Bank business models, negative policy rates, and prudential regulation

Using data from Italian banks over the period 2011–2017, we study how negative interest rate policy and prudential regulation impact on bank business models. We report four key findings. First, banks shifted into retail- and market-oriented business models. Second, high- and low-deposit banks reduced loans and increased security/liquid assets; only market-oriented banks expanded lending. Third, interest rate income compression induced by negative rates has been substantial for the Italian banking system as a whole, although retail banks seem to have suffered less. Fourth, non-interest incomes played a compensatory effect. The portfolio reshuffling, as we observed for wholesale and retail banks (less lending and more securities/liquid assets), is related to the goal of reducing risk exposures and, in turn, the connected capital absorption required by prudential regulation.

Welfare implications of mitigating investment uncertainty

This study explores the welfare implications of mitigating investment uncertainty in the context of Easley and O’Hara (Rev Financ Stud 22:1817–1843, 2009) While one may expect welfare gains by encouraging participation in financial markets by ambiguity-averse investors, we formally show that it hurts other investors and thus is not Pareto-improving without appropriate income transfers. We also examine the welfare effects of income redistribution among heterogeneous investors and government spending on investor education.

Deposit insurance and reinsurance

We study the consequences and optimal design of bank deposit insurance and reinsurance in a general equilibrium setting. The model involves two production sectors, financed by bonds and bank loans, respectively. Financial intermediation by banks is required in the model as we assume that one of the production sectors is risky and requires monitoring by banks. Households fund banks through deposits and equity. Deposits are explicitly insured and banks pay a premium per unit of deposits. Any remaining shortfall is implicitly guaranteed by the government. Two types of equilibria emerge: One type of equilibria supports the Pareto optimal allocation. In the other type, bank lending and the default risk are excessively large. The intuition is as follows: the combination of financial intermediation by banks, limited liability of bank shareholders, and deposit insurance makes deposits risk-free from the individual households’ perspective, although they involve risk from the societal point of view. This distorts investment choices and the resulting input allocation to production sectors. We show, however, that a judicious combination of deposit insurance and reinsurance eliminates all non-optimal equilibrium allocations. Our paper thus may provide a benchmark result for policy proposals advocating deposit insurance cum reinsurance.

On the money creation approach to banking

We study today’s two-tier money creation and destruction system: Commercial banks create bank deposits (privately created money) through loans to firms or asset purchases from the private sector. Bank deposits are destroyed when households buy bank equity or when firms repay loans. Central banks create electronic central bank money (publicly created money or reserves) through loans to commercial banks. In a simple general equilibrium setting, we show that symmetric equilibria yield the first-best level of money creation and lending when prices are flexible, regardless of monetary policy and capital regulation. When prices are rigid, we identify the circumstances in which money creation is excessive or breaks down and the ones in which an adequate combination of monetary policy and capital regulation can restore efficiency. Finally, we provide a series of extensions and generalizations of the results.