses to the COVID-19 pandemic with a recovery package prioritising climate action, China did not take the opportunity to foster a ‘green recovery’.

Three Faces of Climate Justice

There is overwhelming consensus about the science of climate change. Climate politics, however, remains volatile, driven by perceptions of injustice, which motivate policy resistance and undermine policy legitimacy. We identify three types of injustice. The first pertains to the uneven exposure to climate change impacts across countries and communities within a country. Socially, politically, and economically disadvantaged communities that have contributed the least to the climate crisis tend to be affected the most. To address climate change and its impacts, countries and subnational units have enacted a range of policies. But even carefully designed mitigation and adaptation policies distribute costs (the second justice dimension) and benefits (the third justice dimension) unevenly across sectors and communities, often reproducing existing inequalities. Climate justice requires paying careful attention to who bears the costs and who gets the benefits of both climate inaction and action. Expected final online publication date for the Annual Review of Political Science, Volume 25 is May 2022. Please see http://www.annualreviews.org/page/journal/pubdates for revised estimates.

The construction of a growth-oriented global climate agenda: a critical historical analysis

By the end of 2019, more than 11,000 world scientists declared Planet Earth is facing a climate emergency, which signals the failure of the global climate agenda (GCA). Since it took off thirty years ago, emissions have continued to increase at the planetary level. We add to the literature focusing on the economic and political dimensions shaping the GCA. In particular, we examine its economic growth roots under the umbrella of sustainable development (SD) or green growth to shed some light on whether the rules driving the world economy are shaping it. Such rules are built on the growth ideology fuelling the current extractivist socioeconomic metabolism, which in turn lies behind the socioecological crisis. We review the main international climate-focused events and document a shift in the guiding principles of climate politics from the 1980s onwards under which growth is no longer viewed as a driver of climate change (CC) but as its solution. We argue that the strategy to promote growth-based SD represents the main cause of policy failure. Indeed, the result is a policy that is highly reliant on technological solutions and market-based instruments and leads to the belief that green growth is both possible and the solution to CC. Such a belief restricts the debate to the economy’s ‘decarbonisation’ and CC adaptation and overlooks other important socio-political aspects involve in climate action.

Institutions, Climate Change, and the Foundations of Long-term Policymaking

Many policy problems require taking costly action today for future benefits. Examining the case of climate change, this paper examines how two institutions, electoral rules and interest group intermediation, structure distributional politics, and as a result drive variation in climate “policy investments” across the high-income democracies. Proportional electoral rules increase electoral safety, allowing politicians to impose short-term costs on voters. Concertation between industry and the state enables governments to compensate losers, defusing organized opposition to policy change. Moreover, the joint presence of both institutions generates complementarities that reinforce their independent effects, pushing countries onto different climate politics trajectories. Newly available data on climate policy stringency provides support for the arguments. Countries with PR and interest group concertation have the highest levels of policy stringency and distribute higher costs toward consumers. The analysis points to causal mechanisms that should structure responses to a more general set of long-term challenges.