Pembatasan Hak Untuk Bergerak (Right to Move) melalui Larangan Masuk dan Pembatasan Perjalanan selama Penyebaran Virus COVID-19 menurut Hukum Internasional dan Hukum Indonesia

Organisasi Kesehatan Dunia (WHO) menyatakan Covid-19 sebagai Pandemi pada 11 Maret 2020. Sejumlah negara telah membuat berbagai kebijakan untuk menekan penyebaran virus tersebut. Salah satu kebijakan tersebut adalah regulasi masuk dan pembatasan perjalanan. Kebijakan ini dipandang perlu untuk mencegah penularan dan penyebaran virus secara masif akibat pergerakan manusia. Di sisi lain, konvensi hak asasi manusia memberikan perlindungan terhadap hak untuk bergerak dan memasuki suatu negara dan melarang tindakan diskriminasi. Tulisan ini mengkaji perspektif hukum internasional tentang kebijakan masuk dan pembatasan perjalanan serta membahas kebijakan domestik Indonesia dalam menanggulangi wabah korona. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode yuridis normatif, dengan data sekunder yaitu bahan hukum primer, bahan hukum sekunder dan bahan hukum tersier. Tulisan ini merangkum bahwa kebijakan negara mengenai pengaturan masuk dan pembatasan larangan bepergian merupakan sesuatu yang dibolehkan menurut hukum internasional. Hal ini berdampak pada pengurangan jumlah wabah korona lintas batas negara. Meskipun demikian, kebijakan ini mungkin melanggar hak asasi manusia jika tidak mengacu pada ketentuan hukum yang berlaku seperti konvensi hak asasi manusia. Tulisan ini menyarankan kepada para pembuat kebijakan untuk berhati-hati dalam menggunakan kebijakan entry regulation.

Entry regulations and optimal prize allocation in parallel contests

In parallel contests, the contest organizer controls the entry of heterogeneous contestants by regulating access to the contests and determining the prize allocation across contests. The organizer can prevent a contestant from entering more than one contest. I show that the organizer allows entry to multiple contests and uniquely sets identical prizes across contests to maximize aggregate effort in all contests. Independent of the entry regulation, I find no sorting effects. Thus, a contest with a relatively high prize does not necessarily attract contestants with higher abilities. Furthermore, I discover interesting spillover effects of prizes between contests in the case of restricted entry regulations. For instance, the individual (aggregate) effort increases (decreases) in a contest if the prize in another contest increases. The endogeneity of contestants’ participation drives many of these results.

A case study of bureaucratic discretion: heterogeneous application of market entry regulation in Germany

All law is relatively coarse after its initial implementation as the legislature cannot foresee all contingencies that can arise in the actual application of the law. Therefore, decisions need to be made by street-level administrators as novel and particular circumstances arise. Economists have largely ignored the political science literature on street-level bureaucrats, such as policemen, welfare case managers, or regulatory agents. I present a case study in the context of market entry regulation in Germany. Qualitative and quantitative evidence suggests that bureaucratic discretion exists, that is, administrative actions can be found on different ends of a decision space, and that its effects are potentially large. Administrators do not apply legislation in a uniform manner and we observe a systematically different application of rules across subnational jurisdictions.

Entry Regulation and Persistence of Profits in Incumbent Firms

In line with the theory of creative destruction, industries where incumbent firms generate high profits will attract entry, which should drive down profits. This disciplinary effect of entry implies that profits above the norm should not exist in the long run. Factors that affect entry—such as entry regulations—could affect this profits convergence process. Using an unbalanced panel of firm- and country-level data for approximately 13,000 firms in 33 countries between 2005 and 2013, we examine the profit dynamics of incumbent firms in the context of entry and entry regulations.

Does entry business regulation deter FDI? Evidence from Dynamic Estimators

The present paper aims to examine the effects of entry business regulation on the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows (net amount) of 185 countries covering a period from 2004 to 2017. For that reason, we estimate a dynamic panel FDI specification, which additionally checks for macroeconomic and institutional factors, using Fixed Effects, Bootstrap Fixed Effects and GMM estimators. Overall, the empirical findings reveal, a negative and statistically significant association between entry regulation and FDI. This suggests that bureaucratic burdens concerning entry regulation can exert adverse effects on the inflow of FDI. Furthermore, when the full sample is separated into different income groups, our findings still indicate evidence of significance, which, however, arises only in the countries of Low and Middle-income.