A Ontologia Social Analítica: Por uma Interlocução com a Teoria Sociológica

RESUMO O propósito deste artigo é aproximar as discussões da filosofia social analítica do movimento de virada ontológica que ocorre hoje nas Ciências Sociais. Com esse fim, apresentam-se alguns dos autores mais representativos da ontologia social analítica sobre o tema da intencionalidade coletiva. Demonstra-se que, de forma similar ao que acontece na teoria sociológica, seus principais representantes divergem sobre a relação de prioridade entre o nível micro ou macro da realidade social, defendendo posições identificadas com o holismo (John Searle e Margaret Gilbert), o coletivismo moderado (Raimo Tuomela) ou o individualismo relacional (Michael Bratman). Defende-se que a similaridade dessa problemática com as discussões sociológicas, sobre a relação micro/macro, representa uma importante plataforma de interlocução entre estas tradições disciplinares.

Some Memorable Faculty Members at Pacific University College of Optometry in the Early 1970s

This article continues discussion of optometry faculty at Pacific University in the early 1970s. Part 1 profiled Charles Margach, O.D., M.S., Colin Pitblado, Ph.D., and Don West, O.D.; Part 2 presented notes on John Gerke, Ph.D., Margaret Gilbert, Ph.D., Mort Gollender, Ph.D., Leonard Levine, Ph.D., Jurgen Meyer-Arendt, M.D., Ph.D., Theodore Oakberg, Ph.D., Oscar Richards, Ph.D., and Frank Thorn, Ph.D.; and Part 3 provided brief bios of Bradford Wild, O.D., Ph.D., Earle Hunter, O.D., and Richard Septon, O.D., M.S.1-3 Considered first in this part will be some of the optometrists whose instructional duties were mostly in the classroom and laboratory. The latter part of this article will present notes on a few of the part-time faculty who worked in the clinic.

Collective Belief and the Intentional Strategy

What do we mean when we say that some group believes something? Do we simply mean that all the members of the group believe it, or are we acknowledging the existence of some kind of group agent? According to Margaret Gilbert, talk about group mental states refers to the specific kind of agreements she calls joint commitments — that is, to collectively believe something means to be committed with others to believe it. In my article, I will first present Gilbert’s approach in more detail but will ultimately show that this approach is problematic and will refute it. I will briefly consider the most common solution to the problems Gilbert’s account faces, which lies in replacing collective beliefs with acceptances, but I will show that this solution will not do either. The solution I will then present will be based on Daniel Dennett’s intentional strategy, which is a method of interpreting the things around us and predicting their behaviour by treating them as rational agents with relevant intentions. I will try to show that all the problematic cases of collective belief can be explained by applying the intentional strategy to the groups in question.

Can a wise society be free?

Recently, Margaret Gilbert has argued that it appears that the wisdom of a society impinges, greatly, on its freedom. In this article, I show that Gilbert’s “negative argument” fails to be convincing. On the other hand, there are important lessons, particularly for democratic theory, that can be by looking carefully, and critically, at her argument. This article will proceed as follows. First, I present Gilbert’s argument. Next, I criticize her understanding of freedom, and then, using arguments from Christopher McMahon, criticize her understanding of a wise society. Finally, I discuss how what has been said can inform how one should think about democratic theory.

A hard choice for Tomasello

Michael Tomasello explains the human sense of obligation by the role it plays in negotiating practices of acting jointly and the commitments they underwrite. He draws in his work on two models of joint action, one from Michael Bratman, the other from Margaret Gilbert. But Bratman's makes the explanation too difficult to succeed, and Gilbert's makes it too easy.

Bridging the gap between the social science and the social ontology of collective memory

It is commonplace to attribute memories to groups of individuals both large and small. Attributions of memories to groups are also found in social science research. This article proposes using philosophical accounts from the literature on social ontology to help clarify and deepen our understanding of how these terms are being employed in the social sciences. Two contrasting accounts of collective remembering are presented: the joint commitment account derived from the seminal work of Margaret Gilbert, and the participatory intentions account based on Christopher Kutz’s analysis of collective action. The implications of these accounts for clarifying notions of collective memory and remembering in the social sciences are explored through two case studies—one involving a social media site that promotes sharing of memories among users and the other concerning organizational remembering.

Grammatical Equivalence In “Eat, Pray, and Love” A Novel by Margaret Gilbert

The objective of this study was to describe how Indonesian translator translated the meaning of number, gender, person, tense & aspect, and also voice (NGPTV) which proposed by Mona Baker. Besides that, a descriptive qualitative method and content analysis technique were used in analyzing 20% of data. The main results of the study were: 1). The use of number with SS category was 917 (61%); while PS and PP category were almost had the same value 314 (21%) and 264 (17%); but for SP category was only 22 (1%); 2). The use of Gender notion in GN was 248 (55%), and NG was 207 (45%); 3). The use of person was 2103 (100%); 4). The use of Tense & Aspect category in the form of Past tense, Present tense, and Future tense were different in number, they were 336 (95%), 12 (3%) and 6 (2%); 5). The use of voice in the form of AA was the biggest one in 244 (82%), but for AP and PP were only 45 (15%) and 10 (3%). However, it was found that 0% for PA category. Therefore, it concluded that the translator had been successfully translated the text in the notion of NGPTV.

Joint Commitment Model of Collective Beliefs

For almost three decades, Margaret Gilbert has introduced a new account of social facts taking “joint commitments”, not only explicit but also implicit, as the cement of sociality properly understood. Gilbert has used this original account of collective phenomena to clarify a variety of issues, both in the philosophy of rights and in the philosophy of the social sciences. This paper focuses on the latter domain; it argues that although Durkheim and Mauss are central references in her pioneering work, On Social Facts, Gilbert’s model has been underestimated in the fields of sociology and anthropology. This may come from the fact that Gilbert provides the reader with only imaginary examples. To overcome this difficulty, Bouvier investigates several historical examples in two related domains:, the political and the religious. Another reason for this relative lack of interest may come from Gilbert’s very unconventional interpretation of the Durkheimian explanation of social beliefs. Although, on the one hand, her “contractualist” (or Rousseauist) interpretation permits a sharp illumination of certain social facts, it may, on the other hand, impede the recognition of the specificity of other kinds of beliefs, which sociologists and anthropologists—including Durkheim—usually consider as collective beliefs. Bouvier, by contrast, introduces alternative models, illustrating them with similar, although ultimately distinct from previous, historical examples.