A principled approach to bioethical regulation of genetic counseling: mapping the bioethical problems of genetic counseling and models for their solution

Genetic counseling is a field of high-tech medicine, and its development gives rise to many ethical and legal problems associated primarily with the specifics of genetic data. The purpose of this article is to map the problems of bioethical regulation in genetic counseling, as well as approaches to their solution. To structure the problem field, a principlist approach was chosen. Main results: It is shown that bioethical problems of genetic counseling arise not only in connection with adherence to separate bioethical principles, but also in connection with the conflict between the principles of autonomy and beneficence. It is proposed to distinguish two dimensions of this conflict: 1. Individual, associated primarily with the exercise by a person of the right not to know about his/her hereditary risks; 2. Family, associated with the contradiction between the observance of medical secrecy (as part of autonomy) and the potential benefit from informing the patient's relatives about their possible hereditary risks. Conclusions: The models for resolving bioethical collisions highlight new aspects of meaning of autonomy. In the context of genetic counseling, it is possible to understand autonomy not as non-interference, but as an opportunity to control the disposal of genetic data. At the same time, in the context of regulating this disposal, the autonomy of the patient's family members can also be taken into account.

Attitudes among parents of persons with autism spectrum disorder towards information about genetic risk and future health

Clinical relevance of genetic testing is increasing in autism spectrum disorder (ASD). Information about genetic risk may contribute to improved diagnostics, treatment and family planning, but may also be perceived as a burden. Knowledge about the families’ preferences with regard to genetic risk information is important for both health care professionals and policy makers. We investigated attitudes towards sharing information about genetic risk of ASD and knowledge about future health among parent members of the Norwegian Autism Association (N = 1455) using a questionnaire, and the relationships with parent and child characteristics, such as age, gender and ASD severity. Most preferred autonomy in deciding whom to inform about genetic risk of ASD (74.4%) and a minority supported extensive intra-familial disclosure of the genetic risk (41.1%). The majority agreed that it is an obligation to know as much as possible relevant for future health (58.0%) and only 51.7% agreed to a principle of a ‘right not to know’. In regression models, the attitudes were associated with opinions about benefits and harms of genetic testing (e.g., treatment, family planning, understanding of ASD pathology, insurance discrimination and family conflict). In sum, the findings show that most parents want to know as much as possible relevant for their children’s future health and keep their autonomy and intra-familial confidentiality about genetic risk information. Nearly half of the parents were not concerned with a “right not to know”. These attitudes can inform development of guidelines and bioethics in the age of genomic precision medicine.

From proband to provider: is there an obligation to inform genetic relatives of actionable risks discovered through direct-to-consumer genetic testing?

Direct-to-consumer genetic testing is a growing phenomenon, fuelled by the notion that knowledge equals control. One ethical question that arises concerns the proband’s duty to share information indicating genetic risks in their relatives. However, such duties are unenforceable and may result in the realisation of anticipated harm to relatives. We argue for a shift in responsibility from proband to provider, placing a duty on test providers in the event of identified actionable risks to relatives. Starting from Parker and Lucassen’s (2004) 'joint account model', we adapt Kilbride’s (2018) application of the rule of rescue and balance it against the relative’s right not to know, placing responsibility on the providers of direct-to-consumer genetic testing. Where the risk of disease to a relative is actionable, we argue providers ought to share results even in the face of the proband’s objections. Confidentiality issues are navigated by a pre-emptive consent model, whereby consumers agree to the sharing of certain information with their relatives ahead of testing and as a condition of testing. When a relative is informed, the proband’s privacy is protected by maximal deidentification, and the rights of the relative are met by a stepwise approach to informing that allows them to decide how much information they receive.

The Right Not to Know: some Steps towards a Compromise

There is an ongoing debate in medicine about whether patients have a ‘right not to know’ pertinent medical information, such as diagnoses of life-altering diseases. While this debate has employed various ethical concepts, probably the most widely-used by both defenders and detractors of the right is autonomy. Whereas defenders of the right not to know typically employ a ‘liberty’ conception of autonomy, according to which to be autonomous involves doing what one wants to do, opponents of the right not to know often employ a ‘duty’ understanding, viewing autonomy as involving an obligation to be self-governing. The central contribution of this paper is in showing that neither view of autonomy can reasonably be said to support the extreme stances on the right not to know that they are sometimes taken to. That is, neither can a liberty view properly defend a right not to know without limits, nor can a duty view form the basis of an absolute rejection of the right not to know. While there is still theoretical distance between these two approaches, we conclude that the views are considerably closer on this issue than they first appear, opening the way for a possible compromise.

The right not to know and the obligation to know

There is significant controversy over whether patients have a ‘right not to know’ information relevant to their health. Some arguments for limiting such a right appeal to potential burdens on others that a patient’s avoidable ignorance might generate. This paper develops this argument by extending it to cases where refusal of relevant information may generate greater demands on a publicly funded healthcare system. In such cases, patients may have an ‘obligation to know’. However, we cannot infer from the fact that a patient has an obligation to know that she does not also have a right not to know. The right not to know is held against medical professionals at a formal institutional level. We have reason to protect patients’ control over the information that they receive, even if in individual instances patients exercise this control in ways that violate obligations.