Do Job Candidates' Effort Promises Matter When the Labor Market is Competitive? Experimental Evidence

Using an experiment, we investigate whether job candidates' noncontractible effort promises increase their actual effort in the work relationship when the labor market is competitive. Due to promise-keeping preferences, individuals tend to keep promises even if doing so is costly. However, when promises can be made strategically to influence hiring decisions, it is unclear whether workers are less likely to keep their promises. We develop theory to predict that making effort promises matters even more when labor markets are competitive. We find workers promise higher effort levels when competing for a job than when they do not, but do not keep promises to a lesser extent although the costs of promise-keeping increase with the promise size, thereby increasing the total effort provided. The results enhance our understanding of the effects of worker-employer communication during hiring, particularly in a competitive setting in which such communication is most likely to occur.

Skunks and gray foxes in a tropical dry region: casual or positive interactions?

Previous studies have shown that skunks present negative interactions with foxes. However, recently published observations have demonstrated that southern spotted skunk (Spilogale angustifrons) individuals follow gray foxes (Urocyon cinereoargenteus) in the Tehuacán-Cuicatlán Biosphere Reserve (TCBR) in Mexico. In this paper, we reported the same interaction in other locations in the TCBR and evaluated whether this interaction is casual or statistically positive. In this analysis, we included data pertaining to three skunk species (S. angustifrons, Conepatus leuconotus, and Mephitis macroura) and U. cinereoargenteus. We sampled 172 sites using camera traps from 2011 to 2018 for a total effort of 49,764 trap-days. The four studied species were nocturnal; the overlap coefficient between foxes and skunks varied from 0.70 to 0.83. Of the 32 consecutive records between S. angustifrons and U. cinereoargenteus, 11 showed that individuals of this skunk species closely followed U. cinereoargenteus and that these encounters were not random (time interval <1 min). We did not find evidence of a behavioral association of U. cinereoargenteus with C. leuconotus and M. macroura.

Competition Among Contests: a Safety Level Analysis

We study a competition among two contests, where each contest designer aims to attract as much effort as possible. Such a competition exists in reality, e.g., in crowd-sourcing websites. Our results are phrased in terms of the ``relative prize power'' of a contest, which is the ratio of the total prize offered by this contest designer relative to the sum of total prizes of the two contests. When contestants have a quasi-linear utility function that captures both a risk-aversion effect and a cost of effort, we show that a simple contest attracts a total effort which approaches the relative prize power of the contest designer assuming a large number of contestants. This holds regardless of the contest policy of the opponent, hence providing a ``safety level'' which is a robust notion similar in spirit to the max-min solution concept.

Power and punishment influence negotiations over parental care

Asymmetries in power (the ability to influence the outcome of conflict) are ubiquitous in social interactions because interacting individuals are rarely identical. It is well documented that asymmetries in power influence the outcome of reproductive conflict in social groups. Yet power asymmetries have received little attention in the context of negotiations between caring parents, which is surprising given that parents are often markedly different in size. Here we built on an existing negotiation model to examine how power and punishment influence negotiations over care. We incorporated power asymmetry by allowing the more-powerful parent, rank 1, to inflict punishment on the less-powerful parent, rank 2. We then determined when punishment will be favored by selection and how it would affect the negotiated behavioral response of each parent. We found that with power and punishment, a reduction in one parent’s effort results in partial compensation by the other parent. However, the degree of compensation is asymmetric: the rank 2 compensates more than the rank 1. As a result, the fitness of rank 1 increases and the fitness of rank 2 decreases, relative to the original negotiation model. Furthermore, because power and punishment enable one parent to extract greater effort from the other, offspring can do better, that is, receive more total effort, when there is power and punishment involved in negotiations over care. These results reveal how power and punishment alter the outcome of conflict between parents and affect offspring, providing insights into the evolutionary consequences of exerting power in negotiations.

Mammalian fauna in an urban influenced zone of Chandaka-Dampara Wildlife Sanctuary in Odisha, India

A camera trapping survey to estimate the species richness and relative abundance of different mammalian fauna and various anthropogenic activities was carried out for four months within an urban influenced zone of Chandaka-Dampara Wildlife Sanctuary, Odisha. The survey extended over 120 days in January–April 2019 over 10% of the total sanctuary area. With nine cameras and a total effort of 771 trap days, 2,855 independent photographs including 14 species of wild mammals and birds, human traffic, and movement of stray animals were captured. Among the mammalian fauna, Golden Jackal was the most photographed species whereas the Asian Elephant, Striped Hyaena, and Common Palm Civet were the least photographed species. Various anthropogenic activities like intensive movement of departmental vehicles, staff, feral livestock, and stray dogs and cats were also recorded and these activities need to be addressed in management activities for long term conservation of the area and its mammalian fauna. In order to enhance biological connectivity and improve movement of wildlife between the main part of the Chandaka Sanctuary and its near-detached reserved forests in Jagannathprasad-Bharatpur, the study recommends removal of feral cattle, extensive plantations, and construction of a fly-over for vehicular traffic.

Dynamic Contest Games with Time Delays

Dynamic asymmetric contest games are examined under the assumption that the assessed value of the prize by each agent depends on the total effort of all agents, and each agent has only delayed information about the efforts of the competitors. Assuming gradient dynamics with continuous time scales, first the resulting one-delay model is investigated. Then, assuming additional delayed information about the agents’ own efforts, a two-delay model is constructed and analyzed. In both cases, first the characteristic equation is derived in the general case, and then two special cases are considered. First, symmetric agents are assumed and then general duopolies are examined. Conditions are derived for the local stability of the equilibrium including stability thresholds and stability switching curves.

The Third Place Game

We study an elimination tournament with four contestants, each of whom has either a high value of winning (a strong player) or a low value of winning (a weak player) and these values are common knowledge. Each pairwise match is modeled as an all-pay auction. The winners of the first stage (semifinal) compete in the second stage (final) for the first prize, while the losers of the first stage compete for the third prize. We examine whether or not the game for the third prize is profitable for the designer who wishes to maximize the total effort of the players. We demonstrate that if the players are asymmetric and there are at least two strong players, then there is always a seeding of the players such that the third place game is not profitable. On the other hand, if there are at least two weak players, then there is always a seeding of the players such that the third place game is profitable.

Pelaksanaan Hukum Kewarisan Islam di Kota Makassar

Pelaksanaan Hukum Kewarisan Islam berdasarkan Kompilasi Hukum Islam di Kota Makassar sesuai instruksi Presiden RI No.1 Thn. 1991 belum efektif. Beberapa faktor yang mempengaruhi dalam pelaksanaan Hukum Kewarisan Islam di Kota Makassar adalah substansi hukum yang belum menjamin adanya kepastian hukum, tingkat pengetahuan masyarakat, tingkat pengetahuan aparat dan tingkat persepsi masayarakat.Pelaksanaan Hukum Kewarisan Islam di Kota Makassar berdasarkan Kompilasi Hukum Islam, diharapkan menjadi input masyarakat muslim dan pejabat terkait untuk menjadi bahan koreksi dan perbaikan terhadap pelaksanaan Hukum Kewarisan Islam.Untuk mengefektifkan pelaksanaan Hukum Kewarisan Islam di Kota Makassar diharapkan agar Kompilasi Hukum Islam disempurnakan dan ditingkatkan menjadi Undang-Undang, karena itu dibutuhkan upaya yang maksimal untuk mewujudkannya guna meningkatkan pengetahuan masyarakat, pengetahuan aparat, dan persepsi masyarakat.The implementation of Islamic Inheritance Law is based on the Compilation of Islamic Law in Makassar City according to the instructions of the Republic of Indonesia No.1 1991 that has been ineffective. Several factors that influence the implementation of Islamic Heritage Law in Makassar City are legal substances that have not guaranteed legal certainty, the level of knowledge of the community, the level of knowledge of the officers and the level of perception of the community.The implementation of Islamic Inheritance Law in Makassar City based on the Compilation of Islamic Law is expected to be the input of Muslim communities and related officials to be the material for correction and improvement of the implementation of Islamic Heritage Law.In order to make the implementation of Islamic Inheritance Law effective in Makassar City, it is hoped that the Compilation of Islamic Law will be refined and upgraded to the Act because it requires total effort to make it happen in order to increase public knowledge, knowledge of officials, and public perceptions.

Species composition and abundance estimates of reptiles in selected agroecosystems in southern Western Ghats, India

Species composition and abundance of reptiles in selected agroecosystems in Thrissur plains, near Palghat Gap, southern Western Ghats in India, was studied from January 2017 to May 2017. The agroecosystems surveyed were coconut, cashew & rubber plantations, home garden, paddy field, and botanical garden. Time-constrained visual encounter surveys of a total effort of 360 man-hours were done in the field. Coconut and cashew plantations reported the highest species richness with 11 species each, while the highest number of sightings (159) were recorded from botanical garden. Bronze Grass Skink Eutropis macularia was the most abundant species in agroecosystems. Correspondence analysis was done to compare the reptilian diversity in the agroecosystems. The reptile fauna of home garden and paddy field were found to be more distinct than the rest of the agroecosystems. A total of 17 species of reptiles were recorded during the study, thus highlighting the significance of agroecosystems in acting as important buffer landscapes for reptiles.

Effort Choices between Group and Individual Tasks in Mixed Incentives

ABSTRACT Mixed individual and group incentives are widely used in practice under the assumption that by incentivizing both, organizations can increase total effort and predictably direct effort. The present paper explores these assumptions under two forms of mixed incentives, one in which incentives are implemented in a simultaneous/independent manner and the other in a sequential/dependent manner. Results suggest that adding individual incentives to group incentives motivates greater total effort, but adding group incentives to individual incentives does not, regardless of the structure or amount of the mixed incentives. We also find that the independent mixed incentives in our setting lead individuals to allocate a greater (less) percentage of total effort to individual (group) tasks than the sequential mixed incentives. Our findings have important implications to incentive systems design by suggesting that organizations need to consider a fit between the incentives and where they would like their employees to allocate effort. Data Availability: Data are available on request.