electoral accountability
Recently Published Documents


TOTAL DOCUMENTS

241
(FIVE YEARS 70)

H-INDEX

31
(FIVE YEARS 4)

2022 ◽  
pp. 095162982110615
Author(s):  
Austin Bussing ◽  
Michael Pomirchy

Legislative oversight allows Congress to investigate potential wrongdoing by executive branch actors. We present a model in which an incumbent exercises oversight and chooses to take corrective action against the executive before going up for reelection. We show that partisan types who prefer to take corrective action regardless of the probability of wrongdoing will always conduct oversight, but sincere types who only want to correct legitimate wrongdoing will exercise restraint to avoid appearing too partisan and losing reelection. The model also shows that oversight is increasing in the probability that the incumbent is partisan and the probability that the challenger is sincere. Finally, we present two case studies, the Elián González custody case and the attack on the Benghazi embassy, to illustrate our theory.


Author(s):  
Guy Grossman ◽  
Tara Slough

When and how do governments deliver public goods and services in response to citizen preferences? We review the current literature on government responsiveness, with a focus on public goods and service delivery in developing countries. We identify three types of actors that are commonly present in these accounts: politicians, bureaucrats, and citizens. Much of this literature examines interactions between dyads of these actors. The study of electoral accountability and constituency services emphasizes relationships between citizens (or voters) and politicians. Studies of bureaucratic incentives and political oversight of bureaucrats emphasize interactions between politicians and bureaucrats. Finally, studies of bureaucratic embeddedness and citizen oversight of bureaucrats elaborate the interactions between bureaucrats and citizens. We argue that an emerging literature that considers interactions between all three types of actors provides rich theoretical and empirical terrain for developing our understanding of responsiveness and accountability in low- and middle-income countries and beyond. Expected final online publication date for the Annual Review of Political Science, Volume 25 is May 2022. Please see http://www.annualreviews.org/page/journal/pubdates for revised estimates.


Author(s):  
ANDREW T. LITTLE ◽  
KEITH E. SCHNAKENBERG ◽  
IAN R. TURNER

Does motivated reasoning harm democratic accountability? Substantial evidence from political behavior research indicates that voters have “directional motives” beyond accuracy, which is often taken as evidence that they are ill equipped to hold politicians accountable. We develop a model of electoral accountability with voters as motivated reasoners. Directional motives have two effects: (1) divergence—voters with different preferences hold different beliefs, and (2) desensitization—the relationship between incumbent performance and voter beliefs is weakened. While motivated reasoning does harm accountability, this is generally driven by desensitized voters rather than polarized partisans with politically motivated divergent beliefs. We also analyze the relationship between government performance and vote shares, showing that while motivated reasoning always weakens this relationship, we cannot infer that accountability is also harmed. Finally, we show that our model can be mapped to standard models in which voters are fully Bayesian but have different preferences or information.


2021 ◽  
pp. 135406882110524
Author(s):  
Sergi Ferrer

Which is better for electoral accountability: a fragmented opposition that gives plenty of alternatives or an opposition with fewer stronger parties? While oppositions play a key role in democracies, the effect of opposition fragmentation on accountability remains unclear. On the one hand, fragmentation may enhance accountability by providing voters with ideologically close alternatives. On the other hand, increased fragmentation could make coordination over strong viable alternatives more difficult. In this study, I present an original survey experiment designed to test whether fragmentation of the opposition enhances accountability. Moreover, to assess the specific conditions under which fragmentation may enhance accountability, I distinguish between ideologues and pragmatic voters, and differentiate between ideological and valence issues. Results show that opposition fragmentation enhances accountability, particularly for ideologues. Lastly, I present a direct test of the mechanisms that demonstrates that fragmentation improves accountability because marginal gains in ideological proximity outweigh losses in viability.


2021 ◽  
pp. 96-123
Author(s):  
Maria C. Escobar-Lemmon ◽  
Valerie J. Hoekstra ◽  
Alice J. Kang ◽  
Miki Caul Kittilson

Chapter 5 sets out the formal and informal institutions that, collectively, comprise the selection process for the highest courts in five countries (Canada, Colombia, Ireland, South Africa, and the United States). Limiting the focus to formal rules of selection overlooks informal institutions (norms and practices) that constrain and enable the choices of selectors. Selection often rests on identifying a list of potential nominees based on informal networks, which have historically been composed of men. Across country cases, gendered networks and gendered ideas about qualifications often act as filters to hinder the appointment of women. When selectors or their key advisors decide to do so, they can disrupt reliance on these traditional networks by looking beyond the usual suspects as they draw up their shortlists. The chapter also illuminates the contexts in which electoral accountability and incentives matter. When selectors perceive electoral benefit from selecting a woman, and can be held accountable by their electorate, they are more likely to do so. In the context of pressure to select a woman, judicial nominating commissions and affirmative legal language can also increase women’s representation.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1532673X2110434
Author(s):  
Sung Eun Kim ◽  
Joonseok Yang

Gasoline prices are often a heated topic during presidential election campaigns in the United States. Yet, presidents have limited control over gasoline prices. Do voters reward or punish the president for changes in gasoline prices? Why might voters blame the president for an outcome beyond direct presidential control? This study addresses these questions by testing the effects of gasoline prices on pocketbook retrospection by voters. To capture the personal economic burden of gasoline prices, we rely on average driving times to work, given the inelastic nature of gasoline consumption for commuting. The results provide evidence for pocketbook voting: constituencies with longer average driving times to work are more likely to hold the president accountable for gasoline price increases. These findings have broader implications regarding electoral accountability and rationality in voting.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-26
Author(s):  
Rasmus Broms

Abstract Electoral accountability is widely considered to be an essential component for maintaining the quality of a polity’s institutions. Nevertheless, a growing body of research has found weak or limited support for the notion that voters punish political corruption, a central but partial aspect of institutional quality. In order to capture the full range of institutional dysfunction an electorate should be incentivised to punish, I further the concept of institutional performance voting, that is, voting on institutional quality as a whole. Using a novel data set on performance audit reports in Swedish municipalities between 2003 and 2014, I find that audit critique is associated with a statistically significant but substantively moderate electoral loss of about a percentage point for mayoral parties, while simultaneously associated with a 14 percentage point decrease in their probability of reelection.


Author(s):  
Andreas Bågenholm

This chapter reviews the rapidly expanding literature on the electoral effects of corruption. A general finding is that corrupt parties and politicians get punished by voters at elections, but oftentimes not harshly enough to remove them from office. This chapter firstly elaborates how the electoral accountability mechanism is ideally supposed to work. It then looks at the extent to which corrupt elected representatives get punished and how different types of studies seem to systematically reach different conclusions in this respect. Thereafter, the by now quite substantial body of research on the reasons why corruption voting takes place is discussed, after which the much more limited literature on the connection between electoral accountability and levels of corruption is reviewed. The chapter ends with some ideas of how to move forward within this field of research.


Author(s):  
CHRIS HANRETTY ◽  
JONATHAN MELLON ◽  
PATRICK ENGLISH

For incumbents to be accountable for their issue stances, voters must sanction incumbents whose positions are “out of step” with their own. We test the electoral accountability of British legislators for their stance on Brexit. We find that there is very limited issue accountability. Individuals who disagreed with their representative’s stance on Brexit were 3 percentage points less likely to vote for them. The aggregate consequences of these individual effects are limited. A one-standard-deviation increase in the proportion of constituents agreeing with their incumbent’s Brexit stance is associated with an increase of 0.53 percentage points in incumbent vote share. These effects are one and a half times larger when the main challenger has a different Brexit stance to the incumbent. A follow-up survey of Members of Parliament (MPs) shows that MPs’ estimates of the effects of congruence are similar in magnitude. Our findings suggest that issue accountability is conditional in nature and limited in magnitude even for an issue such as Brexit, which should be maximally amenable to such effects.


2021 ◽  
pp. 001041402110243
Author(s):  
Carolina Plescia ◽  
Sylvia Kritzinger

Combining individual-level with event-level data across 25 European countries and three sets of European Election Studies, this study examines the effect of conflict between parties in coalition government on electoral accountability and responsibility attribution. We find that conflict increases punishment for poor economic performance precisely because it helps clarify to voters parties’ actions and responsibilities while in office. The results indicate that under conditions of conflict, the punishment is equal for all coalition partners when they share responsibility for poor economic performance. When there is no conflict within a government, the effect of poor economic evaluations on vote choice is rather low, with slightly more punishment targeted to the prime minister’s party. These findings have important implications for our understanding of electoral accountability and political representation in coalition governments.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document