Congressional oversight and electoral accountability

Legislative oversight allows Congress to investigate potential wrongdoing by executive branch actors. We present a model in which an incumbent exercises oversight and chooses to take corrective action against the executive before going up for reelection. We show that partisan types who prefer to take corrective action regardless of the probability of wrongdoing will always conduct oversight, but sincere types who only want to correct legitimate wrongdoing will exercise restraint to avoid appearing too partisan and losing reelection. The model also shows that oversight is increasing in the probability that the incumbent is partisan and the probability that the challenger is sincere. Finally, we present two case studies, the Elián González custody case and the attack on the Benghazi embassy, to illustrate our theory.

The “Default Hypothesis” Fails to Explain Jewish Influence

The role of Jewish activism in the transformative changes that have occurred in the West in recent decades continues to be controversial. Here I respond to several issues putatively related to Jewish influence, particularly the “default hypothesis” that Jewish IQ and urban residency explain Jewish influence and the role of the Jewish community in enacting the 1965 immigration law in the United States; other issues include Jewish ethnocentrism and intermarriage and whether diaspora Jews are hypocritical in their attitudes on immigration to Israel versus the United States. The post-World War II era saw the emergence of a new, substantially Jewish elite in America that exerted influence on a wide range of issues that formed a virtual consensus among Jewish activists and the organized Jewish community, including immigration, civil rights, and the secularization of American culture. Jewish activism in the pro-immigration movement involved: intellectual movements denying the importance of race in human affairs; establishing, staffing, and funding anti-restrictionist organizations; recruiting prominent non-Jews to anti-restrictionist organizations; rejecting the ethnic status quo as a goal because of fear of a relatively homogeneous white majority; leadership in Congress and the executive branch.

COVID-19 AND POLITICAL PROCESS IN ITALY IN 2021

The paper examines the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the political process in Italy in 2021. The author analyzes the change of government in February 2021 and the country’s economic recovery and resilience plan, as well as changes in the party-political landscape that occurred in the second year of the pandemic. The study showed that there is an increase in the factors of personalization of power and the strengthening of the executive branch and stagnation of the party landscape in the absence of a clear leader among political forces. The center-right and center-left coalitions are comparable in terms of citizens’ support, but at the same time the level of frustration is growing, reflecting the dissatisfaction of citizens with any of the parties. We can say that there is a certain feeling of the lack of alternative to the proposed development model and the absence of the very request for an alternative. Against this background, the ideas of sovranism so popular recently, it seems, no longer have any prospects.

PROTECTION OF PERSONAL DATA IN CONTROL PROCEEDINGS OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH

During the control proceedings, which are carried out by various control institutions in the executive branch, it is essential to preserve the personal data of the inspected individuals and legal entities. The main scope of this report is to present a significant part of the problems that arise in complex control proceedings involving several control institutions. These complex control procedures often require the transfer of information from one control institution to another control institution, which accordingly raises problems regarding the storage and protection of personal data of the inspected objects.

Formalizing Clientelism in Kenya: From Harambee to the Constituency Development Fund

Why does clientelism persist? What determines how politicians signal responsiveness to voters and exert effort towards fulfilling campaign promises? This article explores how state capacity, legislative institutional strength, and established ideas about what politicians can do structure the political market in legislative elections. The argument herein is that campaign promises must be credible to have any currency. Therefore, programmatic campaign promises are likely to be more credible in countries with strong states and legislatures, while clientelism predominates in weak states whose legislatures cannot compel the executive branch to implement legislators’ campaign promises. Historical experience also matters in shaping shared expectations of what politicians can do and the feasible sets of credible campaign promises. I support these arguments with a historical institutionalist analysis of Kenya’s Harambee Movement and the Constituency Development Fund (CDF), as well as evidence from a nationally representative survey. Findings corroborate the claim that clientelism persists when it is the most credible means of fulfilling campaign promises. This article also shows that rising costs can precipitate legislative reforms away from clientelism – as happened with the creation of Kenya’s CDF in 2003. Overall, this article increases our understanding of the origins and persistence of clientelism in low-income states and potential avenues for reform towards programmatic politics.

Methods of National Government. Methods and Means of the Executive Branch. Methodological Guidance

This article discusses the methods of national government as an element of a whole system of mechanisms, legal institutes, specific legal rules and individual orders. Particular attention is paid to the ways and means of regulating the executive branch as a method of government. In addition, an analysis is provided of the methodological guidance and its connection with the three manifestations of public administration.

Legislative Politics

This chapter discusses the general characteristics of the South Korean National Assembly frequently observed since democratization in 1987. Among other things, the chapter primarily focuses on the two major actors in the South Korean parliamentary arena, standing committees and legislative parties. It starts by describing the evolution of the National Assembly, maintaining that the South Korean legislative process has been heavily dominated by the president and the executive branch in one way or another. This observation was never truer than during the authoritarian eras, but has also been the case since the start of the Sixth Republic. With respect to the major actors, political parties in the National Assembly can be said to play a predominant role, while the standing committees have atrophied despite their nominal centrality and positional importance. All the explanations in this chapter suggest that the so-called inter-party consultative system more often than not gives way to majoritarianism in the actual legislative process when the two modes collide.

Fair and balance rate for benefits not scheduled in defined contribution plans

ABSTRACT The objective of this study is to propose a methodology that, using multiple decreases, in addition to classified by actuarial profile and source of social security costs, calculates actuarially fair and balanced rates for unscheduled collective costing benefits from Defined Contribution (DC) pension plans. There are no studies in Brazil about costing rates for benefits not scheduled in pension plans of the DC modality. Any institution that pays collective cost social security benefits must determine an actuarial rate that is not insufficient, generating a financial imbalance in the fund, nor excessive, compromising the participant’s income. This work is the first study on costing rates for collective costing benefits from pension plans with DC modalities. Actuarially fair rates are obtained considering multiple decreases and equalizing the present value of contributions and the present value of pension and disability benefits, classified by actuarial profile and source of social security cost. The specific balance rate is determined for each source of social security costs and is obtained considering the actuarially fair rates for each actuarial profile. The general balance rate is obtained by the marginal contribution of each specific balance rate. The proposed methodology was used to calculate the rates of unscheduled benefits with collective costing in DC modality plans. The proposed methodology estimated that the legal changes, resulting from Constitutional Amendment 103/2019, indirectly increased by more than 4% the general balance rate of the unscheduled benefits of the Supplementary Social Security Foundation of the Federal Public Servant of the Executive Branch of the Federal Government (FUNPRESP-Exe).

ULOGA INSTITUCIJE OMBUDSMANA U BORBI PROTIV KORUPCIJE

It has been empirically confirmed that corruption has damaging effects on the stability of political institutions and economic growth undermining democracy and the rule of law. Traditional ombudsman has been seen as one of the institutional options for fighting corruption whereas its role and significance vary in different legal systems. In the countries with strong bureaucratic mentality, where people have higher expectations form this institution, and not without reason, ombudsman has been given a leading role in the anticorruption battle. The advantages of this institution lie in its accessibility and openness, authority and trust. Citizens can easily approach ombudsman with their issues and expect that they will be resolved in a prompt and efficient way, which is not the case with judiciary. The court procedures are rather slow and often inefficient and judges and prosecutors may be affected by judicial corruption and political interference, which is the valid reason for considering the ombudsman to have larger authority than traditionally assigned. Indeed, the ombudsman institution has a broad mandate to investigate the cases of illegal and inadequate work of administration and civil servants. In majority of cases, inadequate work of administration is the result of corrupt activities. In the public administration system, various bodies and agencies are not independent, but are rather under the supervision of the executive branch of power, while ombudsman is an independent institution which makes the citizens believe that their complaints or information will be treated according to law and the principles of equity.