The impact of institutional factors on corporate mechanism of cash adjustment – New evidence from emerging Asia

PurposeThe purpose of this study is to understand how the business environment of a country has an impact on cash management policies of the firms and also to investigate if there is any asymmetry in cash adjustment dynamics when a firm deviates from its long-term target of cash holdings.Design/methodology/approachUsing a sample of seven emerging Asian countries in the period 2001–2019, the authors investigate the role of country specific variables in the corporate cash holdings and their cash adjustment mechanism. They use the panel data regression method to estimate the results.FindingsThe authors find that the overall financial development of a country has a significant impact on corporate cash holdings and cash adjustment dynamics. When a firm has excess cash, the speed of adjustment towards the target is faster as compared to when it has deficit cash holdings. Further, when a firm holds excess cash, it adjusts towards the target using cash from investments; in case of deficit cash holdings, the adjustment happens via cash from financing activities.Practical implicationsThe results of the study are helpful to corporate managers as these are important references to them to understand and design cash management policies by considering factors that are measured at the country level. It also provides them a clearer understanding about the role of corporate board and information asymmetry in cash holdings.Originality/valueThis is the first study which examines the role of country-specific variables on corporate cash holdings and their adjustment mechanism of firms in emerging Asia. Further, the study extends the literature by providing new evidence that there is asymmetry in cash adjustment dynamics of firms after controlling for the overall financial development of a country.

Growth Expectations, Undue Optimism, and Short-Run Fluctuations

This paper proposes a two-step procedure in order to identify belief shocks—shocks to expectations about the current state of the economy. First, we use the Survey of Professional Forecasters to measure nowcast errors about contemporaneous output growth. Second, we extract belief shocks from nowcast errors, once by regressing them on existing measures of structural shocks, and once by imposing sign restrictions on a VAR model. Using both approaches, we find that belief shocks trigger similar adjustment dynamics and a high degree of co-movement across macroeconomic variables. Belief shocks account for about one third of short-run output fluctuations.

Underpricing of initial public offerings in experimental asset markets

The underpricing of initial public offerings (IPO) is a well-documented fact of empirical equity market research. Theories explain this underpricing with market imperfections. We study three empirically relevant IPO mechanisms under almost perfect market conditions in the laboratory: a stylized book building approach, a closed book auction, and an open book auction. We report underpricing in each of these IPO mechanisms. Uncertainty about the aftermarket behavior may partly explain IPO excess returns but underpricing persists even in the repeated setting where uncertainty is negligible and despite the equilibrium adjustment dynamics, that we observe in the data. The data reveal a market-wide impact of investors’ reluctance to sell in the aftermarket at a price below the offering price. We conclude that a behavioural bias similar to the disposition effect fosters IPO underpricing in our setting.

Game equilibria and unification dynamics in networks with heterogeneous agents

We study game equilibria in a model of production and externalities in network with two types of agents who possess different productivities. Each agent may invest a part of her endowment (it may be, for instance, time or money) in the first of two time periods; consumption in the second period depends on her own investment and productivity as well as on the investments of her neighbors in the network. Three ways of agent’s behavior are possible: passive (no investment), active (a part of endowment is invested), and hyperactive (the whole endowment is invested). For star network with different productivities of agents in the center and in the periphery, we obtain conditions for existence of inner equilibrium (with all active agents) and study comparative statics. We introduce adjustment dynamics and study consequences of junction of two complete networks with different productivities of agents. In particular, we study how the behavior of nonadopters (passive agents) changes when they connect to adopters (active or hyperactive) agents.