Market Power and Income Taxation

This article analyzes concerns about market power and inequality in a model with multiple sectors, heterogeneous abilities, endogenous labor supply, and nonlinear income taxation. Proportional markups with no profit dissipation have no effect on the economy, and a policy that reduces a nonproportional markup raises (lowers) welfare when it is higher (lower) than a weighted average of other markups. With proportional (partial or full) profit dissipation, proportional markups are equivalent to a downward shift of the distribution of abilities, and the optimal policy rule with nonproportional markups maximizes consumer plus producer surplus despite concerns for distribution and labor supply distortion. (JEL D43, D61, H21, H23, H24, K21, L13, L40)

Optimal Positive Capital Taxes at Interior Steady States

We generalize recent results of Bassetto and Benhabib (2006) and Straub and Werning (2019) in a neoclassical model with endogenous labor-leisure choice where all agents are allowed to save and accumulate capital. We provide a sufficient condition under which optimal redistributive capital taxes remain at their allowed upper bound forever, even if the resulting equilibrium trajectory converges to a unique steady state with positive and finite consumption, capital, and labor. We then provide an interpretation of our sufficient condition. Using recent evidence on wealth distribution in the United States, we argue that our sufficient condition is empirically plausible. (JEL D31, E21, H21, H23, H25, J22)