Distribution of new cars – no longer an issue for EU competition law?

Distribution cartels in the automotive sector used to be frequently dismantled and sanctioned by the European Commission and the EU Courts still some 15 years ago. In recent years, however, only a few cases have been reported at the national level of EU Member States. Is it because the distribution of new cars really ceased to be a competition problem as the European Commission declared when it removed this part of the automotive business from the specific Block Exemption Regulation for the automotive sector in 2010? The purpose of the present analysis is first to inspect the car distribution cases that emerged in the EU after the year 2000 and, second, to speculate somewhat whether new forms of distribution, brought by the digitalization of marketing and sales, cannot bring about also new risks to cartel agreements and other types of distortions of competition in car sales.

19. The relationship between intellectual property rights and competition law

This chapter considers the relationship between intellectual property rights and competition law. After a brief introduction, it deals in general terms with the application of Article 101 to licences of intellectual property rights. The chapter proceeds to discuss the provisions of Regulation 316/2014, the block exemption for technology transfer agreements. It also considers the application of Article 101 to various other agreements concerning intellectual property rights such as technology pools and settlements of litigation. This is followed by a section on the application of Article 102 to the way in which dominant undertakings exercise their intellectual property rights, including an examination of the controversial subject of refusals to license intellectual property rights which are sometimes found to be abusive. The chapter concludes with a look at the position in UK competition law.

16. Vertical agreements

This chapter examines the application of Article 101 TFEU and the Chapter I prohibition in the UK Competition Act 1998 to distribution agreements. The chapter begins with a discussion of distribution chains in the modern economy, looking at the various ways in which producers market their goods or services to consumers; these have been enormously enhanced by the emergence of the digital economy. This is followed by sections on how the law applies to producers carrying on their own distribution function (‘vertical integration’), commercial agency and vertical sub-contracting relationships. It discusses the competition policy considerations raised by distribution agreements, and explains the application of Article 101 to various different types of distribution agreements. This is followed by a section on the provisions of Regulation 330/2010, the block exemption for distribution agreements, and the individual application of Article 101(3) to distribution agreements. The chapter then contains sections on Regulation 461/2010 on motor vehicle distribution. Finally, it deals with the application of the Chapter I prohibition in the UK Competition Act 1998 to distribution agreements.

Mind the gap: the consideration of financial technologies and blockchain in the reform of the Vertical Agreements Block Exemption Regulation

This article seeks to draw attention to two areas of technological innovation relevant to the digital economy that the European Commission (‘Commission’) seems so far to have missed in its evaluation of the effectiveness of and reforms required to the Vertical Agreements Block Exemption Regulation (‘VBER’) and the associated Guidelines: fintech and blockchain technologies. In particular, this article seeks to demonstrate that vertical agreements can produce novel solutions in certain fintech markets, whilst also creating potential novel issues around exclusion, bundling and market power when used in the context of blockchain technologies. It is hoped that the results of the public consultation will bring some of these issues to the Commission's attention, because without taking these issues into consideration the Commission risks missing the opportunity to make ex ante changes to the VBER to ensure that it is ready for potential future innovations in the digital economy.

10. Horizontal Cooperation Agreements

This chapter discusses EU competition policy towards horizontal cooperation agreements. It covers joint ventures; the contents of the 2010 Guidelines; the general approach to horizontal cooperation agreements in the Guidelines; information agreements; research and development agreements, including the block emption, Regulation 1217/2010; production agreements, including the block exemption on specialisation agreements, Regulation 1218/2010 ; purchasing agreements; commercialisation agreements; standardisation agreements; and agreements in particular sectors, such as the joint buying or selling of media rights to sports events.

11. Vertical Agreements

This chapter, which discusses EU competition policy towards vertical agreements, begins by outlining the choices available to a supplier when deciding how best to market and sell its products or services to customers, and the impact that the competition rules may have on a supplier's choice, including the treatment of agency agreements. It then discusses the EU approach to vertical agreements, in the light of the Commission’s Verticals Guidelines of 2010, including exclusive dealing, single branding, franchising andselective distribution agreements, and the review of the 2010 regime. It considers the importance in EU law of parallel trade between Member States and how this has influenced policy towards vertical restraints. It analyses the application of Article 101(1) and Article 101(3) to vertical agreements, including the Verticals block exemption of 2010; sub-contracting agreements; and the possible application of Article 102 to distribution agreements.

Exclusive Distribution and Non-Compete Clause in Trade: Transnational Agreements in European Union and United States

Exclusive distribution agreements are commonly used in both European Union (EU) and United States (US) markets to ensure the efficient distribution of products and services. This article compares the competition legislation in the EU and US and focuses on the differences in the treatment of vertical agreements. This topic is addressed also from an economic perspective and focuses on the possible abuse of dominant market position by international multisectoral companies. This article focuses on the following legal and economic questions: how do competition legislations regulating vertical agreements differ in EU and US and, what kind of possible effects do transnational exclusive distribution agreements have on international trade and competition. In EU law exclusive distribution agreements, even those which include a non-compete obligation limited to five years, are considered as lawful restrictions on competition as long as they fulfil certain criteria listed in the Block Exemption Regulation. EU competition law recognizes the terms of block exemption and ‘safe haven’, whereas the US antitrust law does not regulate any exemptions to vertical restraints. Vertical restraints are interpreted in the US common law of antitrust in the light of the principle of Rule of Reason. An important difference in these jurisdictions is the definition of relevant markets, which is taken into consideration when evaluating the legality of a vertical agreement under competition law. Both jurisdictions emphasize the market power of the producer, but the allowed percentage of market share varies between EU and US and only EU legislation gives emphasis to the market power of the distributor. These differences in competition legislations regulating vertical agreements can lead to conflicts when interpreting the legality of a distribution agreement. The definition of relevant product markets might lead to big international multisectoral companies abusing their dominant position by entering into exclusive arrangements.