Stackelberg game based co-firing biomass with coal under carbon cap-and-trade regulation

Coal-fired power industry is under enormous pressure to accomplish carbon emission reduction targets. This paper proposes a bi-level multi-objective model for co-firing biomass with coal under carbon cap-and-trade regulation which considers a leader-follower Stackelberg game between the authority and the coal-fired power plants. The upper level regards social welfare maximization and allocation satisfaction maximization as its multiple objectives, while the lower level attempts to maximize the profits of each coal-fired power plant. The inherent uncertainty prompts the motivation for employing fuzzy set theory to characterize the uncertain parameters and determine their exact values. A case study from Shandong Province, China is provided to demonstrate the practicality and efficiency of the optimization model. [Formula: see text]-constraint method and interactive algorithm are used to solve the model, and furthermore the solutions associated with different free carbon emission quota levels and minimal allocation satisfactions have been generated to examine the influences. Based on the analysis and discussion, the methodology can meet the carbon emission reduction goals and transit to a lower-carbon power generation. It also assists the decision makers to develop desired quota allocation strategy in accordance with their attitudes and actual conditions.

Modeling the Impacts of Driver Income Distributions on Online Ride-Hailing Services

The online ride-hailing taxi brings new vitality into the traditional taxi market, as well as new issues and challenges. The pricing and profit distribution of online ride-hailing services is one of the major concerns. This study focuses on the pricing and income distribution in the online ride-hailing system. Queuing system model and birth and death process theory are introduced to describe the driver’s flow process in the network. The social welfare maximization model and the platform profit maximization model are constructed based on the dynamic pricing mechanism, from the government’s and platform’s standpoint, respectively. Through numerical experiments, this paper analyzes the income distribution of drivers under different settings and the influence of different factors (average travel time, psychologically expected price of drivers and passengers, and probability of driver leaving the system) on the proportion of income distribution. The results show that the drivers’ income distribution proportion is higher in the pursuit of social welfare maximization than that in the pursuit of platform profit maximization, and in different benefit pursuit models, various factors have a certain influence on the driver’s income distribution proportion. The proposed method and conclusion in this study can be considered as references for online ride-hailing market supervision and policy-making.

Calculation Method for Electricity Price and Rebate Level in Demand Response Programs

Demand response programs (DRs) can be implemented with less investment costs than those in power plants or facilities and enable us to control power demand. Therefore, they are highly expected as an efficient option for power supply–demand-balancing operations. On the other hand, DRs bring new difficulties on how to evaluate the cooperation of consumers and to decide electricity prices or rebate levels with reflecting its results. This paper presents a theoretical approach that calculates electricity prices and rebate levels in DRs based on the framework of social welfare maximization. In the authors’ proposal, the DR-originated changes in the utility functions of power suppliers and consumers are used to set a guide for DR requests. Moreover, optimal electricity prices and rebate levels are defined from the standpoint of minimal burden in DRs. Through numerical simulations and discussion on their results, the validity of the authors’ proposal is verified.

Strategyproof Mechanisms for Additively Separable and Fractional Hedonic Games

Additively separable hedonic games and fractional hedonic games have received considerable attention in the literature. They are coalition formation games among selfish agents based on their mutual preferences. Most of the work in the literature characterizes the existence and structure of stable outcomes (i.e., partitions into coalitions) assuming that preferences are given. However, there is little discussion of this assumption. In fact, agents receive different utilities if they belong to different coalitions, and thus it is natural for them to declare their preferences strategically in order to maximize their benefit. In this paper we consider strategyproof mechanisms for additively separable hedonic games and fractional hedonic games, that is, partitioning methods without payments such that utility maximizing agents have no incentive to lie about their true preferences. We focus on social welfare maximization and provide several lower and upper bounds on the performance achievable by strategyproof mechanisms for general and specific additive functions. In most of the cases we provide tight or asymptotically tight results. All our mechanisms are simple and can be run in polynomial time. Moreover, all the lower bounds are unconditional, that is, they do not rely on any computational complexity assumptions.

Effect of Optimal Subsidy Rate and Strategic Behaviour of Supply Chain Members under Competition on Green Product Retailing

This paper investigates the impact of the subsidy and horizontal strategic cooperation on a green supply chain where two competing manufacturers distribute substitutable green products through exclusive retailers. Models are formulated in three-stage game structures in five different scenarios, where the government organization determines optimal subsidy by pursuing social welfare maximization. Both manufacturers invest in improving green quality levels of products. The study aims to explore the advantage of vertical integration and strategic collusion from the perspective of green supply chain practice in the presence of subsidy. The key contributions from the present study indicate that under competition, members of both supply chains are able to receive higher profits through horizontal collusion, but green quality levels of the product remain suboptimal. If upstream manufacturers cooperate, government subsidy does not necessarily improve product quality level, and the amount of government expenditure increased substantially. By comparing outcomes where members are vertically integrated with scenarios where members make strategic collusion, we found that the former might outperform by later. Cross-price sensitivity appears as a significant parameter affecting supply chain members’ performance and the amount of government expenditure. Cooperation between members at the horizontal level is a more robust strategic measure than vertical integration if consumers are highly price-sensitive.