Whenever a decision is made in a social, political, or economic context, it is implicitly grounded in
an ethical outlook. But where do these outlooks come from? To investigate this query, I examine
the basis for ethical decisions regarding technology, focusing specifically on geoengineering
responses to climate change. Subsequently, I argue that ethical considerations concerning climate
change, and their corresponding practical decisions, cannot be reliably made without sufficient
intelligibility regarding the objects and entities these decisions pertain to. To achieve this, I employ
a Heideggerian phenomenological framework through which being affords intelligibility. Doing so
elucidates fundamental inconsistencies in the way humans interact with technology. We are caught
up in what Heidegger calls enframing, the representation of beings as energy reserves. This is the
ground on which our ethical claims are based, but representation cannot afford actuality. When
things are represented in this way, truth is set aside in favour of will, and intelligibility is lost. The
goal, then—if we wish our ethical decisions to be legitimate—must be to gain intelligibility. We
must therefore free ourselves from enframing and look toward being. We cannot, as Heidegger
says, affect enframing’s removal, but we can prepare ourselves for such a change. Only once this
change occurs, can our relationship to technology be intelligible.