Power, Diplomacy, and Diplomatic Networks

This concluding chapter discusses that most multilateral military coalitions—including those operating under the umbrella of an international organization—are purposefully constructed by states that are most interested in the deployment of a particular operation. These pivotal states thereby instrumentalize diplomatic embeddedness; they use their diplomatic networks as a resource, as a strategic capability to construct allied cooperation. Most pivotal states are politically powerful and wealthy. Yet asymmetrical power capabilities alone often cannot account for the coalition negotiation outcomes observed in this book. Relatively weak states in fact are often able to drive a hard bargain. They are aware of the pivotal states' desire for their coalition contribution and thus hold considerable power in coalition negotiations. The social-institutional theory of multilateral military coalition building developed in this book explains the theoretical underpinnings of these dynamics in detail. The chapter then considers this book's implications for how governments, international organizations, scholars, and informed citizens analyze multilateral military coalition building and make policies to deal with it.

The Puzzle of Organizing Collective Action

This introductory chapter discusses the importance of studying the process of coalition building. The puzzle of collective mobilization lies at the root of all politics. Studying the construction of multilateral military coalitions trains this puzzle on the context of international security—the one area of international cooperation that has traditionally been perceived as the most difficult to sustain a cooperative equilibrium. Moreover, the specific techniques used to build multilateral military coalitions affect how wars are fought. On the battlefield, coalition operations are supposedly more successful than non-coalition endeavors. Multilateral coalition building also affects the prospect for peace. Most peacekeeping deployments today are coalition endeavors, and research suggests that the stronger their participants, particularly in terms of personnel numbers and equipment, the more effective the missions are likely to be. Finally, coalitions unleash important socialization dynamics among participating states. They create common battle experiences and shape threat perceptions, military doctrine, and strategy for years to come. Sometimes, participation in a coalition can radically change a country's political trajectory. Thus, this book uses a social-institutional theory and evidence from over eighty multilateral military coalitions to explain coalition-building practices.

Saving Darfur

This chapter assesses how the United Nations, in cooperation with the African Union, formed one of the largest and most expensive peacekeeping operations ever deployed to stop the bloodshed in Darfur. The operation took the name United Nations–African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). The United States initiated and orchestrated the most important political aspects that made the deployment of UNAMID possible. At the United Nations, the United States was intimately involved in the drafting and negotiation of UN resolutions pertaining to the Darfur issue and prodded various UN Security Council members to support the respective resolutions. Once UNAMID was approved by the UN Security Council, the United States was deeply involved in recruiting UNAMID participants. Some countries—such as Egypt, China, Canada, and Ethiopia—had a political stake in the Darfur conflict and thus volunteered forces to deploy to Darfur. Nevertheless, the large majority of countries did not join UNAMID on their own initiative. Rather, they were wooed into the coalition by the United States. U.S. officials thereby followed specific practices to recruit these troops. Many of these practices exploited diplomatic embeddedness: U.S. officials used preexisting ties to ascertain the deployment preferences of potential recruits and constructed issue linkages and side payments. The United States was assisted in the UNAMID coalition-building process by UN staff, most notably from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO).

A Quantitative Test

This chapter presents a quantitative test of the theory that extensive diplomatic embeddedness between pivotal states and third parties is likely to increase the likelihood of coalition contributions. The results of the quantitative analysis reveal that diplomatic embeddedness matters greatly. Diplomatic embeddedness is, however, not the only factor influencing troop deployments. When it comes to U.S.-led coalitions, some proxy variables for the preference convergence theory matter equally, although, arguably less consistently than diplomatic embeddedness. The same is true for multilateral coalitions. Here, being located in the region of operation has a strong and consistently positive effect on the probability of deploying forces. In addition, democracies are more likely to join such multilateral coalitions. Moreover, simultaneous deployments increase the likelihood of coalition participation. This indicates that a particular set of countries has a special penchant to deploy military forces abroad, even simultaneously in different theaters.