Justification under uncertainty

Belief formation and justification of belief is the subject of epistemology, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of action. In this article we are mostly interested in the application of analytic techniques for the explication of belief justification under uncertainty. We need to explicate this phenomenon in order to answer, at least in part, the question of what are the features of reasoning made in conditions that cause doubts, how people make decisions in such conditions. Arguments used for the justification of such decisions have the status of plausible arguments. The crucial issues related to the analysis and evaluation of plausible arguments are of the acceptability of the premises and the transmission of their acceptability to the conclusion. In this article, we have focused on the transition from the premises to the conclusions of plausible arguments, on the transmission of justification of premises to the conclusions. To establish the peculiarities of such a transmission an outline of the semantics for such arguments is proposed. Its key component is the measures of the plausibility of the premises and rules of inference. A plausible argument itself does not provide the ultimate reason for accepting its conclusion. The justification of the conclusion also depends on other arguments that support or defeat it. So to establish the degree of justification of the conclusion we need to attribute the weights to the premises and rules of inference. We hope that this study provides at least a preliminary answer to the question of how the failure of the transmission of justification in plausible arguments differs from the failure of transmission in deductive arguments.

Comenius' man in the context of internal and external freedom towards physical, intellectual and emotional spheres

Is comeniology a science? This question becomes the guiding thought of my contem-plations. I conduct the analysis of John A. Comenius's concept according to the selected scientific criteria: logical order, levels of theory, explanatory power, heuristic power, degree of persuasion and degree of justification, power of prediction, language and methods. I accept the image of a man as a triad involving spirit (immortal part connected with the spiritual world), soul (rational part considering the free will given by the Creator) and body (animal part and the part of the soul capable of perceiving sensory stimuli). In my article I am searching for a proper in-terpretation of Comenius' concept of a free man that was based on observation and experience.

The Value of Fallible Knowledge

This chapter attempts to solve the “threshold problem”: how to provide a plausible account of what fixes the threshold (level, degree) of justification (evidence, probability, warrant, supporting ground) for knowledge in a nonarbitrary way that also makes sense of the perceived value of knowledge. Epistemologists have been largely silent about how strong the justificatory component of fallible knowledge must be. Indeed, nothing like a precise specification of this level of justification has ever been seriously suggested, let alone more widely endorsed. This chapter attempts to answer this challenge. By appealing to the hypothesis that the concept of knowledge is used to identify reliable informants, we can determine the level of justification required for fallible knowledge. Further, we may explain why this level of justification has the significance that makes knowledge valuable. This chapter also explores the alleged payoffs of rejecting fallibilism and shows these benefits to be illusory.

Intuitionism in ethics

To intuit something is to apprehend it directly, without recourse to reasoning processes such as deduction or induction. Intuitionism in ethics proposes that we have a capacity for intuition and that some of the facts or properties that we intuit are irreducibly ethical. Traditionally, intuitionism also advances the important thesis that beliefs arising from intuition have direct justification, and therefore do not need to be justified by appeal to other beliefs or facts. So, while intuitionism in ethics is about the apprehension of ethical facts or properties, traditional intuitionism is principally a view about how beliefs, including ethical beliefs are justified. Varieties of intuitionism differ over what is intuited (for example, rightness or goodness?); whether what is intuited is general and abstract or concrete and particular; the degree of justification offered by intuition; and the nature of the intuitive capacity. The rejection of intuitionism is usually a result of rejecting one of the views that lie behind it. Note that ‘intuition’ can refer to the thing intuited as well as the process of intuiting. Also, somewhat confusingly, intuitionism is sometimes identified with pluralism, the view that there is a plurality of fundamental ethical properties or principles. This identification probably occurs because pluralists often accept the epistemological version of intuitionism.

Hardee versus Newton

William J. Hardee's Corps attacked along the Buck Head and Atlanta Road at about 3 p.m., July 20, with about 15,000 troops. The only force standing in the war was John Newton's division of the Fourth Corps, about 3,000 strong, which was partially fortified in a good position. Hardee handled his attack poorly; one of his divisions never even found the enemy, another nearly outflanked Newton's left but was repulsed, and another only advanced part way to Newton's right wing then stopped in a ravine and fired for the rest of the day. Hardee's reserve division, commanded by Patrick R. Cleburne, was about to renew the attack when Hood called on Hardee to send a division to the east side of Atlanta to oppose McPherson's approach to the city. Hardee Cleburne's Division. Hardee's officers and men generally did not press their attacks vigorously and Hood had some degree of justification in later blaming him for a lack of faith in his plan. The Confederates never discovered that a gap of a mile and a half existed between Newton's division and the rest of the Fourth Corps which was operating with Schofield's Army of the Ohio.

Observation as a method within the context of the debate about quantitative and qualitative approach

Quantitative and qualitative orientations, as dominant in contemporary methodology of social sciences, are based on different forms, parts and types, data. They have their own epistemological specificity. They disintegrate classical sociological methods, such as observation, reducing their penetration and thus reducing the cognitive potential of sociology, while increasing the possibility of its use for ideological purposes. Observation methodologically disintegrates through a normal binding of its participatory forms for qualitative methodology, and structured observation, systematic observation and quantification in the application of observation solely for the quantitative methodology. This article analyzes the degree of justification of such methodological views. Moreover, it examines the efforts to implement diverse mixed or combined strategies with quantitative and qualitative strategy, with particular reference to their impact on observation as a method. The article also points to the relationship of induction, supposedly inherent to qualitative orientation, and deduction, that the literature associates with a quantitative orientation, the possibility of application of observations in social sciences.

Bonjour's Objection to Traditional Foundationalism

Empirical foundationalism affirms that some empirical beliefs a person holds (at a time) have a degree of justification or warrant that does not derive from their being inferable from other empirical beliefs the person holds. Such beliefs are basic for the person (at the time). In his recent book Laurence Bonjour claims that foundationalism faces the following problem:The basic problem confronting empirical foundationalism … is how the basic or foundational empirical beliefs to which it appeals are themselves justified or warranted or in some way given positive epistemic standing, while still preserving their status as basic. This problem amounts to a dilemma: if there is no justification, basic beliefs are rendered epistemically arbitrary, thereby fatally impugning the very claim of foundationalism to constitute a theory of epistemic justification; while a justification which appeals to further premises of some sort threatens to begin anew the regress of justification which it is the whole point of foundationalism to avoid.