The Growth of Intelligence Contracting in the Post-Cold War Era

This chapter charts and explains the rise of intelligence outsourcing in the post-Cold War era. In the 1990s, the private sector led the information technology revolution and became an indispensable asset for the intelligence community. Meanwhile government policies downsized the government intelligence workforce and a number of experienced officials moved to the private sector. Intelligence contracting boomed in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks because the private sector offered a pool of knowledge and capabilities that managers deemed necessary at the time. The government hired thousands of contractors to intensify the national intelligence effort rapidly, and outsourcing diversified to an unprecedented level. In the atmosphere of emergency that characterized the early days of the global war on terrorism, this expansion was not planned, and a variety of contractors related to the intelligence community in ways that were not always harmonious and economically viable.

A Shared History of Successes and Excesses

This chapter provides an in-depth account of the relationship between the U.S. intelligence apparatus and its private outriders, from the earliest days of the Republic to the end of the Cold War. Covering such a large period sheds light on the deep roots, the broad evolution, and the multiple opportunities and risks accompanying intelligence outsourcing. In the United States, the legitimacy of the federal government has always been entwined with the private sector and this is related to the values underpinning American political culture. As a result, the private intelligence industry continued to thrive, deepen and diversify its involvement in national security affairs when the federal government established itself more firmly in this realm. The institutionalization of intelligence in the twentieth century was accompanied by the diversification and formalisation of the ties between the intelligence community and its contractors. Contractors and their government sponsors share the responsibility for some of the greatest achievements and controversies in U.S. intelligence history, from the success of the U2 spy plane to the excesses of Project MKUltra. The history of U.S. intelligence is characterized by successive movements of expansion and regulation through which outsourcing and accountability have become increasingly intertwined.

Introduction

Today, close to a million contractors hold a security clearance in the United States. This is a quarter of all cleared personnel, and more than the total population of the District of Columbia, where most major federal government institutions are located. Tens of thousands of contractors contribute to core intelligence functions like collection and operations, analysis and production, and even mission management....

The Future of Intelligence Outsourcing

This chapter considers the outcome of the US government’s efforts to reform the accountability regime for intelligence contractors. The chapter shows that further efforts are and will be needed to continue fill accountability gaps and adapt the national intelligence effort to the security environment. To avoid past mistakes and provide greater coherence to this effort, adaptation should focus on three essential questions: What (not) to outsource? When to outsource? How to outsource? Answers to these questions emphasize the need for more coherent policies and planning in the domain of human resources, and in particular a more stable pool of government personnel to cope with the ebb and flow of intelligence requirements.

The Accountability Regime for Contractors during the Global War on Terrorism

The post-9/11 trend toward intelligence outsourcing was accompanied by the emergence of a series of accountability problems. This chapter evaluates the accountability regime for contractors in the early 2000s and finds that this regime was imperfect but not inexistent. Six major cases of accountability failure shed light on three types of accountability problems involving contractors: inefficiencies, human rights abuses, and conflicts of interests. Intelligence contractors have not always been efficient, effective, or respected the law but they do not bear sole responsibility for the accountability problems in which they have been involved. These problems were caused by inadequate standards and deficient management on both sides of the public-private divide. While outsourcing can limit intelligence accountability, government accountability shortfalls also affect the outsourcing of intelligence. The chapter concludes that outsourcing and accountability are mutually interdependent.

Broadening Intelligence Accountability

This chapter develops a conceptual model of intelligence accountability as a relationship between accountability holders and holdees, or principals and agents. This model identifies three conditions for accountability to occur: access to information, existence of adequate standards, and authority and willingness to use them. The model posits that the existence of these conditions and the broader relationship between accountability holders and holdees are not fixed in time. When one or more of these conditions is not satisfied, accountability problems emerge and trigger responses that may or may not fill accountability gaps. This conceptual model is used to broaden the study of intelligence accountability – which has largely focused on the role of the three branches of government – and take into account the place of non-state actors in the U.S. system of intelligence accountability.

Improving Government Oversight of Intelligence Contractors

Chapter 5 examines how, from the mid-2000s onwards, the executive and legislative branches of government made substantial efforts to palliate gaps in the accountability regime for intelligence contractors. This chapter sheds a more positive light on the relationship between intelligence accountability and outsourcing, and emphasizes the progress government accountability holders made in four main areas: government access to information on contractors, acquisition management, the definition of core government functions, and balancing the public and private components of the intelligence workforce.

Conclusion

The US intelligence community’s reliance on contractors challenges accountability both in theory and in practice. When intelligence is outsourced, accountability cannot be approached through the sole prism of executive control, congressional oversight and judicial review, as is so often the case in the academic literature. To explore the evolving accountability regime for intelligence contractors, this book has proposed a new model of intelligence accountability as a process that brings together a variety of stakeholders across the three branches of government and broader society. In practice, these stakeholders’ willingness and ability to hold contractors to account differs and evolves....