Vida precaria y sexualidad. Elementos para una ética sexual

En este trabajo exploramos las posibilidades de una ética sexual que responda a tiempos de precariedad. Defendemos que la tarea de una ética sexual repensada puede contribuir a una vida más vivible para personas fragilizadas más allá de nuestra vulnerabilidad constitutiva por tener cuerpo. Ponemos en interlocución a Judith Butler con la filosofía dialógica del siglo XX y los análisis sobre sexualidad y ética de Thomas Nagel y Margaret Farley. En todo ello, una categoría clave será la justicia.

Are We Embodied Souls?

It is argued that Swinburne should stress the functional unity of soul and body under most healthy conditions. Too often, critics of substance dualism charge dualists with promoting a problematic bifurcation between soul and body. Swinburne’s work is defended against objections from Thomas Nagel. It is argued that Swinburne’s appeal to the first-person point of view is sound.

Zwischen Tradition und Geltung

This book shows under which conditions religious reasoning for generally binding norms can be legitimately introduced into democratic decision-making, even if societies are religiously diverse and pluralistic. To this end, the philosophical and social scientific discussion on this subject, which is still continuing today, is first systematically reviewed and critically discussed, starting with New Atheism, continuing with John Rawls and Thomas Nagel and ending with contemporary contributions by Jürgen Habermas. Subsequently, the book adopts the standpoint that the evaluation of religiously founded claims in democracy can only be determined by their practical consequences, thus leaving broad scope for their integration.

Freedom and Taxation

Chapter 9 invokes the solidarity solution to explain why some taxes are morally permissible while others are not. Take, for example, the endowment tax. Unlike the traditional earnings tax based on the individual’s actual income, the endowment tax is based on the individual’s maximum potential income. Although, intuitively, the endowment tax impermissibly interferes with freedom of occupational choice, it is difficult to explain why it impermissibly interferes while other taxes do not. After showing that the well-known attempts of John Rawls, Liam Murphy, and Thomas Nagel fail, chapter 9 puts forward a new solution: the endowment tax is impermissible not because it forecloses more options but rather because it forecloses options to which individuals have a stronger moral claim. The solidarity solution identifies these options.

Existem bases tributárias dotadas de valor intrínseco? Uma reflexão político-filosófica sobre os fundamentos morais da tributação a partir dos escritos de Liam Murphy e Thomas Nagel

Neste artigo, examinamos as principais teses de Murphy e Nagel sobre o fundamento político-moral do direito tributário. Sustentamos, com os autores, que a distribuição de rendas realizada pelo mercado não pode ser tida como intrinsecamente justa, como supunham os teóricos da tradição liberal. Contrariamente aos autores, porém, entendemos que há bases de cálculo intrinsecamente justas, e que é possível analisar a justiça do direito tributário por meio do princípio metodológico da “prioridade local”, oferecido por Ronald Dworkin. Aplicando-se esse princípio, é possível analisar a justiça de certas bases tributárias independentemente da análise das despesas realizadas pelo Estado para o fornecimento de bens sociais.

Dlaczego śmierć nie jest taka zła?

Celem artykułu jest próba odpowiedzi na pytanie o to, dlaczego śmierć nie jest taka zła. Autor twierdzi, że śmierć niekoniecznie musi być aż tak zła, jak to opisują Thomas Nagel czy Jeff McMahan. Według autora śmierć nie jest absolutnym złem, nie ma też śmierci lepszych i gorszych. Nie ma też powodu, by sądzić, że śmierć jest dobra (wartościowa) jedynie w tym sensie, jak to opisują Bernard Williams, czy Leon Kass. Śmierć jest dobra, ponieważ dzięki niej osoba ludzka aktualizuje swoje potencjalności (poznanie, pragnienia, miłość), osiągając pełnię życia.

Losing Moral Knowledge

Some philosophers—including Gilbert Ryle, Ronald Dworkin, and Thomas Nagel—have held that there are important respects in which our cognitive relationship to morality is more secure than our cognitive relationship to ordinary empirical knowledge. I defend the claim that moral knowledge is susceptible to being lost in the same ways in which non-moral knowledge is, including by being forgotten and by being debunked. I offer a novel solution to Ryle’s puzzle about “forgetting the difference between right and wrong.” The chapter raises, and suggests answers to, a number of underexplored questions, including questions about the extent to which some cases of moral corruption are best understood as cognitive processes (i.e. processes involving a loss of knowledge), as well as questions about the kinds of considerations that could in principle make it reasonable for us to lose confidence even in moral claims that strike us as obviously correct.

Religious gestures and secular strengths: Emerson, Nagel, and Kateb on the religious temperament

What would happen to the reception of Emerson if one does not share his religious sentiments? I argue that appreciating Emerson does not depend upon sharing a similar attitude towards religion not only because we can discern a secular sense of wonder in his writings, as George Kateb claims, but also because his literary excellence shows us ways of wonder in the first place. Further, I show that though there is a brief exchange of similar ideas between Emerson and Thomas Nagel in the latter's engagement of ‘the religious temperament’, their responses to what they call the tremendousness of existence is fundamentally different.

¿Por qué no el paradigma teísta? Un diálogo con La mente y el cosmos de Thomas Nagel

En La mente y el cosmos, Thomas Nagel critica los paradigmas reduccionistas en ciencia natural y considera la posibilidad del teísmo aunque acaba rechazándolo. Este trabajo analiza los argumentos de Nagel para tal rechazo y establece la legitimidad de sostener tal paradigma.