AbstractTo what extent does Nietzsche’s concept of Will to Power succeed Spinoza’s concept of conatus? In our approach, based on the history of problems, concepts are viewed as an answer to certain philosophically relevant issues. The concept of conatus is an attempt to solve, among others, the problems of creatio continua, teleology, the will as a faculty, and normativity. Nietzsche reconsiders them, explicitly or implicitly, in a conceptual setting that has much changed over the subsequent two hundred years, and reacts on them with his concept of Will to Power. Such a reconsideration of problems can be conceived as a repetition in the sense of Deleuze, i. e. a repetition that comprises temporal shifts and differences. It is required if problems are considered still as unsolved, or if their former solution seems no longer plausible. The concept of conatus appears therefore in a particular way as an impulse and stimulus for Nietzsche’s own philosophy of Will to Power which is discussed here mainly by recurring to Boscovich. The above mentioned problems arise from ontological concerns, but are ethically oriented in the end, according to Spinoza’s main work The Ethics. A special focus is put on understanding affects as expressions of the conatus on the one hand, and the Will to Power on the other.