Learning to Expect the Predictable: The Role of Expectation in the Cognitive Control of Attention

<p>Some of the visual world is relevant to our goals and needs. Much more is not. A problem we face frequently in day-to-day living is that we are distracted by what is not relevant to our goals at the cost of attention towards what is. Emotional stimuli in particular have been shown to be very effective distractors, out-competing task-relevant stimuli for our attentional resources (Carretié, 2014; Pessoa, 2005; Pourtois et al., 2013). How often emotional distractors occur can alter our ability to ignore them and remain task focussed (Grimshaw et al., 2018; Schmidts et al., 2020). The Dual Mechanisms of Control framework (Braver et al., 2007; Braver, 2012) suggests that, because we can expect upcoming distractors when they occur frequently, we can effectively avoid distraction through proactive control; the use of effortful preparatory cognitive control strategies. That said, when distractors are frequent, we also become more experienced with them, and resolving the attentional conflict they create. The present investigation spanned two experiments assessing whether expectation of upcoming distractors would elicit proactive control while holding the experience of previous distractors constant. In Experiment 1 participants performed a simple perceptual task at fixation while neutral or negative task irrelevant images appeared peripherally on 25% of trials, either predictably in sequence (every fourth trial) or randomly. Expectation of distraction did not improve participants’ ability to avoid emotional distraction. A paradoxical expectation effect was also found wherein distraction was increased rather than decreased when distractors occurred predictably. In Experiment 2 distractors appeared either predictably (every fourth trial), on a random 25% of trials, or on a random 75% of trials. However, neutral and emotional images were now presented at fixation with the perceptual task presented above and below. Greater distractor frequency led to lower distraction and expectation of upcoming distractors again did not improve control, although a paradoxical increase in distraction was not replicated. Findings indicate that expectation of upcoming distractors alone is not sufficient to drive individuals to implement proactive control. Rather, distractor frequency is suggested to drive proactive control through implicit changes in top-down control settings based on experience. While the processes behind experience-driven proactive control are unclear, conflict adaptation and selection history are discussed as possible mechanisms of experience driven proactive control. Critically, present findings also indicate that emotional stimuli may present a unique challenge to our ability to control our attention.</p>

Learning to Expect the Predictable: The Role of Expectation in the Cognitive Control of Attention

<p>Some of the visual world is relevant to our goals and needs. Much more is not. A problem we face frequently in day-to-day living is that we are distracted by what is not relevant to our goals at the cost of attention towards what is. Emotional stimuli in particular have been shown to be very effective distractors, out-competing task-relevant stimuli for our attentional resources (Carretié, 2014; Pessoa, 2005; Pourtois et al., 2013). How often emotional distractors occur can alter our ability to ignore them and remain task focussed (Grimshaw et al., 2018; Schmidts et al., 2020). The Dual Mechanisms of Control framework (Braver et al., 2007; Braver, 2012) suggests that, because we can expect upcoming distractors when they occur frequently, we can effectively avoid distraction through proactive control; the use of effortful preparatory cognitive control strategies. That said, when distractors are frequent, we also become more experienced with them, and resolving the attentional conflict they create. The present investigation spanned two experiments assessing whether expectation of upcoming distractors would elicit proactive control while holding the experience of previous distractors constant. In Experiment 1 participants performed a simple perceptual task at fixation while neutral or negative task irrelevant images appeared peripherally on 25% of trials, either predictably in sequence (every fourth trial) or randomly. Expectation of distraction did not improve participants’ ability to avoid emotional distraction. A paradoxical expectation effect was also found wherein distraction was increased rather than decreased when distractors occurred predictably. In Experiment 2 distractors appeared either predictably (every fourth trial), on a random 25% of trials, or on a random 75% of trials. However, neutral and emotional images were now presented at fixation with the perceptual task presented above and below. Greater distractor frequency led to lower distraction and expectation of upcoming distractors again did not improve control, although a paradoxical increase in distraction was not replicated. Findings indicate that expectation of upcoming distractors alone is not sufficient to drive individuals to implement proactive control. Rather, distractor frequency is suggested to drive proactive control through implicit changes in top-down control settings based on experience. While the processes behind experience-driven proactive control are unclear, conflict adaptation and selection history are discussed as possible mechanisms of experience driven proactive control. Critically, present findings also indicate that emotional stimuli may present a unique challenge to our ability to control our attention.</p>

Perceiving the Self and Emotions with an Anxious Mind: Evidence from an Implicit Perceptual Task

Anxiety disorders cause mental distress and low wellbeing in many people worldwide. Theories of anxiety describe negative worldviews and self-views as maintaining factors of the disorders. Recent research in social cognition has found a link between depression and altered perceptual biases to emotions, but the same research on anxiety is still missing. In this study, we measured perceptual biases to emotional and self-related stimuli in sub-clinically anxious participants and healthy controls using a self-emotional shape-label matching task. Results demonstrate that anxious participants had a diminished perceptual self-bias compared with healthy controls. Furthermore, the severity of anxiety was related to an emotional bias towards valanced other-related stimuli. The findings confirm the hypothesis that anxious individuals display an altered self-prioritisation effect in comparison with healthy individuals and that anxiety severity is linked to altered responses to emotionally valanced others. These findings have potential implications for early diagnosis and treatment of anxiety disorders.

Time-based task expectancy: perceptual task indicator expectancy or expectancy of post-perceptual task components?

The temporal predictability of upcoming events plays a crucial role in the adjustment of anticipatory cognitive control in multitasking. Previous research has demonstrated that task switching performance improved if tasks were validly predictable by a pre-target interval. Hence, far, the underlying cognitive processes of time-based task expectancy in task switching have not been clearly defined. The present study investigated whether the effect of time-based expectancy is due to expectancy of post-perceptual task components or rather due to facilitation of perceptual visual processing of the coloured task indicator. Participants performed two numeric judgment tasks (parity vs. magnitude), which were each indicated by two different colours. Each task was either more or less frequently preceded by one of two intervals (500 ms or 1500 ms). Tasks were indicated either by colours that were each more frequently (or in Exp. 1 also less frequently) paired with the interval or by colours that were equally frequent for each interval. Participants only responded faster when colour and task were predictable by time (expected colour), not when the task alone was predictable (neutral colour). Hence, our results speak in favour of perceptual time-based task indicator expectancy being the underlying cognitive mechanism of time-based expectancy in the task switching paradigm.

Bimanual Grasping Adheres to Weber's Law

Weber's law states that our ability to detect changes in stimulus attributes decreases linearly with their magnitude. This principle holds true for many attributes across sensory modalities but appears to be violated in grasping. One explanation for the failure to observe Weber's law in grasping is that its effect is masked by biomechanical constraints of the hand. We tested this hypothesis using a bimanual task that eliminates biomechanical constraints. Participants either grasped differently sized boxes that were comfortably within their arm span (action task) or estimated their width (perceptual task). Within each task, there were two conditions: One where the hands’ start positions remained fixed for all object sizes (meaning the distance between the initial and final hand-positions varied with object size), and one in which the hands’ start positions adapted with object size (such that the distance between the initial and final hand-position remained constant). We observed adherence to Weber's law in bimanual estimation and grasping across both conditions. Our results conflict with a previous study that reported the absence of Weber's law in bimanual grasping. We discuss potential explanations for these divergent findings and encourage further research on whether Weber's law persists when biomechanical constraints are reduced.

Structure in motion: visual motion perception as online hierarchical inference

Identifying the structure of motion relations in the environment is critical for navigation, tracking, prediction, and pursuit. Yet, little is known about the mental and neural computations that allow the visual system to infer this structure online from a volatile stream of visual information. We propose online hierarchical Bayesian inference as a principled solution for how the brain might solve this complex perceptual task. We derive an online Expectation-Maximization algorithm that explains human percepts qualitatively and quantitatively for a diverse set of stimuli, covering classical psychophysics experiments, ambiguous motion scenes, and illusory motion displays. We thereby identify normative explanations for the origin of human motion structure perception and make testable predictions for new psychophysics experiments. The algorithm furthermore affords a neural network implementation which shares properties with motion-sensitive cortical areas and motivates a novel class of experiments to reveal the neural representations of latent structure.

Metacognitive Performance on Memory and Visuospatial Tasks in Functional Cognitive Disorder

Functional Cognitive Disorder (FCD) is a common diagnosis at the memory clinic. FCD is characterised by significant self-reported cognitive symptoms in the absence of external evidence of cognitive dysfunction. A potential explanation for this is a deficit in metacognition, the process by which we internally judge our own abilities. Here we investigated differences in accuracy, confidence, and metacognition between people with FCD (N = 20), neurodegenerative mild cognitive impairment (nMCI; N = 14), and healthy controls (N = 23). The groups were assessed on forced choice memory and perceptual tasks, with trial by trial confidence ratings. FCD and nMCI participants showed lower accuracy on the memory task (means FCD 63.65%, nMCI 63.96%, HC 71.22%), with a significant difference between the FCD and HC groups after controlling for age and sex. There were no between-group differences in memory task confidence (means FCD 3.19, nMCI 3.59, HC 3.71). The FCD group showed greater confidence when longer time was allowed on the memory task. No between group differences in perceptual task accuracy (means FCD 63.97%, nMCI 64.50%, FCD 65.86%) or confidence (means FCD 3.71, nMCI 3.43, HC 3.88) were found. No differences in metacognitive efficacy emerged between the groups, either on the memory or perceptual task (Memory Meta-d’/d’:FCD 0.63, nMCI 0.94 HC 0.85; Perceptual Meta-d’,d’: FCD 0.50, nMCI 0.51, HC 0.72). Participants showed greater metacognitive efficacy on the memory task compared to the perceptual task. The difficulties experienced by people with FCD do not appear to be due to metacognitive deficits. Their performance was similar to people with nMCI over aspects of the memory tasks, which suggests that the primary issue may lie with memory encoding or retrieval, rather than with their judgement of performance accuracy.

Confidence guides priority between forthcoming tasks

Humans can estimate confidence in their decisions, and there is increasing interest on how this feeling of confidence regulates future behavior. Here, we investigate whether confidence in a perceptual task affects prioritizing future trials of that task, independently of task performance. To do so, we experimentally dissociated confidence from performance. Participants judged whether an array of differently colored circles was closer to blue or red, and we manipulated the mean and variability of the circles’ colors across the array. We first familiarized participants with a low mean low variability condition and a high mean high variability condition, which were matched in performance despite participants being more confident in the former. Then we made participants decide in which order to complete forthcoming trials for both conditions. Crucially, prioritizing one condition was associated with being more confident in that condition compared to the other. This relationship was observed both across participants, by correlating inter-individual heterogeneity in prioritization and in confidence, and within participants, by assessing how changes in confidence with accuracy, condition and response times could predict prioritization choices. Our results suggest that confidence, above and beyond performance, guides prioritization between forthcoming tasks, strengthening the evidence for its role in regulating behavior.