Analisis Pendapatan Murabahah

This study aims to determine the level of development of murabahah margin income and determine the determination of murabahah financing margins at BMT Tamzis Cimahi Branch. In this study the authors conducted research using descriptive qualitative research methods with a case study approach, namely research conducted in depth about aspects of the social environment including humans in it, either individually, in groups, or in the environment around BMT Tamzis Cimahi branch. The conclusion that can be drawn from this study is that the factors in determining the murabahah margin are based on the ceiling value and financing period and are analyzed using th e 5C + 1S analysis principle including character, capacity, capital, condition, collateral, and sharia and the level of income development in BMT. Tamzis Cimahi branch experienced ups and downs from year to year where it can be seen from 2012 to 2016 the average income was Rp.262,183,200 with a total income of Rp.1,310,916,000 with details in 2013 it decreased by Rp.19,026,000 and decreased again. in 2014 with a total decrease of IDR 184,655,000. however, in 2015 the murabahah contract at BMT Tamzis increased again by Rp. 117,193,000 and in 2016 it increased again from the previous year of Rp. 70,409,000. The determination of the murabahah financing margin at BMT Tamzis undergoes several stages including starting with fundraising, deposit contracts, BMT, financing products, goods and then setting margins to generate income for BMT and 'attayya.

Evaluation of Combined Financial Incentives and Deposit Contract Intervention for Smoking Cessation: A Randomized Controlled Trial

Introduction. We evaluate whether a combination of financial incentives and deposit contracts improves cessation rates among low- to moderate-income smokers. Methods. We randomly assigned 311 smokers covered by Medicaid at 12 health clinics in Connecticut to usual care or one of the three treatment arms. Each treatment arm received financial incentives for two months and either (i) nothing further (“incentives only”), (ii) the option to start a deposit contract with incentive earnings after the incentives ended (“commitment”), or (iii) the option to precommit any earned incentives into a deposit contract starting after the incentives ended (“precommitment”). Smoking cessation was confirmed biochemically at two, six, and twelve months. Results. At two, six, and twelve months after baseline, our estimated treatment effects on cessation are positive but imprecise, with confidence intervals containing effect sizes estimated by prior studies of financial incentives alone and deposit contracts alone. At two months, the odds ratio for quitting was 1.4 in the incentive-only condition (95% CI: 0.5 to 3.5), 2.0 for incentives followed by commitment (95% CI: 0.6 to 6.1), and 1.9 for incentives and precommitment (95% CI: 0.7 to 5.3). Conclusions. A combined incentive and deposit contract program for Medicaid enrollees, with incentives offering up to $300 for smoking cessation and use of support services, produced a positive but imprecisely estimated effect on biochemically verified cessation relative to usual care and with no detectable difference in cessation rates between the different treatment arms.

Social media advertisements with deposit contracts and fitness club/gym membership: are consumers persuaded?

Purpose This study aims to examine the association of social media advertising with deposit contracts and consumers joining a fitness club/gym. Design/methodology/approach This paper surveyed 745 college students. Three deposit contract options were presented with goals of losing 5% of your original weight, losing 10 pounds from your weight and exercising for 75 min. Findings This paper found that consumers chose deposit contracts at higher rates than no contract or regular contract options. This paper found that behavioral control was positively associated with choosing a deposit contract. This paper found that presence of a weight problem was positively associated with choosing a deposit contract with very concrete goals of losing 10 pounds or exercising for 75 min while no association occurred for the less specific concrete goal of losing 5% of your original weight. Originality/value In conclusion, marketers can consider a novel advertising approach on social media of advertising deposit contract information to possibly interest consumers to join a fitness club/gym.

Evaluating the Feasibility, Acceptability, and Effects of Deposit Contracts With and Without Daily Feedback to Promote Physical Activity

Background: Despite interest in financial incentive programs, evidence regarding the feasibility, acceptability, and effectiveness of deposit contracts (ie, use of participants’ own money as a financial reward) for increasing physical activity (PA) is limited. Furthermore, evidence regarding the use of feedback within incentive programs is limited. Purpose: To evaluate: (1) the feasibility and acceptability of deposit contracts for increasing objectively measured PA and (2) the effects of deposit contracts with or without ongoing feedback on PA. Methods: Participants (n = 24) were exposed to 3 conditions (1) self-monitoring, (2) incentive, and (3) incentive with feedback in an ABACABAC design, with the order of incentive conditions counterbalanced across participants. Results: Effect sizes suggest that individuals had a modest increase in PA during the incentive conditions compared with self-monitoring. Presentation order moderated results, such that individuals exposed to incentives with feedback first performed more poorly across both incentive conditions. In addition, individuals often cited the deposit contract as a reason for not enrolling, and those who did participate reported inadequate acceptability of the incentives and feedback. Conclusions: Results suggest that while deposit contracts may engender modest increases in PA, this type of incentive may not be feasible or acceptable for promoting PA.

Money, Banking, and Financial Markets

The fact that money, banking, and financial markets interact in important ways seems self-evident. The theoretical nature of this interaction, however, has not been fully explored. To this end, we integrate the Diamond (1997, Journal of Political Economy105, 928–956) model of banking and financial markets with the Lagos and Wright (2005, Journal of Political Economy113, 463–484) dynamic model of monetary exchange—a union that bears a framework in which fractional reserve banks emerge in equilibrium, where bank assets are funded with liabilities made demandable in government money, where the terms of bank deposit contracts are affected by the liquidity insurance available in financial markets, where banks are subject to runs, and where a central bank has a meaningful role to play, both in terms of inflation policy and as a lender of last resort. Among other things, the model provides a rationale for nominal deposit contracts combined with a central bank lender-of-last-resort facility to promote efficient liquidity insurance and a panic-free banking system.