Luria, Schelling, and Freud: From Zimzum to the Oedipus Complex

In contrast to previous attempts to establish a direct relation between Freud and Kabbalah, this article argues for an indirect relationship mediated by way of Schelling’s philosophy. My claim is that Freud’s Oedipus complex partly originated in Schelling’s idea of God’s contraction, which he arguably derived from the Lurianic doctrine of zimzum. Furthermore, in thinking of the oedipal complex, and of repression more generally, as a late development of the Lurianic and Schellingian imagination of what I call “productive negativity,” I suggest that an important conceptual horizon is opened for the Freudian concept, one that transcends the widespread but narrow formulation of repression as a retroactive and regressive mental mechanism.

The Boundaries of Knowledge: The Unity of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik’s Jewish Philosophy in Light of His Doctoral Dissertation

Two philosophical positions adopted by Soloveitchik in his doctoral dissertation continued to inform his Jewish philosophical writings throughout his career. The first position, epistemological pluralism, stands behind Soloveitchik’s approach to the religious view of causality and repentance in his writings during the 1940s–1960s. It also grounds his consistent use of the dialectical method. The second position, the eternal mystery of the unknown, comes from the Marburg neo-Kantian Paul Natorp; this idea is a consistent thread throughout Soloveitchik’s writings and a foundation of his existentialist writings through the late 1970s. The conclusion suggests how these two positions might be related to one another.

Two Kabbalistic Historical Approaches: Between Safed and Byzantium

Cosmological descriptions and interpretations of the process of creation in kabbalistic literature deeply influenced various conceptual issues, especially the definition of “history.” Sefer ha-Temuna, which first appeared in Byzantium over the course of the fourteenth century, presents a unique concept of history in which the entire world operates according to a precise and predetermined model: the Sabbatical theory (Torat ha-shemitot). Its approach, however, was criticized by the Safed kabbalists in the sixteenth century. This article attempts to explain why this idea continued to influence Eastern European kabbalists in later generations, despite the harsh opposition it encountered.

Cohen über Spinoza: Das Denken der Natur und die Natur des Denkens

This analysis of Cohen’s reception of Spinoza’s thought draws attention to theoretical issues: the nature of thinking and the thinking of nature. In a synoptic way it refers to several of Cohen’s works, trying to determine continuity and discontinuity in his interpretation of Spinoza, with a specific focus on Ethica ordine geometrico demonstrata. Thus, Cohen’s reception of Spinoza’s thought seems to be characterized by a continuity similar to what we can find in Cohen’s philosophical system as a whole. Discrepancies in his interpretation of Spinoza correspond to a progressive refinement of his own speculative approach.

Can the World Be Redeemed? Geʾulah versus Pidyon: Toward a Mundane, Non-Eschatological Approach to Redemption

In this essay, I juxtapose two conceptions of redemption, as expressed by the Hebrew terms geʾulah and pidyon. I contend that today, the non-eschatological conception of redemption that animates the term pidyon is more politically salient than traditional cautions against geʾulah-inspired apocalypticism. Indeed, restoring the more mundane understanding of redemption suggested by pidyon – as release from inherited narratives and obligations – may help us break the stalemate that has descended upon Israeli politics.

Is the Human Being Redeemable? Consolation as an Integral Meaning of Rosenzweig’s Understanding of Redemption: A Blumenbergian Reflection

In this article, I test out Hans Blumenberg’s understanding of consolation as a pattern to interpret Rosenzweig’s “new thinking.” Drawing on Blumenberg’s philosophical anthropology, I explore the connection between the concept of redemption as consolation and the image of the human being that it presupposes. I further examine the function of consolation in concepts and non-conceptual images through a comparison of redemptive consolation in the respective thought of Luther and Rosenzweig.

Is the Human Being Redeemable? A Self-Defeating Question

Rosenzweig’s pathos with respect to an ultimate redemption raises the question of the desirability of a state in which so much has to be undone in order to retain nothing but the One, the All, the Eternal, and the True. Similar doubts arise concerning Rosenzweig’s portrayal of the ways that this state of redemption is anticipated in life: through prayer, love of neighbor, the communal hymn of the We. How accessible are these to “the human being” as such? Rather than arguing against what appears as a grand remnant of the urge for totality, I invoke here two figures whose concepts of redemption partly resemble Rosenzweig’s, but depart from him in ways that make all the difference: Benjamin and Kafka.

Redeeming God, Redeeming Redemption

On the Rosenzweigian view that I advocate here, redemption is neither a humanly attainable ideal, nor a regulative ideal, nor a solely critical ideal. Redemption is rather a human actualization whose full realization depends on God. In the course of explicating this claim I explore the rabbinic and kabbalistic background to Rosenzweig’s position.

Is the Human Being Redeemable? A Meditation on Rosenzweig’s Claim That Death Is Very Good

In this article I claim there is no contradiction involved in Franz Rosenzweig’s love of life and his apology for death: what he loves and wants us to love is the finite life, life offered in its finitude which should in the end appear as enough – that is, sufficient and fit for everything we could want from life, redemption included. The beyond toward which death as the end gestures is not a promise of immortality, offering a transcendence in temporal terms infinitely prolonged. The will “to stay, to live,” of which Rosenzweig speaks in the opening paragraph of The Star of Redemption, is the drive characteristic of another finitude: desiring and investing in life, without, at the same time, wishing to prolong itself into infinity.