The Impact of Corporate Governance Mechanisms on the Commitment of Managers in an IPO Setting: Evidence from Korean Small and Venture Firms

Managers’ commitment and dedication crucially affect the sustainable growth of firms. When private companies first offer their shares to the public in an initial public offering (IPO), an IPO lockup is one way of revealing managers’ commitments. IPO lockups are agreements that promise not to sell the shares retained by pre-IPO shareholders for a specified period in the market after the IPO. This paper investigates the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on the length of the lockup period. The paper’s sample consists of IPO firms that have gone public in Korea’s KOSDAQ market, which is a listing venue for small and venture companies. The major findings of this paper are as follows: first, the length of the lockup period increases with the number of outside directors and, second, IPO firms with audit committees have longer lockup periods than those without them. These results indicate that managers of firms with greater board independence choose a longer lockup period when going public. This paper also finds that the lockup period is positively related to the presence of venture capitalists serving as directors of IPO firms, which suggests that venture capital directors may ensure that managers have longer lockups. Overall, these findings suggest that, when small and venture companies go public, managers may use the IPO lockup as a commitment device that complements corporate governance mechanisms in reducing investor concern about the moral hazard problem of managers.

REFLECTIONS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ON PAY-PERFORMANCE SENSITIVITY: A NEW PERSPECTIVE

ABSTRACT Purpose: This research investigates whether the characteristics of corporate governance (executive compensation, board composition, ownership structure, and control) influence the sensitivity of remuneration to firms’ performance, the so-called pay-performance sensitivity. Originality/value: This study brings to the literature a new perspective on the interaction of corporate governance mechanisms aligned with the concept of pay-performance sensitivity. The study shows that governance instruments are not isolated but rather interrelated and interdependent. Design/methodology/approach: The study sample was composed of Brazil 100 Index (IBRX 100) companies listed on B3 from 2014 to 2018. Data were extracted from the Economatica® database, and the reference forms were accessed on the Securities and Exchange Commission of Brazil’s (CVM) website. We use panel data regression models with fixed and random-effects models. Findings: The board composition (represented by the CEO/Chairman duality) increases the pay-performance sensitivity, while the ownership concentration reduces it. In addition, a greater presence of independent members on the board reduces the variation in executive compensation.

The effect of financial and non-financial performance on investors’ reactions: The role of corporate governance mechanisms as moderating

The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of financial and non-financial performance on investor reactions and the role of corporate governance mechanisms as moderating. The analysis technique used is the moderated regression analysis (MRA). The research population is manufacturing sector companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX). Based on the purposive sampling method, 78 companies were selected as the samples (390 firm-year observations). The results of this study provide empirical evidence that the existence of financial and non-financial performance in a company can increase investor reactions. Institutional ownership plays a role in the relationship between financial performance and investor reactions. Meanwhile, independent commissioners, boards of directors, and audit committees have no role in the relationship between financial performance and investor reactions. And independent commissioners and institutional ownership can moderate the influence of non-financial performance on investor reactions. Meanwhile, the board of directors and audit committee cannot moderate the influence of non-financial performance on investor reactions.

Corporate Governance and Leverage Mechanisms on Integrity of Financial Report: Conservatism Index Approach in BUMN

The integrity of financial statements is related to one of the characteristics required by IFRS, namely faithful representation. The financial statements that are presented must contain information that is relevant and reliable so that it has high integrity and can be used by stakeholders in making decisions. In reality, realizing the integrity of financial statements is a difficult thing. There have been several cases that cast doubt on the level of integrity of financial statements. One of them happened to PT Jiwasraya (Persero) recently. This research is aimed to examine the effect of corporate governance mechanisms proxied by (institutional ownership, proportion of independent commissioners, and audit committee meetings) and leverage on the integrity of financial statements using a conservatism index approach in the market book value. Firm size as a control variable. The population is BUMN listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2016 to 2018 with a sample of 22 companies. The data analysis method used is panel data regression. The results of the common effect model test that only the audit committee meeting variable has a significant influence on the integrity of the financial statements, while the variable institutional ownership, the proportion of independent commissioners and leverage has an effect but is not significant on the integrity of the financial statement

Corporate Governance Regulations and Practices under COVID-19 Crisis: Time to Rethink

The COVID-19 has brought the challenge of survival for all the companies around the globe. This pandemic totally changed the procedures of managing and governing the firms with the help of regulations of the state. The said disaster has also hit the existence of the major companies in different sectors of the economy. Consequently, it has drawn the attention of all the practitioners of the Corporate Governance along with the policy makers of the economy. The focus of this article is to see the utility and practicability of different regulations and practices of the corporate governance to cope with the current emerging challenges of COVID-19 in corporate sector. Furthermore, the current study takes some valuable insights from the leading business journal articles and find the key mechanisms of the corporate governance, which help the companies to deal with the recent crisis. These mechanisms could be effective for the different business units during this dilemma of COVID-19. This review intends to change the management philosophy of the different companies. Furthermore, this study aims to provide them with the latest mechanisms of corporate governance, which are helping the companies for their successful progression of business affairs in this tough time of Corona Virus. These mechanisms include presence of risk management committee, more attention to the stakeholders, family ownership, and block holders. This paper concludes that all the above said mechanisms of corporate governance are very helpful during the crisis of COVID-19. The study highlights that this pandemic has affected the governance mechanisms of al the establishments, therefore firms should be prepared for such crisis in future by paying attention to the different corporate governance mechanisms. The study recommends that certain practices of the corporate governance are very helpful in coping the challenges posed by the pandemic of COVID-19.

Human Rights Disclosures, Corporate Governance Mechanisms, and Firm Performance: Directions for Future Research

This paper aims at investigating and scrutinizing prior literature of human rights disclosures, corporate governance mechanisms and their effect on firm performance in an attempt to unveil the influence of non-financial disclosures such as human rights on the corporation’s financial performance. We highlighted that the “board of directors” plays a vital role as one of the “corporate governance” mechanisms in spreading the awareness of the importance of “human rights” issues that might impact the corporation. Additionally, we propose the need for a change in corporate governance mechanisms to be more accountable towards human rights. Also, our analysis suggests that human rights disclosures impact the corporation’s image which in turn could be translated into increasing sales that would eventually influence the financial performance of the corporation. Therefore, this paper sheds the light on directions for future research that will explore the association between human rights disclosures and firm performance through incorporating corporate governance mechanisms.

The effects of corporate governance mechanisms on earnings management: Empirical evidence from Moroccan listed firms

Purpose: The purpose of the study is to systematically review and examine the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms in restraining earnings management among the listed firms of the Casablanca Stock Exchange. Research methodology: In this study, we used the modified Jones model to calculate discretionary accruals. Our sample comprises 27 firms covering the period from 2016 to 2018, analyzed by the EGLS estimator. Results: Our empirical results show that gender diversity, board size, and audit committee independence reduce the managers' discretion. Simultaneously, we found a significantly positive association between earning management and different corporate governance characteristics such as CEO duality, institutional investor ownership, and family ownership. We do not find any evidence that audit committee size, ownership concentration, and managerial ownership significantly influence discretionary accruals. Limitations: This study's main limitation is that we did not address the direction of discretionary accruals, which does not allow us to detect the motivational aspects behind earnings management. Contribution: The results of this study will help Moroccan authorities in their formulation of an appropriate regulatory framework because very few studies have been conducted in this area in the case of the Moroccan listed companies, especially with a large set of governance variables as our empirical model. Keywords Accruals; Board of directors; Corporate governance; Earnings management; Ownership structure

Can corporate governance mechanisms reduce earnings-management practices in Islamic banks?

Purpose This study aims to provide empirical evidence on the role of corporate governance mechanisms in reducing earnings-management practices in Islamic banks in Asia. Design/methodology/approach This study used 28 Islamic banks in Asia, which were listed on the stock exchange from 2013–2017. The research method used quantitative regression with data on the characteristics of Islamic banks taken from the websites of each bank. This study used discretionary loan loss provision as a proxy for measuring earnings management. Findings The results show that only the audit committee size has a significantly negative effect on earnings management. An independent audit committee has a negative, but not significant, effect. The difference expectation signs cannot be interpreted further. Research limitations/implications Only a few components of corporate governance were tested in this study. Therefore, it is expected that future studies will include more components. Practical implications In general, the components of corporate governance that include the characteristics of the board of directors and the audit committee have a varied effect on reducing the earnings-management practices in Islamic banks, except audit committee size. In practice, audit committee size should have an important role in earning management reduces. Originality/value This may be the first paper that studies the effect of corporate governance on earnings management in Islamic banks in Asia.