The impact of audit quality on earnings management and cost of equity capital: evidence from a developing market

Purpose This study aims to examine the effects of audit quality on earnings management and cost of equity capital (COE) considering the impact of two owner types: government ownership and foreign ownership. Design/methodology/approach The study uses a panel data set of 236 Vietnamese firms covering the period 2007 to 2017. Because the two main dependent variables of the COE capital and the absolute value of discretionary accruals receive fractional values between zero and one, the paper uses the generalised linear model (GLM) with a logit link and the binomial family in regression analyses. The paper uses numerous audit quality measures, including hiring Big 4 auditors or the industry-leading Big 4 auditor, changing from non-Big 4 auditors to Big 4 auditors or the industry-leading Big 4 auditor, and the length of Big 4 auditor tenure. Big 4 companies include KPMG, Deloitte, EY and PwC, whereas the non-big 4 are the other audit companies. Findings The study finds a negative relationship between audit quality and both the COE capital and income-increasing discretionary accruals. The effects of audit quality on discretionary accruals and the COE capital depend on the ownership levels of two important shareholders: the government and foreign investors. Foreign ownership is negatively associated with discretionary accruals; however, the effect is more pronounced in the sub-sample of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), the firms where the government owns 50% or more equity, than in the sub-sample of Non-SOEs. Originality/value To the best of the knowledge, no prior similar study exists that used the GLM with a logit link and the binomial family regression. Global investors may be interested in understanding how unique institutional settings and capital markets of each country impact the financial reporting quality and cost of capital. Further, policymakers of developing markets may have incentives to improve the quality of financial reporting and reduce the cost of capital which should result in attracting more foreign investments.

Impact of information risk and cost of equity: moderating role of investor attention

PurposeThe purpose of this study is to finds out how investor attention plays the moderating role between the relation of information risk and COE by considering the effect of three different types of information risk, that is private information, lack of quality and transparent information.Design/methodology/approachFor that purpose, data is collected from all the non-financial firms listed on PSX from 2007 to 2019. Two-step system GMM dynamic panel estimators are applied to test the dynamic nature of the proposed model.FindingsThe findings of the study show that investor attention reduces these three information risks by increasing the stock liquidity and decreasing the crash risk which ultimately decreases the COE. Also, this study examined the role of investor attention between the relations of information risk and corporate investment in the dynamic panel model, where the two-step system generalized method of the moment has been applied. The finding of the study shows that investor attention stimulates the innovative investment by increasing investor confidence and decreasing the agency conflict.Originality/valueThis study contributes to the literature by providing the novel findings by considering the role of investor attention in reducing the effect of three different types of information risk, that is private information, less quality as well as less transparency of information and further their effect on the cost of equity.

Disclaimer language in US banks’ audit committee reports: determinants and consequences

Purpose This paper aims to investigate the determinants and consequences of using disclaimer language in the banks’ audit committee (AC) reports. This study aims to analyze the factors tempting AC members of banks to disclose disclaimer language in the AC reports and the effect of such language on the cost of equity. Design/methodology/approach The data cover the period from 2006 to 2015 and considers the top US bank holding companies. Voluntary disclosure in the AC report is manually coded by using a scoring grid. Multivariate regression analysis is mainly used in the study. Findings The findings suggest that the ACs are using the disclaimer language to protect themselves when disclosing a high level of voluntary information that describes their oversight activities or to reduce their liability exposure due to lower financial reporting quality. The findings also reveal that investors are requiring a higher return on their investments whenever ACs use disclaimer language in their reports. Originality/value The AC report provides useful information to shareholders who evaluate the AC’s performance and accordingly vote for or against AC members on annual basis. The paper sheds lights on the motives and consequences of disclaimer language in the ACs report. Thus, the study benefits shareholders by providing empirical evidence in regard to the usage of disclaimer language. Also, the findings benefit industry, corporate governance organizations, standard setters and regulators that analyze AC disclosures and issue recommendations or new standards for improving those disclosures.

Living up to your codes? Corporate codes of ethics and the cost of equity capital

PurposePrevious literature provides mixed evidence about the effectiveness of a code of ethics in limiting managerial opportunism. While some studies find that code of ethics is merely window-dressing, others find that they do influence managers' behavior. The present study investigates whether the quality of a code of ethics decreases the cost of equity by limiting managerial opportunism.Design/methodology/approachIn order to test the hypothesis, the authors perform an empirical analysis on a sample of US companies in the 2004–2012 period. The results are robust to a battery of robustness analyses that the authors performed in order to take care of endogeneity.FindingsEmpirical results indicate that a higher quality code of ethics is associated with a lower cost of equity. In other words, firms with a more comprehensive code of ethics and better-designed implementation procedures limit managerial opportunism and pay a lower cost of equity because they are perceived by investors to be less risky.Research limitations/implicationsPractical implicationsSocial implicationsOriginality/valueThe authors contribute to the literature in two ways. First, by looking at the market reaction to the code of ethics, thus capturing all its indirect possible benefits and second, by measuring not only the existence but also the quality of a code of ethics. Based on the results, policymakers may choose to further promote codes of ethics as an effective corporate governance mechanism.